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ABSTRACT 
 
As New Caledonia moves towards a decision on self-determination, this thesis traces 
important moments of conflict in New Caledonia’s recent history and identifies gestures 
of recognition that might have led to reconciliation. It considers, in particular, cycles of 
pre- and post-colonial conflict in order to understand the role of customary knowledge 
and practices amongst the indigenous peoples. Throughout the history of New 
Caledonia intertribal rivalry has been a major source of conflict. Yet customary 
self-regulation practices were challenged when each new arrival—missionaries, 
colonisers and convicts—brought new sources of conflict. Disruption, rapid change and 
the threat to Kanak survival kept the cycle of conflict extant and reconciliation illusory. 
Throughout the post-annexation history of the country, statutes, decrees and laws 
written by French administrators, governors, and politicians have failed to mediate 
across cultural difference to resolve conflict and achieve reconciliation. 
Chapters One and Two examine, largely through the eyes of French Catholic Marists 
and the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, the various sources of 
intertribal conflict which existed prior to colonisation and the divisions which became 
more pronounced with the arrival of missionaries, merchants and marines. Following 
French annexation, the Melanesian population was marginalised as land was 
expropriated, military reprisals were exacted, missionary work compromised and priests 
and pastors deported. Ongoing clashes—intertribal, interdenominational and 
international—set in motion a cycle of conflict which has persisted until the present 
day.  
Chapter Three analyses the impact of World War II on New Caledonia and the end of 
the Indigénat, a period of hope when Kanak citizenship was recognised and there was 
an enhanced possibility of reconciliation. With the guidance of the churches, the Kanak 
became more politically aware, yet during this same period schisms within the 
Protestant Church caused further conflict within the Kanak community in the form of 
intertribal religious and political divisions. Chapters Four and Five survey the Kanak 
awakening of 1968 and the tendency over the following decades towards the more 
militant conflict which culminated in the violent conflict of the 1980s. The events of 
this period were followed by French-initiated mediation, in which the Churches again 
 viii 
played a prominent role, and led to the signing of the Matignon Agreements. The 
reconciliation which accompanied these developments was shallow. A recognition and 
acceptance of past events has facilitated more recent inter-island and inter-family 
reconciliation so that with the support of indigenous Church leaders, genuine pardon 
has been achieved in what may be seen as the maturing of a society.  
The study reveals that the conflictual events of the past remain painful in the indigenous 
collective memory and will need to be addressed further if the cycle of conflict is to be 
broken so that lasting reconciliation may be achieved and translated into the destin 
commun for the country’s inhabitants that is prefigured in the Noumea Accord. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ADCK Agence de développement de la culture kanak 
ADRAF Agence de développement rural et d’aménagement foncier 
AENCNH Association des étudiants de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et des 
Nouvelles-Hébrides 
AICLF Association des indigènes calédoniens et loyaltiens français 
CAFAT Caisse d’allocations familiales et des accidents du travail 
CPDI Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 
CRS Compagnies républicaines de sécurité 
DGSE Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure 
DOM-TOM Départements et d’outre-mer et territoires d’outre-mer 
ÉÉNCIL Église évangélique en Nouvelle-Calédonie et aux îles Loyauté 
EFO Établissements français d'Océanie 
EHESS École des hautes études en sciences sociales 
EPA Entente pour l’autonomie 
EPIGN Escadron parachutiste d'intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
EPKNC Église protestante de Kanaky Nouvelle-Calédonie 
FI Front indépendantiste 
FLNKS Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste 
FNSC Fédération pour une nouvelle société calédonienne 
FULK Front uni de libération kanak 
GIGN Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
 2 
IFO Institut français de l’Océanie 
INALCO Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales 
INCO International Nickel Company 
INSEE Institut de la statistique et des études économiques 
JORF Journal officiel de la République française 
LKS Libération kanak socialiste 
LMS London Missionary Society 
ORSTOM Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer 
PALIKA Parti de libération kanak 
RPCR Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République 
RPR Rassemblement pour la République 
SLN Société le Nickel 
SMEP Société des missions évangéliques de Paris 
UC Union Calédonienne  
UICALO Union des indigènes calédoniens amis de la liberté dans l’ordre 
USTKE Union syndicale des travailleurs kanaks et des exploités 
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INTRODUCTION 
Soyons unis, devenons frères, 
Plus de violence ni de guerre. 
Marchons confiants et solidaires 
Pour notre pays 
National anthem of New Caledonia  
 
The undeniable sentiments of fraternity, peace, and optimism for the future are clearly 
expressed in the new ‘national anthem’ of New Caledonia. However, these sentiments 
have not always been present during New Caledonia’s troubled history. ‘Guerres 
fréquentes’ (Brainne 1854), ‘la loi des armes […] le déclenchement du nouveau 
processus de violence qui a embrasé ces jours-ci la Nouvelle-Calédonie’ (Le Monde, 
6 May 1988a), ‘la tension en Nouvelle-Calédonie’ (Le Monde 24 April 1988b) and 
‘l’insurrection canaque’ (Le Monde 15 January 1985b) are frequent themes in the 
colonial historiography of New Caledonia. In this thesis, I propose to consider a number 
of contexts in New Caledonia’s history which saw religious, cultural, racial and 
ideological differences result in conflict, and to discuss the various attempts to mediate 
and resolve tension and to achieve reconciliation.  
The history of New Caledonia has been peppered with regular cycles of conflict. Before 
colonisation, merchants, missionaries and marines described the natives of New 
Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands as being ‘almost constantly at war’ (Douglas 1990, 
p. 22). Dr Victor De Rochas, a surgeon of the Imperial Marines, suggested that a 
passion for warfare was innate among the natives: 
Il n’est besoin de forcer personne à prendre les armes, car tout sujet en 
état de manier la lance et le casse-tête n’a garde de faillir au premier 
point d’honneur de l’homme, et de manquer l’occasion de satisfaire une 
passion innée chez tous les Calédoniens. 
(De Rochas 1862, p. 203). 
The belief that aggressive behaviour is innate and is the precursor of conflict is rejected 
by French academic and philosopher, René Girard. In Girard’s view, violent conflict is 
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the end product of rivalry resulting from an innate imitative desire and it is by religious 
and cultural intervention that warring groups become reconciled in sustainable 
communities (Girard 1972). The propensity for conflict in the Kanak population may be 
subject to differing interpretations. As Montaigne wrote in Les Essais (111, No. 324), 
‘Il y a plus affaire à interpréter les interprétations, qu’à interpréter les choses.’ Whilst 
cognisant of the differing interpretations of events I will examine in some detail in the 
various kinds of conflict that have beset the history of the peoples living in the 
archipelago we know as New Caledonia.  
In pre-colonial times conflict within the tribe was most commonly manifested in 
‘extravagant verbal aggression and bravado’ (Douglas 1998, p. 130); intertribal wars, on 
the other hand, were fought to the death in accordance with a predetermined framework 
of customary order. Post-war suzerain rights were also encoded. At times, the battle 
lines were drawn with epic precision: ‘C’est alors qu’on voit les guerriers des deux 
camps se défiant réciproquement du geste et de la parole, à la façon des héros 
d’Homère.’(De Rochas 1862, p. 205).  
Yet despite warfare and the linguistic divisiveness of some twenty-eight spoken 
languages, the tribes of New Caledonia had coexisted for centuries within the dictate of 
native custom which governed alliances, enmities, trade and marriage patterns. Custom 
by prohibition, ritual and myth was a stabilising element in Kanak society and in 
warfare. Death had an ameliorative effect: it signalled the end of the war and a return to 
peace. The eating of the slain completed the ritual and within the confines of customary 
law, reconciliation or at least temporary abatement was achieved in the alternating 
cycles of war and peace. 
During the early nineteenth century, as interest in the ‘black islands’1 of the western 
Pacific increased, the wave of new arrivals—missionaries, French colonists, convicts, 
and free settlers—introduced new sources of rivalry. This, in accordance with Girardian 
mimetic theory, escalated into conflict and the collapse of customary order. The 
sandalwood traders introduced a market economy to which the Melanesians rapidly 
adapted; however, inequitable practices between traders and tribes encouraged an 
‘acquisitive desire’ among those tribes who perceived themselves as disadvantaged, and 
                                                
1 The French explorer Dumont D’Urville divided the Islands of the Pacific into three groups: Polynésie—
many islands, Micronésie—tiny islands and Mélanésie—black islands (Stanley 2013, p. 104).  
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this inevitably degenerated into hostility and violent conflict. Western commercial law 
had no equivalent in native custom where acquisition by stealth and warfare was the 
modus operandi. As tribes set out on the path to wealth, trading ships were sacked and 
entire crews were massacred. It was judged that these vessels were responsible for 
upsetting tribal order, and for balance to be restored a ‘scapegoat’, the crew, had to be 
sacrificed. Retaliating traders, on the other hand, faced the Western judicial system and 
the law courts of Sydney. During these early encounters, cultural differences remained 
unexplored and, in the absence of dialogue, conflict resolution was ineffective; indeed, 
it often led to further conflict. 
In the pre-colonial clash of civilisations, the arrival of Polynesian catechists of the 
London Missionary Society (LMS) presented a possible source of dialogue and 
mediation between the warring tribes; instead, however, intertribal rivalry and conflict 
intensified. The catechist, as a stranger to the island, could only be received as a 
privileged guest, enehmu2, by one tribe. This tribe, in consequence, gained prestige and 
security, and neighbouring tribes became envious (désir mimétique).3 In an attempt to 
secure similar power and wealth, the tribes which believed themselves to be 
disadvantaged called upon Marist priests for support. Catholic–Protestant antagonism 
resulted in further confrontation and the tribes were swept into an ever-increasing 
conflictual vortex. 
French annexation in 1853 added dramatically to the vertiginous cycle of conflict. 
Initially the country was administered by the French military of the Établissements 
français de l’Océanie (EFO) which sought to civilise the native population by 
exterminating violent conflict. In the Western view of mediation, conflict was 
considered to equate to barbarity, and dialogue to civilisation. It was a colonial paradox 
to find that the Administration, when grossly outnumbered, resorted to violent 
repression and superior armoury to quell fighting. With no real negotiating power, the 
Kanak became marginalised socially, economically and geographically, and their voices 
remained unheard. A major and continuing cause of violence was the colonial ‘land 
grab’ which transferred all tribal land to the property portfolio of the French Empire. 
                                                
2 Custom on Lifou dictated that strangers were welcomed by the chief as special friend or privileged 
guest—enehmu—, who was protected and supplied with food and lodging in what was considered to be ‘a 
kind of freemasonry among the natives’ (Macfarlane 1873, p. 27). 
3 According to Girard (1972) all culture originates from désir mimétique, which can become rivalry and 
escalate into violence. 
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The impact of invasion, forced displacement, and the destruction of property denigrated 
and demoralised the Kanak to such an extent that retaliatory action was taken and 
conflict escalated into warfare. In 1878 and again in 1917 major revolts brought into 
play native alliances and enmities which transcended tribal linguistic division. This 
could be seen as an instance of compact as outlined in Rousseau’s Social Contract: 
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and 
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each 
associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still 
obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. 
(Rousseau 1973, pp. 190-191). 
This illustrates the very essence of all beings and the instinct of survival which 
overrides all other instincts. In conflict with the French military, the Kanak were at a 
technological disadvantage, and the French, acting within the accepted order of 
European colonial law, brutally suppressed any uprising. The devastating native death 
toll went uncontested; there was no reconciliation and the Kanak were pushed further 
into the inhospitable land of the Chaîne centrale.4 In the early years of colonisation 
there was little room for dialogue or mediation. 
 On the Loyalty Islands, historical tribal enmity escalated into wars of religion when 
rival tribes embraced opposing Christian denominations of Catholicism and 
Protestantism. In the currency of the day, Catholicism equated to French and 
Protestantism to English, and these Imperial arch-rivals had become bitter adversaries in 
the carving up of the Pacific. Interdenominational tension exacerbated intertribal 
fighting and led to a ‘paper war’ which drew into the fray the Governments of Britain 
and France. A souring of the relationship between Church and State in France was 
reflected in the anticlerical attitude of several of the Governors appointed to New 
Caledonia. This added to the difficulties of the Church and hindered mission work. As 
antagonism between Church and Government increased, native zealots were exiled, 
priests and pastors were dismissed, commandants were decommissioned, and governors 
were returned to France. Conflict led to drastic measures being taken in which 
reconciliation was not an option. 
                                                
4 La Chaîne centrale (or Grande Chaîne) is the central mountain chain which divides the mainland of 
New Caledonia longitudinally. 
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The first colonial Governor, Charles Guillain, arriving as a ‘liberator’ to civilise, 
produce and rehabilitate (Matsuda 2005, p. 118), had visions of a socialist utopia, 
particularly for the convicts sent to the new penal colony. He saw reconciliation as a 
process of assimilation, and to prevent further Melanesian disadvantage he delineated 
reservations which were unalienable and non-commutable. An Office of Native Affairs 
was established, and in the pursuit of his Saint Simonian ideals, a phalanstery was 
constructed on 300 hectares at Yaté in the expectation that all would live together in 
communal and self-sufficient harmony. The success of the project was short-lived: ‘Une 
année ou deux après, ils durent se séparer pleins de défiance, d’aigreur, de haine les uns 
contre les autres’. (Garnier 1871, pp. 78-79).  
As the colony expanded, the acquisition of land for the new arrivals—felons, 
recidivists, political prisoners, free settlers and imported workers from Vietnam, Japan, 
the New Hebrides, Indonesia and Reunion Island—was hotly contested. Huge tracts of 
Kanak ancestral land were expropriated, Kanak discontent increased, and violent 
conflict erupted. Worse was to befall the Kanak in 1887 when Governor Nouet 
introduced the repressive Native regime, the Indigénat. In an age marked by violence, 
injustice and humiliation, this regime of isolation and oppression was contrary to the 
generally accepted international code of behaviour, and to the fundamental document of 
the French Revolution, the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789. 
The Kanak were incarcerated, forced to work and obliged to pay a ‘head tax’. Support 
provided by priests and pastors was limited as the Churches contended with a 
succession of anti-clerical Governors. Alienated in their own land, the Kanak had no 
legal or political redress; they were non-citizens locked in colonial alterity and this 
remained the case until World War II.  
After the French had capitulated in 1940, pro-Vichyist and Free French battled it out in 
New Caledonia under the watchful eye of the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments. Subsequently, with war raging in the Pacific, the geographic advantage 
and mineral wealth of New Caledonia were seized upon by the Government of the 
United States of America and hundreds of thousands of allied troops set up camp in the 
country. For the Kanak, it was a decisive moment. The possibility of escaping the 
treadmill of political repression was foreshadowed in 1944 when General de Gaulle put 
forward a number of initiatives which hinted at decolonisation and economic reform for 
French colonial subjects in the colonies. At the same time, complete independence was 
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categorically rejected. In the aftermath of World War II, the Indigénat was abolished 
and Kanak tribes, liberated after almost a century of incarceration, presented a fertile 
breeding ground for the newly emerging Communist Party. 
This led to other forms of struggle. The Churches, faced with the threat of Communism, 
were quick to respond by establishing associations aimed at providing the Kanak with a 
Christian based means of presiding over native affairs. Within a short period of time 
these associations regrouped to form a Party with real political teeth, the Union 
Calédonienne (UC) which, under the motto, ‘deux couleurs, un seul peuple’, saw 
Europeans and Kanak join in the struggle against the crushing excesses of the ruling 
oligarchy. Just as warring tribes had united to fight against colonial oppression in the 
previous century, in the mid-twentieth century Melanesian and European differences 
were forgotten, when a united front was presented to battle for social reform and 
change. These changes were hotly contested by the ruling plutocracy, which sought to 
retain the status quo, and violence again erupted. 
As the Kanak political voice became more powerful, intertribal and interdenominational 
differences were overshadowed in the fight for social, administrative and land reform. 
In 1956 the French Government responded to political pressure by providing the 
Territory with greater autonomy by way of the loi-cadre of the French socialist 
politician, Gaston Defferre. Certain powers were transferred from Paris, but this step 
towards reconciliation between the French State and New Caledonia was temporary. In 
1958 de Gaulle was swept back into power and in a referendum on the new constitution 
New Caledonians voted overwhelmingly in favour of their continuing association with 
France. In coexistence, coloniser and colonised proceeded along increasingly divergent 
tracks and little attempt was made to bridge the ever-broadening gap. 
By the late 1960s several Kanak students who had become embroiled in the student–
worker riots in France returned to New Caledonia imbued with political fervour. This 
Kanak awakening was not universally welcomed. With newfound freedom, the 
educated Kanak elite established new political parties: the Foulards Rouges and the 
Groupe 1878 and began to press for greater autonomy. Protests were held in Noumea 
which appeared to mirror those of the French soixante-huitards but beyond the wall of 
slogans was a fundamental difference between the demands of the Kanak and the 
students in France. The New Caledonian students’ fight was for the recognition of 
native custom and of the ideals of the previous generation; in France, the rebellion was 
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against parental mores. Europeans who had ruled supreme in New Caledonia for one 
hundred years suddenly found their position of privilege under threat and they were not 
prepared to negotiate. Conflict became violent as Caldoches5 took to the streets to 
disrupt passive Kanak demonstrations. 
New Caledonia had become a cauldron of intractable conflicts as the traumas of the past 
dictated the attitudes of the present. Mass immigration during the years of the nickel 
boom in the late 1960’s saw the Kanak outnumbered; their power was reduced and they 
were trapped in a vicious cycle from which there seemed no exit. The push for greater 
autonomy changed to a call for independence. Conflict escalated between the pro and 
anti-independence sectors, the latter pushing for total autonomy with French patronage. 
In response to increasing tension Parliamentary Ministers in France introduced a series 
of statutes—la valse des statuts—which provided and then withdrew the degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by the Territory according to the political persuasion of the 
Government. In 1983, Georges Lemoine, the Minister for the DOM-TOM,6 in a bid to 
break down the barriers and proceed towards reconciliation, brought together at 
Nainville-les-Roches those from the opposed camps in New Caledonia and French 
officials. Although consensus was not reached, the great achievement was in bringing 
the warring parties together for face-to-face discussions. In the words of Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou, ‘Ce discours est une étape de progrès, et je dois saluer le courage de M. 
Lemoine pour affronter cette étape. Mais le chemin est encore long.’ (Le Monde 
5 December 1983). Generally, the statutes were embedded in a Western conceptual 
framework which gave no consideration to cultural difference and in consequence 
failed. Despite the good intentions of the French Government, reconciliation remained a 
chimera. 
Violence between the pro- and anti-independence camps reached a climax in the 1980s 
when a period tantamount to civil war, les événements, culminated in 1988 in Ouvéa 
when four gendarmes, nineteen Kanak and two soldiers lost their lives. In the wake of 
this massacre, the Socialist Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, sought to establish dialogue 
and reconciliation between the warring parties by bringing together an œcumenical 
                                                
5 The word Caldoche was originally a pejorative term which described New Caledonians of European 
origin. In current parlance, it designates descendants of colons, long term French residents, and mixed 
race New Caledonians who have become assimilated and identified with the European culture of the 
island. 
6 Départements d’Outre-Mer et Territoires d’Outre-Mer—French overseas departments and territories.  
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group of six eminent French clergymen and public servants, les Médiateurs du 
Pacifique.7 A peace treaty, the Accords de Matignon-Oudinot (Matignon Agreements), 
brought about an uneasy peace and delayed the decision on independence for ten years. 
Touted as a process of reconciliation, the Agreements fell short of this expectation. 
Time had not been allowed for mourning or for the discussion required to reach a 
general consensus. The people of Ouvéa believed that they had been abandoned by the 
Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS) chiefs during the assault and 
by the French after the assault: ‘Bien des parents des morts d’Ouvéa pensent qu’ils ont 
été sacrifiés […] par les deux camps.’ (Le Monde, 7 May 1989). The people of Ouvéa 
were given no opportunity to participate in the decision-making, and further conflict 
could only result. 
The cycle of violence was not extinguished. One year later, at the end of the customary 
period of mourning, the independence leaders Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwéné 
Yeiwéné were assassinated by a radical independent, Djubelli Wéa. After a decade of 
mourning, the Churches, which had provided the advance guard for colonisation and 
continue to play an important role in New Caledonia, united to mediate with the 
estranged Tjibaou, Wéa and Yeiwéné families. The importance of the Church in 
Melanesian society is described by Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, ex Vice-President of the 
FLNKS: ‘Quand il y a entre nous, du FLNKS, des divergences de vues, ou des 
problèmes personnels nous nous tournons volontiers vers l’Église’. (Le Monde 
3 September 1989). The documentary film, Le Pardon, which was made by Gilles 
Dagneau in 2004, traces the long and difficult process which, under the guidance of 
Catholic and Protestant religious leaders, led to the reconciliation and pardon of the 
Tjibaou, Yeiwéné and Wéa families.  
In this multiethnic society, the roots of the present remain deeply embedded in the past 
and memories of colonial injustice continue to divide. It has been difficult for those who 
have suffered directly and those who have inflicted the suffering to accept that which 
remains an imperfect reality. The anguish of Ouvéa resurfaced again in 2011 with the 
filming and screening of Mathieu Kassovitz’s film L’Ordre et La Morale. This film 
recounts the recollections of Philippe Legorjus, head of the Groupe d’intervention de la 
                                                
7 Les Médiateurs du Pacifique is the name of a documentary film produced in 1997 by Charles Belmont. 
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Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), concerning the massacre on Ouvéa during the final 
stages of the French Presidential election in 1988.  
After the Ouvéa bloodbath, tension remained high; innocent Kanak were incarcerated in 
France, the army was found to have committed summary executions and to have failed 
in its duty of care for the wounded. Twenty-three years after these events, the suffering 
on Ouvéa was still so intense that Kassovitz found it impossible to obtain total 
consensus to film there. In this divided society, it is only with reference to the problems 
of the past, and dialogue between the different ethnic groups, that the present can be 
understood and the future shaped. As Chomsky (2011, p. 268) claims, to approach 
reconciliation with ‘historical amnesia’ is to compromise moral and intellectual 
integrity and set the scene for further violence. 
In what follows, I propose to analyse certain of these key events of the past which have 
led to a continuing cycle of conflict, and what appear to be irreconcilable differences, 
but also to consider the potential for reconciliation that has emerged at various critical 
moments in New Caledonian history.  
Chapter One examines the pre-colonial period from 1840 until 1853, the sources of 
intertribal conflict which existed prior to colonisation, and divisions which became 
more contentious with the arrival of missionaries, merchants and marines. Throughout 
the history of New Caledonia intertribal rivalry has been a major source of conflict. 
Chapter Two draws attention to the problems of the ever-increasing marginalisation of 
the Melanesian population following French annexation. Unwitting Administrators and 
Governors, absorbed in the task of colony-building, considered the original inhabitants, 
estimated to be around 60,000, to be little more than nuisance value. They were treated 
as a sub-species, dehumanised and stripped bare of ancient tribal land and custom. An 
insurmountable barrier was built between colonised and coloniser and in the sanguinary 
clash of cultures in 1878, 1400 lives were lost—1200 of whom were Kanak. During the 
period of colonial rule examined in this chapter, 1853-1902, Governors were 
omnipotent, Melanesian land was expropriated, violent military reprisals established 
compliance, missionary work was compromised and missionaries were deported. 
Conflict inevitably resulted. 
Chapter Three analyses the impact of World War II on New Caledonia, its aftermath 
and the end of the Indigénat. It was a period of hope when Kanak citizenship was 
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recognised and there was a real possibility for reconciliation. With the guidance of the 
churches, the Kanak became more politically aware and as the aspirations of the Kanak 
and the white plutocracy proceeded on a collision course, an independence movement 
was born. During this period the Protestant Church, which for 100 years had supported 
the Kanak, bowed to the pressure of internal disagreement and split into two separate 
entities. This caused a scission within the Kanak community. Particular attention will be 
paid to the divergent routes, religious and political, taken by the Napoemien tribe of 
Poindimié and the Embouchure tribe of Ponérihouen.  
Chapter Four investigates the Kanak awakening of 1968, the increased militancy of the 
loyalists and the piecemeal attempt of various statutes to bridge the gap and overcome 
mounting conflict. The Hienghène massacre and the controversial non lieu judgement 
on the self-confessed assassins is also examined. As a result of this ruling, the strategy 
of the FLNKS changed from peaceful protest to more militant conflict and the fight for 
independence continued with greater determination and violence. This period of 
growing polarisation offered scant opportunity for reconciliation. 
Chapter Five evaluates the violent conflict of the 1980s, les événements—the disastrous 
Ouvéa Massacre—and the post-trauma period when the new Socialist Prime Minister, 
Michel Rocard, brought together a carefully selected group of mediators to initiate 
dialogue between the antagonists on the way to reconciliation. The Churches played a 
prominent role in this process which led to the historic signing of the Matignon 
Agreements. The success, or otherwise, of this process of reconciliation is examined as 
well as the ‘drama of ambiguity' which resulted in the deaths of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and 
Yeiwéné Yeiwéné. This study includes an examination of the subsequent 
Church-instigated intra-island and Ouvéa–gendarme reconciliations and the heartfelt 
difficulty of achieving a pardon between the Tjibaou, Yeiwéné and Wéa families.  
The apocalyptic proportion of the disaster of 150 years of conflict and the piecemeal 
approach to reconciliation in New Caledonia remains an unfinished history. Throughout 
the post-annexation history of the country, statutes, decrees and laws written by French 
administrators, governors, and politicians have failed to mediate across cultural 
difference to resolve conflict and achieve reconciliation. Socio-political attempts to 
bridge the gap have been skewed toward Western values, they have ignored historical 
and political factors, and have been unable to ease the painful legacy of long and bitter 
conflict. As Maclellan (2005, p. 2) indicated: ‘There is a limit to legislative justice. You 
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cannot legislate away racial discrimination.’ Short-term solutions cannot alleviate the 
painful memory of deep-seated conflict. Authorities cannot impose trust and empathy 
by decree but they can encourage steps towards reconciliation by mutual encounter and 
exchange. (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse 2003, p. 26).  
In 1998, pro- and anti-independence forces, together with the French Government under 
the direction of Lionel Jospin, negotiated the Noumea Accord, which acknowledged 
past injustice and set forth a process of decolonisation to culminate in a referendum by 
2018. This Accord also called for ongoing social dialogue, a process by which the 
mosaic of ethnic groups living in New Caledonia could move from a divided past to a 
shared future, a destin commun.  
I will not consider in any detail the intricacies of the Noumea Accord and the 
subsequent political developments in New Caledonia. Suffice it to say that the future of 
New Caledonia lies in the balance and that reconciliation of the diverse communities to 
achieve the projected destin commun is a long-term project which will require past 
truths to be confronted, different cultural ways of conflict resolution to be considered, 
and time allowed for la parole to ameliorate the bitter memories of colonialism and the 
legacy of violent conflict and injustice. 
I hope that my thesis will offer an opportunity to consider important moments of 
conflict and possible reconciliation, including the failure of various kinds of 
recognition. This history needs to be taken into account if the vision articulated in the 
Preamble of the Noumea Accord is to have a chance of being realised: 
Le passé a été le temps de la colonisation, 
Le présent est le temps du partage, par le rééquilibrage, 
L’avenir doit être le temps de l’identité, dans un destin commun.8 
                                                
8 Article 4 of the Preamble to the Noumea Accord. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Missionaries, Sandalwooders and Intertribal Warfare on the 
Loyalty Islands and Grande Terre: 1840-1853 
Pre-contact hierarchies and intertribal conflict 
Warfare among the indigenous population was a common theme in the writings of 
mariners and missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century (Crocombe 1968, pp. 86-93; 
De Rochas 1862, pp. 201-214; Douglas 1998, pp. 123-159) and the rules were well 
established. According to Tardy Montravel, there were two types of enemy tribes, those 
classified as enemies by birth (Wofof) and those who became enemies by accident 
(Oote) (Person 1953, p. 30; Reuillard 1992, p. 482).9 The missionary-anthropologist 
Maurice Leenhardt provided a listing of the Wofof tribes which included Touho, 
Hienghène, Balade, Arama and Belep, as well as the Oote tribes of Tendo, Tiendanite, 
Poyes, Wanas, Koné and Voh (Person 1953, p. 39). Wars between these tribes were 
fought to the death, with the number slain in battle limited by the number of bodies that 
could be removed from the battlefield by the victors. It was only after the bodies were 
removed that victory could be claimed.10  
Wars reflected deep-rooted rivalry and vengeances which were likely to resurface at the 
least provocation (Montrouzier 1870, p. 30). Powerful chiefs, the political players of the 
day, were able to acquire additional land and prestige, by the skilful manoeuvring of 
their warriors.11 According to oral history battles were both intra and inter island. At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, warriors from Lifou defeated the Kunie people on 
the Isle of Pines where they ‘gained control of the disunited local tribes and soon 
organised a single authority structure on the island (Crocombe 1968, p. 27; Pisier 1969, 
                                                
9 Although there is general agreement on the existence of this classification, the orthography differs: 
Montrouzier (1870, p. 30) refers to the Ot and Wawap tribes and Guiart (1994, p. 112) to the Ohot and 
Hwaap. 
10 Guiart (1997, p. 86) claims that ‘the rules governing traditional war are that some men may be killed, 
but there may be no attempt to exterminate the enemy, with whom one will eventually negotiate, because 
of inter-marriage between the adversaries’. 
11 A chiefdom’s prosperity was proportional to its demographic success and to the number of bodies that 
were welcomed into the chiefdom […] or were destroyed by enemies (Bensa 1997, p. 84). 
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p. 74; Shineberg 1967, p. 32). After several generations of prosperity, the Kunie chief 
was killed in battle by the people of Tuauru on the south-eastern part of the mainland. 
His son, Ti-Tourou Vendegou,12 who had acceded to the rank of High Chief, set about 
exacting vengeance. Victory in battle provided Vendegou, the only chief on the Isle of 
Pines, with aristocratic status and chiefly authority (Pisier 1996, p. 76); his chiefdom 
extended to Noumea, Yate, Garji, Tuauru and Kanala. Vendegou’s chiefly power and 
stature, however, were not fully appreciated by white traders and missionaries and this 
led to angst and conflict.  
On Ouvéa, chiefdoms had been established by sea-faring chiefs from the Mainland, 
Lifou and Wallis Island. Bazit, from Lifou, was the High Chief of Weneki, and his 
major rival Weneguei, High Chief of Fayaoué (cited in Dauphiné 1996, p. 7) was from 
the east coast of the mainland. Intertribal marriage and alliances with the Polynesian 
seafaring tribes of Nekelo, Beka and Doumai from Wallis Island (Uvea) had added to 
chiefly power.13 In a polygamous society,14 chiefs were frequently related by marriage; 
Weneguei was the brother-in-law of both Bazit and Nekelo (Dauphiné 1996, p. 8). 
Powerful links were also forged by marriage between mainland and Loyalty Island 
tribes. Grande Terre chiefs favoured wives from Ouvéa:  
The chiefs of New Caledonia are said to have a strong desire for wives 
from this island, and it is customary when a party from Uvea goes over 
to build a large canoe [they have no timber of their own for the purpose], 
that the right to fell such as they may require is purchased by the 
surrender of a daughter of the principal personage.  
(Erskine 1853, p. 347). 
Such alliances, however, did not prevent conflict and in 1856, Nekelo was killed by the 
people of Fayaoué.15  
                                                
12 According to Cook, ‘Tea seems a title prefixed to the names of all, or most, of their chiefs or great 
men’. His indigenous friend honoured Cook by calling him ‘Tea Cook’ (Williams 1997, p. 262). 
13 Descendants of Wallisian emigrants are most numerous in Ouvéa (De Rochas 1862, p. 124) where 
Polynesian-Melanesian cultural difference has invoked conflict. According to Daniel Nekelo, grand chef 
de Takedji [Ouvéa]: ‘À la chefferie, on parle faga’uvea. Avant on avait du mal à se comprendre avec les 
Iaai. Maintenant, les jeunes peuvent apprendre les deux langues à l’école et cela favorise les échanges 
entre nous’ (Mwà Véé 2009b, p. 36). 
14 Ti-Tourou, High Chief of the Isle of Pines, claimed to have fifty wives but according to Captain 
Cheyne, he had only 30! (Pisier 1969, p. 77). 
15 Intermarriage between the Ohot and the Hwaap did provide a ‘chain of solidarity’ during the Pouebo 
uprising in 1867 (Guiart 1994, p. 112). 
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Despite language differences, Iaai and Faga-Uvea on Ouvéa, Drehu on Lifou, Nengone 
on Maré and some twenty-five spoken languages on Grande Terre, there was 
considerable inter-island movement. Dauphiné (1986, p. 9) writes of a ‘veritable 
diaspora’ from southern Ouvéa to the east coast of the mainland.16 De Rochas, a naval 
surgeon, describes invasions by the bravest and most enterprising warriors who, in 
victory, became village chiefs of the defeated tribe. He notes that submission by the 
vanquished was not always complete; often the defeated tribe retained its own chief and 
its own distinct nationality, language and customs (De Rochas 1862, p. 241). Intricate 
intertribal networks were formed but it would appear that the desire for power kept the 
tribes of New Caledonia, and the Loyalty Islands deeply divided. 
Before colonisation, a hierarchy of warfare was well established within the indigenous 
communities of Grande Terre and the Loyalty Islands. Most commonly, conflict was 
intra or inter-village in retaliation for insult or injury.17 Intertribal raids were by stealth 
and ambush, which was less costly in terms of human life than open confrontation. 
Although war was constant, casualties were few. According to the Reverend Samuel 
Macfarlane, ‘they are not sufficiently advanced in civilisation to understand the art of 
killing by thousands’ (Macfarlane 1873, p. 7). High Chiefs were protected and were 
never in the front line of battle; they remained prudently behind and an appointed war 
chief would lead the warriors. To lose a chief in combat would result in the loss of 
honour for the tribe (De Rochas 1862, p. 207).  
It is the chief that they are really after. But if their own chief is killed, 
their enjoyment comes to an end for it signifies the defeat of that party 
[…]. The defeated become as serfs. They cannot create another chief for 
themselves, but they will not be attacked again for they have become 
mere slaves. They will be called by a shameful name; they will be 
spoken of as slaves, or as pigs sewn through the nose with sennit.  
(Crocombe 1968, p. 86).  
                                                
16 According to De Rochas (1862, p. 115), ‘Les communications entre les îles Loyauté et la côte orientale 
de Calédonie, surtout avec la tribu de Hienghène sont fréquentes ; les indigènes d’Ouvéa ont même formé 
des villages en plusieurs localités de ce même littoral.’ 
17 De Rochas’s essentialist perspective on the question of violence is clear: ‘Une des passions les plus 
vives et les plus tenaces dans l’âme du Calédonien, c’est celle de la vengeance. Le temps est impuissant à 
effacer la mémoire du dommage ou de l’injure qu’il a reçue, il en gardera au fond du cœur l’inexorable 
souci, et toute sa vie il guettera l’occasion de se payer du sang de l’agresseur. Ce même esprit de 
vengeance passe des individus à la société, et c’est lui qui entretient la perpétuité des guerres.’ (De 
Rochas 1862, p. 158). 
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In a final display of victory, the dwellings of the defeated would be burnt and their 
crops destroyed, to promote post war famine or suite de la guerre (De Rochas 1862, 
p. 242). Among the cannibal tribes, war also provided a supply of human flesh. 
According to Ta’unga, the slain were gathered by the women, chopped up and cooked 
in earth ovens, and ‘great was their delight because they were eating well that day’ 
(Crocombe 1968, p. 92).18 Garnier (1991, p. 148) also describes in detail the feast of 
human flesh which followed a battle between the people of Ponérihouen and the 
neighbouring tribe of Houindo. 
Chiefs in New Caledonia were all-powerful; they were protected in warfare and 
respected. Captain James Cook, when he discovered the country which he named New 
Caledonia, found chiefly order well established. When the chief spoke there was 
silence, broken only by murmurs of approbation of the elderly (Williams 1997, p. 251; 
Person 1953, p. 10). The supposedly despotic chief, Bourate of Hienghène, was 
described by De Rochas as ‘vile’—‘l’ogre des Annales de la Propagation de la Foi’ who 
frequently killed his subjects—yet despite this, he was revered by his people, who 
would chant to him, ‘Grand chef, Bourate ! Beau seigneur, Bourate !’ (De Rochas 1862, 
p. 246). Women, on the other hand, were believed to play a subservient role; they stood 
behind the crowd and were ignored. The Reverend Nihill, during his sojourn on Maré, 
described female behaviour in terms of custom rather than subservience:  
[…] young ladies who slink about in the most approved fashion, for it 
would be considered very improper for a woman to pass a chief without 
stooping and cowering with her shoulders. It seems to be a matter of 
form rather than anything else, for they do not seem obliged to work very 
hard, nor do they appear to be on unequal terms with the men in other 
respects.  
(Nihill 1852, p. 39). 
Rivalries were nurtured for generations and war erupted at the least provocation. When 
Western seafarers and missionaries arrived, these deep-seated differences led to the 
forging of opposing religious and political alliances which changed the tribal 
equilibrium and reignited intertribal conflict. 
                                                
18 Ta’unga was a Polynesian catechist from Rarotonga who worked at the Tuauru mission 1842-1845. 
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The arrival of the LMS on the Isle of Pines (Kunie): Disease, death and 
revenge 
Until the arrival of the missionaries of the London Missionary Society (LMS) in New 
Caledonia, these ‘black islands’ of the Western Pacific remained largely ignored. In 
1840 the LMS, having successfully evangelised the eastern Pacific, sent the mission 
ship Camden to New Caledonia with a party of Samoan natas.19 The expedition had 
been made at the request of the Rev. John Williams who had lost his life the previous 
year on Eromanga. When the ship arrived at the current site of Noumea, the natas took 
fright and refused to disembark, for fear of being eaten by the cannibals (Crocombe 
1968, pp. 86-95; Montrouzier 1870, p. 30).20 
Subsequently the Camden was welcomed at the Isle of Pines by Touru, the chief, and 
two Samoan evangelists, Noa and Taniela, were left on the island. As the only chief in 
New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands with access to the ‘white God’ Touru’s chiefly 
power was greatly augmented, but his satisfaction was short-lived. Not content with the 
natas Touru demanded a white missionary, but none was available when the Camden 
returned to the island the following year. To add fuel to the fire, the missionaries 
intended to leave two natas with the people of Touaourou on the southeast coast of the 
Mainland (Grande Terre) Touru had defeated these people in battle, they were his 
slaves and to provide them with access to the White God would undermine his chiefly 
authority and lead to conflict. 
Sandalwood merchants and conflict 
On the second voyage of the Camden to the Isle of Pines, a sailor, Edward Foxall, 
noticed sandalwood growing on the island. The enterprising sailor sold the information 
to ‘tea-iron-sandalwood’21 merchants in Sydney, and in secrecy, Messrs Dacre, Jones 
                                                
19 The aim of the LMS was to evangelise ‘Oceanians by Oceanians.’ They established training centres in 
Samoa and Rarotonga to train the most adept and ardent indigenous students to take ‘the Word’ to the 
heathen of Melanesia. In these ‘savage islands’ of the Western Pacific, the natas who were indigenous 
catechists were expected to look after themselves, adapt to a foreign country, learn the local language, 
teach the rudiments of Christianity and prepare the way for white missionaries. 
20 Also The Hobart Town Mercury 4 February 1857, p. 3. 
21 This circuit provided the Australians with the tea they so desired, the Melanesians with iron, which was 
a source of amazement for people who only knew the strength of sharpened stone, and the Chinese, who 
use the fragrant wood as incense for worship and other ceremonies. 
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and Elgar dispatched two vessels to the island. The first of the sandalwood merchants to 
arrive was Captain Cheyne, and with gifts of hoop-iron he established friendly relations 
with Touru, who promised to make his natives cut and load wood onto the trader’s 
boats. For this he was richly rewarded, according to Cheyne:  
There is seldom a day passes but what he gets some presents from us, as 
we find it in our interest to do so for he has great power over the natives, 
and makes them keep bringing the sandalwood. I generally give him an 
axe and some Iron Hoop for every boat load of wood that goes off to the 
ship, as tribute: which makes him anxious to get as many sent off in a 
day as he can.  
(Cited in Shineberg 1967, p. 36). 
The sandalwood merchants soon realised that they were very much in the hands of the 
chief and that there was no possibility of demonstrating white superiority. Touru was in 
full control and he rapidly accumulated wealth. The news of sandalwood on the Isle of 
Pines quickly became a secret de Polichenelle and other traders soon followed. From 
the time of Cheyne’s first visit on 6 August 1841 and Captain Ebrill’s visit of the 
ill-fated brig Star in November 1842, twenty sandalwood merchants had visited the 
island (Shineberg 1967, pp. 220-222). Competition for the wood and for native labour 
was intense. The indigenous population became shrewd bargainers and turned rivalry 
among the traders to their own advantage in the game of supply and demand (Shineberg 
1967, p. 150).  
An ignorance of local custom and language put the traders at a great disadvantage, and 
suspicion and conflict soon arose. When an unknown illness began to decimate the 
native population, ‘white sorcery’ was suspected, as neither whites nor catechists were 
affected. In ignorance, the traders ignored native taboos which aimed to stop trade in 
sandalwood, and an already sensitive situation became more volatile. The innocent 
natas were suspected of collaborating with the traders, and when the chief’s house was 
burnt to the ground fuel was literally added to the fire. Although it was found that that 
the fire had not been deliberately lit, the truce remained uneasy. By this time the island 
was awash with iron hoop, axes and beads, and so the law of supply and demand no 
longer applied: it was more the law of ‘might is right.’ As the situation worsened, the 
sandalwood traders left the island, leaving only the unfortunate catechists to face the 
wrath of Touru.  
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When Melanesian and European came face-to-face, different customary expectations 
led to suspicion, mistrust and conflict which at times became violent. Touru hoped that 
by banning the traders, the death of his people would cease. The plan was unsuccessful 
and the Kunies continued to die by the score. In the meantime, the catechists had lost 
credibility and influence. Traders were warned to avoid the Isle of Pines as the situation 
was grave, but for the crew of the Star the message was not received. Twenty-one were 
massacred, including the Samoan catechists who were making their escape. Vengeance 
had been exacted on the white man’s god. After the attack, valuables were removed, the 
ship was burnt and the slain were eaten. The Catherine, a vessel in the same vicinity, 
was also attacked and the crew massacred. Ignorance, misunderstanding and a fear of 
the unknown had dire consequences. It was now a case of fight or flight, and both 
traders and missionaries chose flight. 
Chiefly power in New Caledonia demanded recognition and when challenged the 
outcome was tragic. The Reverend Murray of the LMS was aware of possibility of 
problems arising from an ignorance of native custom. In Missions in Western Polynesia 
he wrote: ‘Great care is necessary in dealing with a savage people; mistakes and 
misunderstandings are so apt to arise, and it is often a difficult matter to get them 
rectified’ (Murray 1863, p. 293). Paradoxically, it was the evangelising mission of the 
LMS that opened the way for the sandalwood traders they abhorred, for the Roman 
Catholics whom they liked even less and the arch-enemy of the British, the French. 
Lack of communication, absence of linguistic and customary understanding and the 
introduction of hitherto unknown contagious diseases led to violent conflict, the demise 
of European-Melanesian relations, and the avoidance of the island by both evangelists 
and sandalwood traders.  
Maré (Nengone): Natas, traders and a court case 
When Reverend Murray and several indigenous evangelists approached the island of 
Maré on 9 April 1841, they were surprised to hear a voice from a nearby canoe calling 
out: ‘I know the true God’ (Murray 1863, p. 300). It was the voice of a Tongan, Taufa, 
who had been lost at sea with seven fellow compatriots and had drifted to Maré. They 
had been living on the island for about seven years and spoke Nengone, the language of 
Maré. The Reverend Nihill of the Anglican Melanesian Mission, who lived on the 
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island and worked on the translation of the Bible into Nengone, mentioned the Tongan 
population of Maré in an 1855 diary entry: 
There are no less than 33 Tonga people at this place counting children, 
the descendants of a party which went adrift in a canoe. Only one of the 
original party is alive now, a fine old white-haired woman called Sarai. 
The others that I have seen are only distinguishable from the Nengone by 
being a little lighter in colour […] Bula’s (retained) wife is a Tonga 
girl.22 
(Nihill 1852, p. 17).  
Meeting the Tongans was fortunate for the catechists, Tataio and Taniela, who as a 
result gained the protection of Yeiw, high Chief of si-Gwahma. Soon, however, the 
sandalwood merchants followed. The people of Maré adapted rapidly to the market 
economy, they were astute and applied themselves assiduously to the laws of supply 
and demand and quickly amassed personal wealth: glass, iron and cotton fabric called 
manou. Sandalwood had no real value for the natives, it was merely for burning, but for 
the merchants it added to the value of their trade with China. Ships loaded with tea in 
China for the tea-thirsty Australian colony could now be filled with sandalwood, a 
saleable commodity, for the return voyage. According to Shineberg, the Chinese market 
value for sandalwood was up to 100 pounds sterling per ton and some cargos were in 
excess of 320 tons thus merchants such as Burns, Towns and Paddon were able to 
amass great wealth (Shineberg 1969, p. 220). Due to the ease of anchorage (Marchand 
1911, p. 126)23 and the protection of the natas, trade was conducted exclusively with 
the si-Gwahma tribe. This increased the power of Yeiw (Dauphiné 1996, p. 9)24 and 
ignited the jealousy of rival tribes who sought vengeance, and the capture of a trading 
ship was seen to be ‘a royal road to wealth’ (Turner 1861, p. 399). The Martha was 
attacked in April 1842 (Turner 1861, p. 404) at Sereuamiet and the crew was killed. In 
November 1843, an attack on Paddon’s schooner the Brigand led to the demise of 
                                                
22 The presence of Tongans on Lifou, Maré and Isle of Pines has also been documented by Tautu’u 
(2012). 
23 On arrival at Maré the LMS mission ship spent an entire day searching for a suitable anchorage due to 
the coral cliffs which formed a rampart. 
24 This suggests that the chief was Naisseline. The contacts were more bloody in Maré because this island 
was less open and, in addition, the sandalwood merchants traded uniquely with the northern chiefdom of 
Naisseline. Dubois (1969, p. 312) suggests that, at that time, Naisseline was only two or three and not yet 
a chief. Murray (1845, p. 3) mentions Nesili, son of Jeui the chief at Kuama. 
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seventeen crew and about fifty natives. The catechists believed that the attacks were due 
to intense intertribal jealousy and that the traders were the innocent victims of the 
war-mongering natives. The Reverend Gill describes constant intertribal war on Maré: 
‘War was their constant employment and in it they had the greatest delight’ (Gill 1855, 
p. 9).  
Six ships were lost on the Maré coast, the situation was tense. It was in these 
circumstances that the trigger-happy crew of the Will o’ the Wisp, whose superiority 
was limited to a knowledge of firearms, murdered three natives. The ship’s captain, 
Captain Lewis, was brought to trial in Sydney’s Supreme Court where, according to the 
Judge: 
Even if the Jury should be of the opinion that there had been no actual 
necessity for the killing of these men as a measure of self-defence; still if 
there was fair and reasonable grounds for the creation of such a belief in 
the mind of the prisoner, he would still be justified […] it should appear 
plain not only to Englishmen, but to the islanders themselves, that the act 
was justified, for if this was not the case, most sanguinary measures in 
retaliation might be anticipated.25 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1851). 
The Jury found the Captain not guilty. Twenty months later the Lucy-Ann was attacked 
at the site of the Will o’ the Wisp murders. In the view of Captain J. E. Erskine26 and the 
missionaries, this massacre was a justifiable reprisal. For Robert Towns, the owner of 
the ship, it vindicated Captain Lewis’ belief that the Nonte-Kuruba tribe intended to 
take a European ship for instant gratification, and when the attempt on the Will ‘o the 
Wisp failed a subsequent successful attempt was made on the Lucy-Ann (Shineberg 
1967, p. 205).  
Conflict was multi-layered. It extended beyond trader–native and intertribal combat to 
Christian tribe–heathen tribe hostility. When two natives escaped from their heathen 
tribe to join the enemy Christian tribe of Naisseline, they were chased and massacred. 
They became the first New Caledonian Christian martyrs (Marchand 1911, p. 129). 
                                                
25 A similar logic was applied by Maitre Semur in Noumea in 1986, following the Hienghène massacre. 
26 John Elphinstone Erskine (1802-1887) was a naval officer whose account of his voyage around the 
Western Pacific, Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the Western Pacific, was published in 1853.  
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Naisseline, who tried to protect the two during the attack, escaped injury. His life was 
spared in recognition of a service which that he had previously rendered to the enemy 
tribe. Thus, customary justice was honoured.  
In 1852 while the Reverend Dr George Selwyn, the Anglican Bishop of the Melanesian 
Mission, travelled around the islands of the Western Pacific, his colleague, the 
Reverend William Nihill and a Maori helper, Henry Taratoa, stayed on the island of 
Maré. At Netché, in the tribe of si-Gwahma, they found that Polynesian evangelists 
from Samoa and Rarotonga had established three mission stations on the island. In an 
agreement struck between the LMS and the Melanesian mission in 1848, it had been 
decided that the Melanesian mission would be responsible for the evangelisation of the 
Loyalty Group (Nihill 1852, p. 17). Both Protestant missions trained natives as teachers 
in order that Oceanians would be evangelised by Oceanians. Bishop Selwyn recruited 
young people from the Loyalty Islands and New Caledonia, trained them at his college 
in Auckland and returned them to teach their own people. The aim of the mission was 
not to make Melanesians Englishmen but Christians: ‘to think out the meaning and 
attitude of the Melanesian mind and character—not to suppress, but educate it.27  
It seems incongruous that, with this ambition, natives were educated in a foreign 
country where it was necessary for them to read, write and speak in the language of the 
missionary, to dress like the missionary and to live and behave like the missionary. The 
LMS, on the other hand, trained Rarotongans and Samoans at theological seminaries in 
their homelands. Once trained, these native teachers or natas were taken by the LMS 
mission ship to the islands of the Western Pacific. Despite their differences, the 
Anglicans, LMS teachers and natives worked together and were well received by the 
natives: 
Every night we translate for about an hour and a half […]. The natives 
supply us with food in abundance, yams etc., at all times, fowls very 
frequently, pork occasionally. They treat us as they do their own chiefs 
attending to our wishes, saluting us etc., and their teachableness is shown 
by the congregation on Sunday amounting to a thousand.  
(Nihill 1852, p. 21). 
                                                
27 Letter written to his father by John Patteson 1866 (cited in Garrett 1982, p. 185). 
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This arrangement proved to be so successful that the Reverend Nihill and his family 
remained on Maré for two years until Bishop Selwyn decided to cede the Loyalty 
Islands to the LMS because of their ‘priority of occupation’. The striking of this entente 
religieuse avoided unnecessary and costly duplication of limited mission resources, as 
well as sparing native converts the unedifying spectacle of competing Christian creeds. 
It was agreed that the Reverend Nihill would leave the island when LMS missionaries 
were found. When, in October 1854, LMS missionaries Creagh and Jones arrived, 
Nihill continued to work with them while waiting for a passage from the island, but he 
died of tuberculosis before the ship arrived.  
Lifou (Drehu): A pernickety Scot, conflict and expulsion 
Lifou, the largest of the Loyalty Islands, was divided into three tribal districts, each with 
a High Chief: Bula at Lossi in the south, Zeoula at Gaitcha in the centre and Ukeneso at 
Wet in the north. At the time of arrival of the LMS catechists, these tribes were almost 
constantly at war (Delbos 1993, p. 111). In 1842, two catechists, Pao and Zekaraia, 
arrived from Maré. When Zekaraia apostatised, Pao, who became known as the ‘apostle 
of Lifou’,28 was the sole catechist on the island until 1845 when he was joined by two 
other teachers. Fortunately, Pao, a man of indomitable perseverance and dauntless 
courage, became enehmu to the respected blind High Chief Bula.29 Tribal rivalry was 
intense, and Ukeneso resented Bula’s appropriation of the catechists who, he believed, 
were responsible for Bula’s victory in battle. The death of Bula in 1847 and the 
emergence of various contenders for the chieftainship embroiled the whole of Lossi in 
internecine warfare. Fighting, as well as an epidemic in 1846 that decimated the tribe, 
made the evangelists’ position untenable. In the interest of self-preservation, they were 
forced to abandon the mission and flee to Maré. It was not until 1851 that the teachers 
returned to Lifou to continue to prepare the way for the long-awaited ‘white 
missionary’. The catechists succeeded in extending their influence in Gaitcha and to 
                                                
28 Pao, or Fao, remained on Lifou until his death in 1863. He is buried at Wé (Delbos 1993, p. 111). 
29 Also part of Bula’s household was a seaman, James Reece, who had been left on Lifou in 1844 by 
Captain Lewis. Reece married a woman of Lifou and remained on the island until Bula’s death when 
internecine warfare drove him to Maré (Shineberg 1967, p. 65). 
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some extent in the north by converting the chief of Chépénéhé, Wainya,30 to 
Christianity.  
For Ukeneso, the teachers were the cause of his defeat in battle and as Protestantism 
gained ground he looked to find a counterbalancing force. Marist priests were already 
established on Ouvéa and it was to them that Ukeneso turned. He hoped that they would 
arrive with French military reinforcements to punish those disobedient subjects who had 
accepted the catechists’ gospel. Messages between Bazit on Ouvéa, who had become 
Catholic, and Ukeneso led to the arrival on Lifou of three Catholic priests, Fathers 
Palazy, Fabre31 and Bernard. They arrived in 1858 by French warship under the 
command of Jules Testard.32 During the reign of Louis-Philippe, warships had been 
placed at the disposal of Marist missionaries for the development of ‘civilising 
missions’. In the face of French military power, it was as an act of political expediency 
that many of Fao’s converts became Roman Catholics.  
Before the Marists’ arrival on Lifou, Bishop Selwyn had conducted several of his winter 
schools on the island but, when the LMS missionaries arrived, it was decided that a 
united Christian front should be presented. The British missionaries were anxious to 
avoid conflict between the different denominations of the Christian Church and 
subsequent division and antagonism within the native community. As Bishop Selwyn 
put it: ‘We must not give a divided testimony to those whom we desire to represent the 
unity of the Godhead’ (cited in Davidson 2000, pp. 19-20). To promote this solidarity, 
the Protestants decided to carve up the southwestern Pacific. Each denomination had an 
area of responsibility: the Methodists, Fiji and Tonga; the LMS Samoa, the Cook 
Islands and New Caledonia; and the Presbyterians, the New Hebrides: ‘There is no 
rivalry between us. Each does its own work as far as possible without interfering with 
that of the others’ (cited in Davidson 2000, p. 20). Catholics were excluded from these 
considerations, and when Marist priests decided to settle in areas that had been 
commandeered by the Protestants, the foundations of public tranquillity rattled. 
                                                
30 Wainya’s wife, Mary Hennessy, was the daughter of an Irishman and had been brought up in the 
islands (Macfarlane 1873, p. 149). 
31 Fr Jean-Baptiste Fabre remained on Lifou for twenty-five years (Delbos 1993, p. 111). 
32 In the opinion of Testard there was no place for the Kanak in the colony: ‘Le Calédonien est intelligent, 
mais c’est un monstre de perversité ; il faut commencer par détruire cette population si l’on veut vivre en 
sécurité dans le pays. Le seul moyen qui paraisse un peu praticable pour en venir à bout, serait de faire 
des battues comme pour les loups en France.’ (Cited in Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 12). 
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In 1859, shortly after the Marists, Reverends Baker and Macfarlane of the LMS arrived. 
However, as Samuel Macfarlane explains, arriving after the Marists did not bother the 
LMS: ‘It is true that the priests were a year before us in person, but as they are centuries 
behind us in principle, we had not much to fear’. (Macfarlane 1873, p. 62). By this time 
the Polynesian catechists had evangelised much of the island; built comfortable 
plastered cottages, and chapels were ready for worship. The indigenous population’s 
intention that a white missionary would consolidate chiefly power was perhaps not 
understood by Samuel Macfarlane, who retained a notion of white superiority: ‘even if a 
missionary did act as a kind of king over the natives, is it, I ask, a very great calamity 
for these poor ignorant natives to be governed by an intelligent, Christian gentleman?’ 
(Macfarlane 1873, p. 22). It is true that this ‘superiority’ was not shared by all. 
According to Bishop Selwyn, ‘to go among the heathens as an equal and a brother is far 
more profitable than to risk that subtle kind of self-righteousness, which creeps into the 
mission work’ (cited in Davidson 2000, p. 20). Selwyn’s idea of the ideal missionary 
was, however, someone who had been through the British public-school system, 
‘preferably Eton’, and was university educated. In accordance with these ideals, John 
Coleridge Patteson was recruited in 1854 to establish a training school on Norfolk 
Island. 
Macfarlane, with his notion of grandeur, was nevertheless a source of inspiration. He 
dug wells to obtain potable water on an island where there was no fresh surface water; 
he procured a horse from Samoa to enable him to travel more easily across the island; 
he improvised horseshoes by bending iron; he constructed buildings to withstand 
hurricanes and wallpapered the walls of his home and grew flowers in his front garden. 
In the belief that language is power, he set about mastering the local language, Drehu, 
reading sermons in that language within four months and preaching in it by the time he 
had spent seven months on the island. He had hymn books and primers printed in the 
local language and a seminary for the training of native teachers established at 
Chépénéhé. Macfarlane had welcomed Catholics to festivities such as the consecration 
of a chapel but when the Marists built a church in close proximity to the established 
Protestant Church in Chépénéhé the bond of friendship was broken and conflict erupted. 
Differences between the French administration, the Marists, and the LMS mission 
surfaced when a British ship arrived at the island containing crates of books which had 
been printed by the Reverend Creagh on the LMS printing press on Maré. The books 
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were written in Drehu, the local language of Lifou. Macfarlane received an official 
letter from the Governor instructing him to stop teaching in the local language and to 
stop the distribution of books written in Drehu. A decree published in the local press, Le 
Moniteur, in October 1863 banned, from that date, the use of native languages in 
schools. For the LMS mission this was a blow as some of the schools had been in taught 
in the local language for twenty years. The decree favoured the Marists who taught in 
French. As Macfarlane boldly put it, ‘the cold freezing hand of despotism and Popery 
had laid its iron grasp upon what the natives esteemed highly and held dearly’ 
(Macfarlane 1873, p. 132).  
A barrage of letters from the Governor informed the missionaries that, as subjects of a 
friendly nation, they could stay on the island but if this option was chosen, all land was 
now owned by the French Administration and would need to be repurchased. In 
addition, missionaries who wished to continue to evangelise could only do so with the 
approval of his Majesty, the Emperor of France. Lifou was in a state of siege, and the 
missionaries were incarcerated, as it was suspected that Protestantism was the Trojan 
Horse of Britain. This was denied by Macfarlane who insisted that the missionaries’ 
interest was in spreading the gospel and not nationality. This meant little to the soldiers 
who went about destroying, burning and plundering Protestant houses and property in 
what became a war on religion. 
Undeterred, Macfarlane embarked on a ‘paper war’ waged through Noumea, Sydney, 
London and Paris. Letters were published in the Sydney Morning Herald 33 and in the 
English press. After some six months of correspondence a memorial34 addressed to the 
Emperor, Napoleon III, bore fruit. The Emperor’s reply granted the missionaries 
personal freedom, the return of mission property and freedom to worship. The 
anti-clerical Governor resisted what he saw as British imperium in imperio and, in an 
attempt to stop Macfarlane, decided that the ‘freedom to worship’ approved by 
Napoleon did not include the distribution of literature in the native dialect or the 
                                                
33 In Sydney, he relied upon the support of Pitt St. Congregational laymen, the proprietor of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, John Fairfax, and the editor of the paper, Rev. John West, a Congregational minister. 
Letters published in the paper written by Rev. Murray drew attention to events in the Loyalty Islands. 
34 This memorial was signed by Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury; Henry Pelham, 3rd Earl of Chichester; 
A.C. Lonson, Bishop of London; Arthur. P. Stanley, Dean of Westminster; Warren. S. Hale; Lord Mayor 
of London; several Aldermen of the City of London, as well as church dignitaries (Macfarlane 1873, 
p. 196). 
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reopening of schools or of the seminary. Another six months of correspondence 
between Governor Guillain and Macfarlane resulted in approval being granted to 
distribute printed material and to reopen the seminary but not the schools. If the idea 
was to keep the English out and make the islands French, there was no resistance. 
Macfarlane’s cynical political analysis is quite clear on the subject: 
The idea of keeping the English out of the barren rocks that compose the 
Loyalty group is quite a farce. Our valuable colonies show that ‘John 
Bull’ is a little more ambitious in his selection of territory, and can well 
afford to allow his chivalrous neighbour the undisturbed possession of 
such islands. 
(Macfarlane 1873, p. 214). 
Persecution continued on all of the Loyalty Islands. On Maré the LMS missionaries 
Creagh and Jones continued to work, despite the Governor insisting that they had no 
right to live in a French Colony without a residence permit. The Reverend Jones argued 
that there had been no official annexation of the Loyalty Islands and he queried the 
ability of one country to take possession of another by simply publishing the act in a 
newspaper. According to the missionaries, the French flag had never been raised in the 
Loyalty Group and hoisting the flag ten years earlier in New Caledonia did not 
constitute possession of the group. Subsequently, in 1864, the flag was raised, with the 
consequence that LMS schools were shut and missionaries and catechists were 
incarcerated.  
Ouvéa (Iaai): Catholic vs Protestant, Church vs State 
Violence was perpetrated on multiple fronts. Shortly before his death in 1856, 
Weneguei, with the help of Henry Burns, a merchant who had settled on the island, 
brought two teachers from Maré to Ouvéa. In the game of chiefly politics, the aim was 
to gain an advantage over the rival tribe. The two powerful chiefdoms were in constant 
conflict to gain total control of the island, and in 1857 when two Catholic priests, Jean 
Bernard and François Palazy, arrived in the northern chiefdom of Nekelo, it was 
suspected that the tribal battlelines would be drawn. Father Bernard was chosen for the 
mission, as he had previously spent several years on Wallis Island and spoke the 
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language of Nekelo’s tribe.35 Nekelo, however, refused to receive these ‘men in black’. 
Experience suggested that a French warship could signal a possible French invasion 
with loss of life and land. Bazit was not so reticent, and in his struggle for power the 
priests were a worthy investment. After establishing friendly relations with Bazit, the 
priests journeyed south where they received a hostile reception. Eventually, with the aid 
of a French warship and Commandant Testard, who was anxious to limit British 
influence on the island, the Marists won over Nekelo in the north and Doumai in the 
south. For Doumai, this enabled him to divorce himself from Weneguei and forge links 
with his confreres, the northern Polynesian chiefs Nekelo and Beka. Fayaoué and 
Wadrilla, with the encouragement of Maré catechists and Henry Burns, remained 
Protestant. In the north, Ohua, the chief of Ognat, influenced by his Lifou in-laws, 
accepted Protestantism and built a church in close proximity to that of the Catholics. 
This aroused the fury of Bazit who, with his warriors, set out on a course of murder, 
pillage and plunder, setting fire to the houses and church of the Ognat tribe and forcing 
the Protestants to seek refuge in the grotte d’Ouvéa.36 These incidents will remain 
relevant to New Caledonian history and, in particular, underpin some elements of the 
tragic massacre of 1988 (see Chapter 5). 
Finally, the Protestants fled to Wadrilla, thus beginning a long and sad exile.37 For 
thirty-four years, the tribe lived in exile as refugees with the Wadrilla-Fayaoué tribe. 
Twice they returned to their tribal homeland only to be driven back to their southern 
confreres. The extreme volatility and violence of these early encounters left an indelible 
impression on the Gossanah tribe which, almost one hundred years later, found itself an 
unwilling participant in the bitter events of 1988-1989 and once again isolated from the 
rest of the island, and the outside world. Others, led by Wadgylia of Weneki, called the 
‘Cromwell of Ouvéa’38 by the Catholic missionaries, were opposed to both new 
                                                
35 Immigrants from Wallis retained their Polynesian language, Faga-Uvea, whereas the tribe originating 
from the mainland (Fayaoué tribe) kept their Melanesian language, Iaai (Person 1953, p. 34). 
36 In the region of the tragic massacre of 1988. 
37 It was not until 1884 with the death of Imwone that his widow and young son returned to Weneki to 
reclaim their personal effects. Bazit would not, however, relinquish their land. This Protestant tribe, 
christened ‘Hosanah’ or ‘Gossanah’ was presided over by Imwone’s son who converted to Catholicism. 
In 1989, after the Ouvéa massacre and the assassinations that followed, the Imwone chiefdom was 
officially recognised. According to Guiart this was not the first time the tribe of Imwone had been in 
exile: ‘À l’époque des premiers contacts européens, Imwone et les siens ont été exilés en Grande Terre, à 
Houaïlou. Revenus, ils se sont faits protestants et ont été exilés, de nouveau, en conclusion de la guerre 
civile entre catholiques et protestants.’ (Cited in Plenel & Rollat 1988, pp. 42-43). 
38 So called because he plotted to depose his chief, Imwone. 
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religions. Tension on the island increased and the priests, fearing further conflict, 
requested military reinforcement from the mainland. When LMS missionary Samuel 
Ella arrived at Fayaoué in 1864, antagonism throughout the Loyalty Group was 
extreme: Protestants and Catholics; French and British, and rival tribes were at war. 
Disembarkation was impossible. It was only after being stranded at sea and retreating 
for three months to the New Hebrides that the Reverend Ella was finally granted 
residency on Ouvéa. Conditions applied, and he was banned from pursuing any 
evangelistic functions.  
Ella was drawn into the paper war when his station at Fayaoué was attacked by the 
military. He complained to France of the draconian behaviour of the Governor, Charles 
Guillain, and of the part played by the Priests Bernard and Barriol39 in attacks on 
Protestants. Both Marists were withdrawn. Three months later Guillain40 agreed to 
allow Ella to work as a missionary on the condition that religious conflict was avoided.  
In June 1865, Guillain raised the French flag on Ouvéa in the expectation that with the 
application of French law the island would return to order. He divided the island into 
three districts and appointed Catholic chiefs for each district. The Catholic chiefs 
limited religious freedom for the Protestants, and enemy tribes, which represented 
opposing religions, remained on a collision course. In response to a battery of 
correspondence sent by the Reverend Ella to the Governor of New Caledonia, the 
British Government and His Majesty, the Emperor of France, a Commission of Inquiry 
was set up to hear the missionaries’ grievances in relation to the unjust, oppressive 
administration of the Loyalty Islands. It was only after a second Imperial Commission 
of Inquiry was held into religious persecution that the despotic commandant of the 
Loyalty Islands and Governor Guillain were returned to France. Land taken from the 
Protestants by the commandant was returned, and with the defeat and imprisonment of 
Napoleon III in Germany, the military base was removed from the Loyalties. Justice 
was seen to be done. 
                                                
39 Fr Barriol replaced Fr Palazy in July 1858 (Dauphiné 1996, p. 18). 
40 Guillain was by now more circumspect. He had been reprimanded for his brutal intervention in Lifou. 
Preventing the spread of British influence while not being seen to favour the Marists, who were in a state 
of open warfare with the natives on mainland New Caledonia, required great diplomacy. 
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Multi-layered conflict on Grande Terre: Nata–Kanak, Marist–Kanak, 
Marist–British merchant 
Fear of cannibalism thwarted the first attempt to place natas on Grande Terre, and it 
was not until a year later in 1841 that two Polynesian teachers, the Samoan Taniela, and 
the Rarotongan Mataio, began work. On its annual voyage around the islands the 
mission-ship Camden replaced these first catechists with Ta’unga, a Rarotongan, and 
two Samoan teachers, Noa and Taniela They were welcomed by the son of the local 
chief, Uadota,41 but among the catechists there was dissension. Ta’unga disputed the 
popularity of Samoans, writing: ‘A few people began being friendly towards me but not 
to those two Samoans because they were bad tempered and the people were not 
attracted to them.’42  
During these early years of the mission epidemics raged, causing widespread death 
among the indigenous population. Transmissible diseases such as measles, smallpox, 
dysentery, influenza, syphilis, tuberculosis and leprosy have generally been cited as 
being responsible. The indigenous population, ignorant of the transmission of microbial 
disease, believed death was the work of the teachers and their god Jehovah. In reality, 
sandalwood merchants were a more likely source of disease but they did not dispute the 
natives’ claim. They were happy to point the finger at the catechists to divert attention 
from themselves. Touru, chief of the Isle of Pines, took action. He had effectively 
removed catechists from his island and sought to rid the land of the Tuauru of them 
also. To unleash an attack on mainland catechists provided Touru with two possible 
advantages: it would stop the deaths of his people and demonstrate his suzerainty over 
the Tuauru43. Nathotha, chief of the Tuauru, refused to stain an axe with the blood of 
the catechists (Person 1961, p. 75) who had, by their presence, liberated him from the 
despotic chief of Kunie. Such insubordination enraged Touru who set out with twenty 
canoes of armed warriors to seek vengeance. When they arrived on the mainland, 
                                                
41 Sometimes spelt Wadoka (Garrett 1982, p. 190). 
42 According to Gunson, the Rarotongan teachers considered themselves as the senior evangelists, having 
helped to evangelise Samoa. On the other hand, the Samoans opined themselves to be more cultured. 
They were described by the British missionaries as ‘the French of the South Seas’ (Shineberg 1968, 
p. 40). 
43 Guiart (2012, p. 94) believes that the missionaries of the LMS panicked unnecessarily in removing the 
evangelists from the mainland and that the arrivals from the Isle of Pines would not fight the tribe which 
had welcomed the catechists, due to familial alliances. 
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Ta’unga greeted them with priestly calm. This act of courage was admired by Touru 
and the missionaries’ lives were saved. The LMS missionaries Murray and Turner, 
however, feared for the safety of the Polynesian teachers and in 1845 decided to 
withdraw them from Grande Terre and relocate them on Maré.  
Indigenous deaths from unknown causes during the period of early European contact 
caused conflict. Clearly, introduced disease for which there was no pre-existing 
immunity (or treatment)44 contributed to the ever-increasing death toll. Undoubtedly, 
death was multifactorial. Massacres of ships’ crews, made possible by the introduction 
of firearms, provided an unprecedented increase in the supply of human flesh, which in 
a cannibal population, could have led to prion disease epidemics.45 Shipborne rats 
introduced the bubonic plague. On arrival in New Caledonia, George Griffith46 was 
bombarded with plague warnings (Griffith 1901, p. 97) and mosquitoes:  
When I went to bed, I shut the long windows opening onto the balcony 
to keep the smell out. I also shut in the heat and some odd millions of 
mosquitoes, any of which, according to popular belief, might have had 
thousands of microbes concealed about its person. 
(Griffith 1901, p. 101).  
In their correspondence, the Marist priests frequently mentioned mosquitoes. 
Br Germanique in a letter to Brs François and Louis-Marie describes a night spent with 
mosquitoes in a village between Pouebo and Hienghène: ‘The natives gave us a hut to 
lodge in, but it was impossible to close one’s eyes for the mosquitoes.’ (Clisby 142).47 
Fr Rougeyron in his report on New Caledonia to Fr Colin complained of the deathly 
bite of mosquitoes. Everywhere there was a hint of cannibalism: 
                                                
44 Rev. Nihill (1852, p. 31) describes illness on Maré and the medicine chest of the day which included 
arrowroot, ginger, an emetic and Dover’s Powder (Ipecac and Opium) which would provide little 
opposition to viral or secondary bacterial infections. 
45 Gajdusek won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1976 for his work on transmissible spongiform 
encephalitis among the cannibalistic Fore people of Eastern New Guinea. 
46 George Griffith, 1857-1906, British journalist, author and explorer. 
47 Also De La Hautière (1869, p. 34): ‘Les indigènes pour échapper, la nuit, durant le sommeil, aux 
piqures des moustiques, entretiennent du feu dans l’intérieur de leurs habitations, et parviennent, au 
moyen fumée, à chasser ces hôtes importunes.’ See also Garnier (1991, p. 45). 
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The traveller has no sooner breathed the beautiful air of New Caledonia 
than thousands of mosquitoes, also known as marengouins, attack him 
and suck him like leeches but the bite is very much different; it is fatal. 
(Girard 0533).  
The living conditions of natives were conducive to the spread of newly introduced 
disease. Melanesians slept huddled together in smoke-filled huts, and this would have 
facilitated the transfer of microbes by droplet infection. Despite popular belief, 
epidemics did not spare the Europeans. Fr Rougeyron in a letter to Fr Vidal, 
1 September 1853, describes the death of Bishop Douarre as follows:  
There appeared in our island one of those frightful epidemics which 
carried off a very great proportion of the population. The Bishop fell 
victim and it took three days for the scourge to take him to the tomb. 
(Girard 1276).  
The abnormally high mortality rate of missionaries’ children is well documented (Lal & 
Fortune 2000, p. 186). However, in a comparative demographic study, the death rates 
may not have been as disproportionate as has been suggested. The European population 
of New Caledonia in 1860 was only 432 (O’Reilly 1953, p. 30); at the same time the 
Melanesian population was estimated at around 60,000 (Filippi & Angleviel 2000a, 
p. 32). Shineberg, in an examination of the demographic history of New Caledonia, 
concludes that census figures for Melanesians in the nineteenth century are ‘worthless.’ 
She disputes the ‘catastrophic decline’ and imminent extinction of the native population 
following European contact. The theory of the ‘fatal impact’ provided the 
administration and settlers with two advantages. Firstly, a decline in Kanak numbers 
would reduce their need for land which would free up additional land for settlers. 
Secondly, the catastrophic decline of the Kanak justified the introduction of overseas 
labourers who were found to be more reliable and more agreeable.  
On Grande Terre, the figures were rubbery. Captain Cook on his voyage of discovery in 
1774 describes the population: 
To judge merely by the numbers of the natives we saw every day, one 
might think the island very populous but I believe that, at this time, the 
inhabitants were collected from all parts on our account. Mr Pickergill 
observed that down the coast to the west there are but few people; and 
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we knew they came daily from the other side of the land, over the 
mountains, to visit us. 
(Williams 1997, p. 261).  
The consensus is that for the first hundred years after discovery, demographic figures 
which were, and continue to be bandied around, are merely estimates and lack any 
authority (Filippi & Angleviel 2000a, pp. 32-35). It was admitted in 1866 that ‘il n’était 
pas possible de donner le chiffre, même approximatif, de la population indigène’.48 The 
figures from the Loyalty Islands were kept by the missionaries and provide a more 
accurate idea of the demographic trend. These figures are interesting as they indicate 
that the population of the Loyalty Islands remained relatively stable despite disease and 
considerable mobility (Filippi & Angleviel 2000a, p. 35). The death toll was 
nevertheless of concern to the natives and a cause of further conflict (Filippi & 
Angleviel 2000a, p. 35).  
Conflict: British vs French 
Concern of the possibility of a French takeover of New Caledonia was aired in Australia 
as early as 1842. The prospect of having a foreign power on a large island on its 
doorstep was of major concern to Australia. Although Britain showed little interest in 
the annexation, the Australians and New Zealanders realised the benefit of such an 
acquisition. A year before the French marines and Marist missionaries arrived in New 
Caledonia, the Sydney Morning Herald published a prospectus drawn up by a Police 
Magistrate, Major Sullivan, entitled ‘A prospectus for forming a British Colony on the 
Island of New Caledonia’:  
                                                
48 ‘Extraits des archives du Secrétariat colonial de la Nouvelle-Calédonie’, Le Moniteur, 30 September 
1866 (cited in Shineberg 1983, p. 34). 
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There can be no doubt that it would be highly advantageous both to this 
colony and to the mother country were a British colony established in 
New Caledonia, and the recent intelligence that the French have taken 
possession of the Marquesas, renders such a step almost necessary […] 
the establishment of an important sea-port in the direct line of 
communication to China and India, whenever the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans may be joined at the Isthmus of Darien. 
(Sydney Morning Herald 23 August 1842, p. 2). 
Marists at Balade 
In 1843, the Marist priests Monsignor Douarre, Fathers Rougeyron and Viard and 
Brothers Taragnat and Marmoiton arrived at Balade in the north-east of New Caledonia 
on the French battleship Bucéphale. They were welcomed by Paiama, high chief of 
Balade and the French flag was raised by Commander Julien Laferrière, to a twenty-one 
gun salute. The country, by virtue of flag and gun, was given to God and to France 
(De Salinis 1892, p. 17). Paradoxically, the missionaries, despite their reliance upon the 
marines, were reluctant to keep the flag which they believed might compromise the 
spiritual nature of the mission. In the absence of French inhabitants on the island, the 
priests agreed to keep the flag, providing that the government would take the necessary 
measures for annexation within six months. This was not to be.  
King Louis-Philippe, not wanting to add to the friction between Britain and France 
caused by the Pritchard affair in Tahiti,49 ordered Commander Le Comte to retrieve the 
national flag and return it to France. At the time, the British–French relationship was 
cordial; the Minister of External Affairs, François Guizot, had struck an entente 
cordiale with his British counterpart, Lord Aberdeen. In addition, Louis-Philippe was 
related by marriage to both Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.50 As fate would have it, 
the naval ship La Seine, which was sent to retrieve the flag, struck a reef and was lost, 
                                                
49 While the British missionary and Consul to Tahiti, George Pritchard, was in England making 
arrangements for Tahiti to become a British protectorate, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, against the wishes of 
Queen Pomare, took possession. French-British relations soured as a result and for three years Tahiti was 
at war with France. 
50 Louis-Philippe’s daughter Louise was married to Leopold 1 King of the Belgians, the uncle of both 
Victoria and Albert, who were first cousins. 
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leaving some three hundred shipwrecked sailors in the care of the struggling Marist 
mission at Balade. Fr Rougeyron wrote of this event to Fr Cholleton: 
You know of course that France had really taken possession of our island 
and that the flag has been raised. Today it flutters no more. The ship, the 
Seine, which was shipwrecked, was given orders to come to New 
Caledonia to take it away. 
(Girard 0528). 
During the early nineteenth century, the fortunes of the Catholic Church in France had 
waxed and waned. The privileges previously held by the Church had been withdrawn. 
Catholicism was no longer the religion of the State and so the struggling mission 
received little support. Louis-Philippe promised naval support for the mission but for 
twenty months, the small band of Marists remained isolated with dwindling food 
supplies. The Marists felt that they had been abandoned by France and were fearful of 
the advance of Protestant ‘heresy.’ Missions of the LMS were spreading throughout the 
Pacific, and the possibility of a British claim on the strategically-placed island seemed 
likely. Several sandalwood traders had already established warehouses and refuelling 
depots in the area and Bishop Selwyn of the Melanesian Mission had been welcomed by 
Bourate at Hienghène. In an attempt to reverse the decision to abandon French 
annexation of the island, Bishop Douarre travelled to France to plead with the King and 
his Ministers (De Salinis 1892, p. 44), but his pleas were ignored. It was not until the 
Revolution of 1848 when Louis-Philippe abdicated and Napoleon III came to power 
that a decision was made in favour of annexation.  
The small band of priests at Balade with no knowledge of local custom was at 
enormous risk. Intertribal rivalry was intense and soon jealousy turned to hostility. 
When Pouebo was chosen as the site for a second mission station rather than Hienghène 
the situation became untenable. Bourate, the High Chief of Hienghène, was 
anti-Catholic and anti-French and he felt that he had been deceived by the Marists 
(Dauphiné 1996, p. 51). His dealings with British sandalwood traders, Richards, Towns 
and Paddon, who were established in the area, had guaranteed him power. In 1843, the 
year the Marists settled at Balade, Bourate visited Sydney with Richards and in 1848, he 
returned as the guest of Robert Towns. In Sydney, he was feted by the press and 
referred to as the ‘King of New Caledonia’ (Dauphiné 1996, p. 46). Gifts were 
showered upon him: horses, a saddle, bridle, spurs, pigs and an accordion. Bourate was 
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able to converse in English and had adopted English manners, which put him at an 
advantage when dealing with the sandalwood traders who had settled in Hienghène. 
Nevertheless, Bourate was anxious to improve his position of power and reap any 
benefit the Marists may bestow.51 On 27 August 1846, Bourate sold a parcel of land to 
Bishop Douarre with the intention that this land would be used for a mission station. 
When it came to found the promised mission, Father Grange, the Priest chosen to open 
the mission refused to venture so far from Balade alone. Father Grange was, according 
to Father Gougon, ill-suited for the mission:  
Le père Grange, qui avait à l’égard des indigènes une réaction raciste de 
haine et de mépris, se montrait [dur et déloyal envers eux]. Un jour il 
chassa à coup de pied un chef qui souriait pendant le catéchisme. De tels 
gestes ne s’oublient pas.52 
(Cited in Person 1961, p. 112).  
Subsequently Father Grange abandoned the mission and returned to France. 
Famine, epidemics, and attacks on the mission by Bourate made life increasingly 
difficult for the priests. When the mission buildings were set on fire and Brother Blaise 
Marmoitan was speared and then clubbed to death, the priests fled to Pouebo. In July 
1847, the mission house at Pouebo was also attacked and burnt to the ground. For the 
priests, there was now little choice other than to move to Hienghène. The priests 
suspected that Bourate might have instigated the attacks on the Balade and Pouebo 
missions either as ‘payback’ or as strategic power play. By driving the priests to 
Hienghène he may have hoped in one fell swoop to increase his power in the north 
relative to that of his rivals, the chiefs of Balade and Pouebo (Girard 0663). However, 
the priests, wary of this despotic tyrant, the ‘Tiger of Hienghène’,53 remained besieged 
for a month at Pouebo. Miraculously, the French ship the Brillante, with eighty sailors, 
appeared and managed to evacuate the mission. Before leaving Grande Terre, the 
                                                
51 Reports vary. De la Hautière (1869, p. 88) writes: ‘Ce chef comprit sans peine que tout son prestige, 
reposant sur les usages, et surtout les superstitions des siens tomberait rapidement s’il tolérait la présence 
au milieu de la tribu, des Révérends Pères Maristes.’ 
52 When the Balade mission was eventually abandoned and the priests were evacuated to Sydney, Father 
Grange left the mission and returned to France, not before humiliating and slandering his colleagues 
(Person 1961, p. 118). 
53 ‘Son amour de la chair humaine était proverbial, et la case de ses ancêtres était ornée sur toutes les 
faces, des crânes de ses victimes’ (De La Hautière 1869, p. 88). 
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priests destroyed their buildings which were being used to trap passing ships. The 
natives dressed in priestly attire: 
[…] a violet soutane to look like a Bishop and […] black soutanes; they 
all carried books in their hands, pretending to recite their breviary whilst 
strolling to and fro on the terrace […] so as to deceive.  
(Girard 0663). 
Rougeyron, in a report on the mission, described this design of the natives on 
unsuspecting ships (Girard 0651).  
Plagued by violent conflict, the priests left Pouebo and Balade and travelled to Saint 
Vincent to open a mission. Due to a lack of fresh water and insufficient arable land, this 
mission was aborted, as was an attempt to establish a mission on Ouvéa because of the 
‘unfavourable disposition of the inhabitants’ (Delbos 1993, p. 76). Finally, the group of 
Marists settled on the Isle of Pines.  
Monsignor Douarre was surprised to find his Anglican counterpart from New Zealand, 
Bishop Selwyn, on the Isle of Pines. The British Bishop, old Etonian and Cambridge 
don, was on a quixotic mission to recruit suitable islanders54 for his training college in 
Auckland. From his arrival in the South Seas the Bishop had determined that he would 
never interfere with other missions. Christianity should, be believed, present a united 
front. Neither would he force English manners upon the natives, his intention being that 
native pastors retain their culture and custom and be trained to organise their own 
churches.55  
Selwyn believed that white missionaries should be ‘white corks supporting a black net’. 
Monsignor Douarre made it clear that he would prefer not to have protestant 
competition and the Anglican bishop, ‘extremely courteous and conciliatory, according 
to the custom of his church, did not insist and left the field clear for the Catholics’ 
(Delbos 1993, p. 81). He thus presented a united Christian front and cooperative 
missionary venture. 
                                                
54 ‘Bishop Selwyn, like all great men, was a good physiognomist.’ (Coleridge 1987, p. 8). 
55 The first students at St Johns were Loyalty Islanders: George Siapo, Isaka Valu, Waderulu, George 
Apale and John Thol. Females were also recruited: Wasatrutru and Wabisane, the wife of George Siapo 
and daughter of high chief Bula (cited in Davidson 2000, p. 23-27). 
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Monsignor Douarre went back to Hienghène in 1848 but this attempt also failed and the 
priests returned to the Isle of Pines. According to Montrouzier, the reason for the failure 
of the Marist mission in Hienghène was due to the British who frequented that 
anchorage and threatened not to return with gifts of hatchets, guns and red cloth if 
French Catholic priests established a mission there. The Marists returned to Pouebo in 
May 1853 on the advice of Brother Taragnat who, while assigned to act as an interpreter 
for Viscount Harcourt on the Alcmène, had been told by the natives of their wish for the 
Priests to return. At Balade, the site of the original Marist mission, Febvrier-Despointes 
on 24 September 1853 took possession of the country for France.  
Tardy de Montravel on arrival in the northeast found that the Pouebo tribe had accepted 
the French, but that Bourate was still antagonistic. To counter this resistance, de 
Montravel returned to Hienghène on 5 May 1854 with two warships the Prony and the 
Constantine, and two hundred armed men disembarked with four mountain howitzers to 
impress and intimidate the defiant natives (cited in Dauphiné 1996, p. 60). Despite this 
display of power by the French, intertribal relations continued to deteriorate until 
Bourate, who was considered to be responsible for all francophobic behaviour, was 
taken prisoner and exiled to Tahiti. Various pleas to commandant Testard, including one 
from Bishop Selwyn for the release of the chief, failed. 
Continued tribal unrest in the north during September 1859 resulted in further military 
intervention and the despatch of three warships the Styx, Thisbé and Calédonienne. One 
hundred and seventy armed soldiers disembarked at Hienghène and during a week of 
warfare,56 several dozen lives were lost, dwellings were burnt and crops were destroyed. 
Sailors and sandalwood merchants were banned from Hienghène. It was only after the 
arrival of the anti-clerical Governor Guillain in 1862 that communication with the 
township resumed and Bourate was able to return to his homeland. The French punitive 
strategy of sanguinary violence and exile had paid off, the wild beast of 1857 had been 
tamed, and he became a loyal ally of Governor Guillain. 
                                                
56 Of this event there are differing reports from Governor Saisset. On 8 September 1859, he reports that 
the enemy was demoralised and dispersed without resistance (cited in Dauphiné 1996, p. 65). Then on 
31 December 1859 in a letter to the Ministry in France he writes of facing a warrior population of 40,000. 
All the tribes united against his 170 soldiers (Dauphiné 1996, p. 66). The expedition met with resistance. 
A marine, Tricot, was killed and all of the enemy villages and plantations were destroyed. Three whites 
who fought against the French were taken prisoner and shot (De La Hautière 1869, p. 89). 
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Conclusion: Chapter 1 
Conflict was well established and intertribal warfare was constant, organised and 
sanguinary between the tribes of New Caledonia before annexation in 1853. Enemy 
tribes were predetermined, and wars were fought according to a customary agenda that 
also regulated post-war outcomes. The civilising mission of Christianity, and the 
economic Eldorado of sandalwood trade, provided new and more powerful sources of 
prosperity for certain tribes, which boosted intertribal antagonism and caused the 
centuries-old balance to waver. On the Loyalty Islands, which were not formally 
annexed until 1864, dissent between priests and pastors bolstered intertribal rivalry, and 
this was often fuelled by the intervention of the French military and local governors. 
When European guns and warships were introduced to the islands, the death toll, which 
in pre-European times had been in units, leapt into the realm of hundreds. The Kanak, 
technologically disadvantaged, had no voice, and were dominated and marginalised. 
The missionaries’ attempt to bridge the European–Kanak gap was hindered by 
interdenominational battles which were played out on the international stage with pen 
and gun. The early governors were military men, trained in warfare, and conflict was 
resolved violently. Kanak deaths were not contested; there was no apology, and no 
room for compromise. Violence, which is synonymous with conflict, could only 
generate a vicious cycle of hatred, revenge and further conflict, with no real prospect of 
reconciliation. Early incidents on Ouvéa sowed the seeds for resentment and revenge 
that would come to haunt the island a century later.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
The Military, Missionaries, Melanesians and Governors 
in Conflict: the Colonial Period 
By the mid-nineteenth century, interest in the Pacific of the major Imperial powers of 
the day, Britain and France, had waned. Britain had considerable economic interests 
east of Aden and key trading posts in Singapore, Hong Kong, Natal, India, and New 
Zealand,57 while Australia provided penitentiary lodgings for British criminals. 
Annexation of additional regions would have been costly for Britain to administer and 
would have provided no real economic or strategic benefit.  
France during the same period was in a state of political flux. The demise of the 
Napoleonic Empire led to turmoil as Bonapartists, Monarchists and Republicans jostled 
for power.58 The July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe was loathe to jeopardise France’s 
relationship with Britain,59 and rejected the idea of further colonial expansion in the 
Pacific.60 Burgeoning unemployment led to street rioting and the brutal military 
repression of the les journées de juin. Thousands were wounded and massacred and 
thousands more were captured and deported.61 In these tumultuous circumstances, the 
aspirations of the Marists to annex New Caledonia remained dormant. In 1851 
Louis-Napoléon, with his constitutional term at an end, dissolved the National 
Assembly, and by plebiscite changed the constitution, thus providing himself with a 
second unlimited term of office. Louis-Napoléon became Napoleon III, Emperor of the 
                                                
57 During the first half of the nineteenth century Britain secured sovereignty over: Singapore (1819), 
Aden (1839), Hong Kong (1842), New Zealand (1840), Natal (1842) and India was annexed in 1847. 
58 In the first thirty years of the nineteenth century there were seven changes of Government in France: 
the Consulate (1799-1804), the 1st Empire (Napoleon 1, 1804-1814) the 1st Restoration (Louis XVIII, 
1814-1815), the Hundred Days (Napoleon, 1815), the 2nd Restoration (Louis XVIII, 1815-1824), Charles 
X (1824-1830), July Monarchy (Louis-Philippe 1st, 1830-1848). 
59 This decision was fortuitous. When the King abdicated in February 1848, he fled in ignominious style 
to Britain. In 1871 Napoleon III also sought refuge as a political refugee in Britain. Instability in France 
became the butt of British journalistic humour. The Times (8 March 1871, p. 9) reported: ‘France is the 
political volcano of the Continent, and Paris is its crater. The expulsion of dynasty after dynasty has been 
more regular than the eruptions of Vesuvius.’ 
60 The annexation of Algeria had taken place in 1830 during the reign of Charles X. 
61 This insurrection was the subject of Victor Hugo’s novel Les Misérables. 
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Second Empire62 and, free from the shackles of the old constitution, he was now able to 
reassert French influence in Europe and around the world. 
France takes possession 
In 1853, Napoleon III gave the order to Théodore Ducos, Minister of Marines and 
Colonies, to annex New Caledonia. This annexation would, as well as pleasing the 
friends of the Marist mission,63 provide a refuelling station for ships en route to the 
emerging China market. France had a naval base at Valparaiso to provide military 
protection for her interests in the Pacific, but for the navy to be reliant upon a foreign 
country was unsatisfactory, and supply was uncertain and irregular (Person 1961, 
p. 151). The establishment of a base in the Pacific on French land became a priority. 
The missionaries were eager for French annexation in order to stem the advance of 
British ‘heresy’ which was causing them as much concern and more conflict than 
paganism. Fears of British possession escalated when British warships began 
hydrographical exercises in the area. This was noted by Fr Montrouzier: ‘Il y a ici trois 
HMS, deux vont aller prendre possession de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, que la Grande 
Bretagne va occuper, ce qui bouleversa Mgr Douarre.’ (Fr Montrouzier, personal 
communication, 30 August 1851, cited in Person 1953, p. 177). Fr Montrouzier’s 
conviction that a British move to annex the country was imminent was so strong that he 
engaged an English-speaking Marist in Sydney to teach him English ‘pour pouvoir me 
débrouiller à mon retour en Nouvelle-Calédonie, que la Grande-Bretagne va occuper’. 
(Fr Montrouzier, personal communication, 27 September 1851, cited in Person 1953, 
p. 177).  
                                                
62 After the coup d’état on 2 December 1851 Victor Hugo sought refuge in Guernsey where he remained 
in exile until the fall of Louis-Napoléon. A bitter opponent of Louis-Napoléon, Hugo showed no pity for 
this ‘pitiless man’ whose power mongering he described as ‘treachery in conception, perjury in the 
execution, murder and assassination in the struggle, spoliation, swindling and robbery in the triumph.’ 
(Hugo 1909, p. 12). 
63 In 1848 Louis-Napoléon by obtaining the support of the Church gained victory over the Republicans. 
As the Concordat 1 of 1801 was still in place, Catholicism was recognised as the religion of the majority 
of French citizens but not the ‘official religion’ of the State as had been the case during the reign of 
Charles X [1824-1830] when Catholicism had regained its pre-revolutionary position. Under Concordat 
1, Cardinals sat in the Senate and clerical salaries were paid by the State. Despite the Emperor’s support 
of the Catholic Church and Pope Pius IX, by providing French troops to protect the Papal State, there 
remained points of dissension between Church and State especially in matters concerned with education 
and politics (Maurain 1930, p. 911). 
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The advantages of British annexation were recognised in Australia and New Zealand, 
but Downing Street remained indifferent, and no action was taken. Britain and France 
were, during this period, allied in the battle to stop Russian aggression against Turkey in 
the Crimea (1853-56), and Britain was not prepared to challenge the limits of meum et 
tuum, and risk a fallout with the Emperor. Anxious to counter British dominance in the 
Western Pacific, the Emperor was well aware of the geopolitical benefits of 
annexation.64 He also realised the possible advantage of clearing the mouldering naval 
prisons in France by sending prisoners to the other end of the world and using them as 
manpower to construct the new colony. 
In Australia, the newspaper baron, John Fairfax, and his Sydney Morning Herald editor, 
the Reverend John West, were strongly opposed to the transportation of felons to the 
colonies. Transportation had ceased in New South Wales in 1840, in Moreton Bay in 
1839 and in Tasmania 1853 and for Australia, and New Zealand, the prospect of having 
French brigands on the doorstep was intolerable.65 
Despite opposition, Napoleon III sent instructions to a number of people to act: to Rear 
Admiral Laguerre, commander of the Naval Division of Réunion and the Indian Ocean, 
to Tardy de Montravel, and to Febvrier-Despointes, Commander of the Pacific Division. 
Febvrier-Despointes was first to arrive at Balade and, in the presence of Marist priests 
Rougeyron, Forestier and Vigouroux and local chiefs, he took possession of New 
Caledonia and its dependencies in the name of his Imperial Majesty, Napoleon III, 
Emperor of the French (Person 1961, p. 182).66  
With the possession of the country in hand, the American barque, John H. Millay, was 
chartered to deliver a copy of the procès verbal to M. Sentis, the French consul in 
Sydney.  
                                                
64 With the advent of steam ships and the opening of the Panama Canal, interest in New Caledonia as a 
possible site for a refuelling depot was aroused. Warships began to roil the seas: the British warship the 
Havannah commanded by Captain John Elphinstone Erskine in 1849, the Fly (1849), l’Alcmène (Captain 
Harcourt) and HMS Bremble (Person 1953, p. 166). 
65 ‘No sooner, therefore, have we got rid of British convictism, than we are threatened with French 
convictism. An unlimited collection of Parisian brigands within a short and easy voyage of our northern 
coasts.’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 3 November 1853, p. 4). See also Donohoo (2013). 
66 Bishop Douarre, who had laboured for annexation, passed way just months before it was achieved. 
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Trans-Tasman protest and French ownership under dispute 
When the news became public, there was an outcry on both sides of the Tasman. A 
flurry of letters to the local press and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies decried 
the ‘cruelty, treachery and faithlessness’ (Sydney Morning Herald 3 November 1853, 
p. 4) of the French. The British Government was also criticised for shilly-shallying and 
wasting time on enquiries and correspondence: 
But while England and the English, although possessing most extensive 
colonies in the vicinity of these islands, have remained unaccountably 
blind to their importance, France and the French appear to have been 
awake, and to have understood fully not only the importance of the 
islands themselves, but the facility with which the rights of the weak 
races which possessed them could be set aside. 
(Sydney Morning Herald 3 November 1853, p. 4). 
Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand, wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, with the request that the French should be informed that the 
Isle of Pines and New Caledonia were considered to be British Territories by the British 
Government and the French should not take any further action until the question of 
ownership was settled (AtoJsOnline 1877).67 Despite warnings of the vulnerability of 
British Pacific possessions and the need to avoid conflict in the region, Britain refused 
to act. Allied in Europe, in the Pacific Britain and France were rivals, and during the 
‘cat and mouse’ antics the Kanak were mere pawns in the game. 
50,000 natives dispossessed 
The Kanak, the indigenous population of New Caledonia, lived in established villages 
on shared tribal land that, as acknowledged by the Noumea Accord, was taken 
illegitimately by France without establishing proper relations with the indigenous 
                                                
67 In 1848, Rev. John Dunmore Lang, Presbyterian Minister, noted that Britain had the right of possession 
of New Caledonia as it had been discovered by Captain Cook. Lang also wrote to the German 
Government in Frankfurt suggesting German annexation. In 1847 43,000 Germans had emigrated to New 
York and in the opinion of Lang it would be preferable for them to have their own colony where they 
would be able to speak their own language and have their own laws and institutions. New Caledonia was 
proposed as a suitable site: ‘The territory referred to consists of a series of larger islands of the Western 
Pacific Ocean, and particularly the large island of New Caledonia, situated within a few hundred miles of 
the East Coast of Australia.’ (Roots 2004, p. 45). 
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population, whatever the norms of ‘international law’ recognised by the leading powers 
of the day.68 The Kanak cultivated crops by means of elaborate irrigation systems, and 
had an accepted framework of customary justice. Yet despite this, according to the 
international law of the day and the French Civil Code, by the signing of a treaty, prior 
ownership rights became invalid. The treaty was drawn up by the French, to the 
advantage of the French, and only understood by the French. It was a unilateral 
manifestation of the Emperor’s command. Native law and custom were swept aside by 
flag, gun and treaty. The Kanak, numbering around fifty thousand in 1853,69 were 
stripped of the land of their ancestors that was essential for their very being. 
With annexation, the country came under the authority of the Military Administrators of 
the EFO, some 5000 kilometres away in Tahiti, and the Administrators,70 with a 
military force of only 187, relied upon their superior armoury to quell native uprisings; 
at times, reinforcements had to be brought in from Tahiti. This occurred when violence 
erupted in June 1854, as large tracts of land were expropriated from the Koindo, 
Kandio, Jack and Goumbar tribes to make way for the township of Port-de-France71 and 
violence erupted. Generally, conflict was between ancient tribal rivals, but when 
missions or settlers were attacked, the military was quick to react by burning villages 
and destroying crops. Despite the superior weaponry and technological advantage of the 
French, the age-old method of retribution as used by the Kanak, à la suite de la guerre, 
was resorted to by way of French reprisal. The taking of prisoners was considered too 
costly. In confrontation with the military, the natives offered no resistance and took to 
                                                
68 Notwithstanding the ‘good old rule of history’ as proposed by Sir Walter Scott (1813, p. 382), ‘that 
they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can’, it is debatable whether the notion 
of terra nullius, which came into common parlance to justify Imperial colonisation (in the belief that 
indigenous peoples were not sufficiently civilised to comprehend or warrant land ownership), can be 
applied to New Caledonia. In 1998, in the Noumea Accord, France accepted that it had acted 
illegitimately in taking possession of New Caledonia, but that this action had been in line with certain 
international practice at the time. The document states that ‘ce territoire n’était pas vide’. 
69 Filippi & Angleviel (2000a, p. 33) provide a figure of 40,000 to 60,000. 
70 Contre-amiral A. Febrier-Despointes from 24 September 1853 until 1 January 1854; Capitaine de 
Vaisseau Tardy de Montravel from 1 January 1854 until 31 October 1854; Capitaine de Vaisseau Joseph 
du Bouzet from January 18 1855 until 28 October 1856; Chef de Bataillon Jules Testard 18 January 1856 
until 21 December 1856; Capitaine de Corvette Le Bris 25 May 1856 until 5 May 1857; Capitaine de 
Genie Roussel from 21 December 1858 until 20 March 1859; Chef de Bataillon Durand 20 March 1859 
until 1 July 1860; Capitaine de Vaisseau Saissel from 22 May 1859 until 2 April 1860. (Congrès de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie n.d.). 
71 This name was later changed to Nouméa due to confusion caused between Port-de-France (New 
Caledonia) and Fort-de-France (Martinique) for the postal system. 
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the hills. They were not pursued; the effort of rebuilding was considered punishment 
enough. 
In the north-east of the country, where British traders had established a stronghold and 
anti-French feeling ran high, hostility frequently led to warfare. In September 1859 the 
troops under M. Saisset,72 the acting Commandant, were transported in the warships the 
Styx and the Calédonienne, to Hienghène. In the battle that followed, a French soldier, 
Captain Tricot, was killed and another, Bauville, died later of injuries received. As a 
result, villages were destroyed and three Englishmen who fought with the natives were 
taken prisoner and shot. Another five British nationals who were captured faced 
deportation or the death penalty (Colquilhat 1987b). The Kanak were forcibly 
suppressed. 
Administrators and the ambiguity of land spoliation 
A major cause of conflict was the expropriation of tribal land. Since annexation, land 
rights were in the hands of the Administrators, military men who had little 
understanding of the legislation as it related to property. Admiral Du Bouzet73 on 
20 January 1855 provided an initial declaration relating to land title. This was on the 
premise that by taking possession of a land ‘non encore occupé par une nation civilisée 
et possédé seulement par des tribus sauvages’ (Merle 1999, p. 5), all previous 
ownership title was cancelled, and natives had no right to dispose of land which they 
occupied either jointly or severally by sale or exchange. The government had the 
exclusive right to purchase land occupied by natives. Therein the ambiguity: if natives 
are able to sell land to the Government, do they own the land, which they have 
cultivated, or do they merely have tenancy rights? The rights to land that had been 
purchased prior to annexation were repealed and had to be renegotiated with the 
Administrator. In theory, these measures were put in place to protect the unwary native 
from unscrupulous settlers. In practice, it provided the Administration with absolute 
control of land which was required for French settlement (Conseil Général 1887, p. 8). 
The Du Bouzet declaration, while conforming with the international law74 of the day 
                                                
72 Jean-Marie Saisset, acting Commandant for Jean Durand, 22 May 1859 to 2 April 1869. 
73 Joseph Fidèleugène du Bouzet, Commandant 18 January 1855 to 28 October 1856. 
74 International laws were at the time written by the major Imperial powers and therefore favoured 
colonisation. 
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and Article 713 of the French Civil Code concerning ‘vacant’ land (Merle 1999, p. 5), 
ruptured native ties to the land and disrupted Kanak agricultural practices. For decades, 
the issue of land rights continued to be a major source of conflict.75  
The Imperial arrogance of the day gave credence to the belief that the uncivilised 
inhabitants of a country exert only limited rights over land. This legitimised the 
appropriation of the territory by force, treaty or occupation by a ‘civilised’76 colonising 
power (Merle 1999, p. 4). Under the military administration, vast areas of land were 
expropriated.77 Settlement was favoured in areas around military posts and large areas 
of land controlled by Kouindo, Kandio and Angara around Port-de-France were 
allocated, which led to discontent and violence. Louis-Théodore Bérard, who settled on 
land acquired at the foot of Mont-Dore with a dozen other settlers and about forty New 
Hebridean labourers, was the victim of an uprising in 1857. Bérard and twenty-seven 
others, including fifteen New Hebrideans (Douglas 1980, pp. 32-33), were killed in the 
attack. The innocent settler paid the price for administrative magnanimity, ignorance 
and arrogance. 
The land that was sold by the Administrators was not vacant and ownerless, but tribal 
land with centuries old ties to the indigenous community. It was the blood of the 
ancestors, the very root of Kanak existence. With annexation, the entire territory 
claimed by France left the Kanak usufructuaries of their own land. As Kanak, land was 
lost so, too, was native identity, power and social position. Anti-French sentiment 
escalated and erupted into violent conflict with the continuing cycle of land spoliation, 
revolt and repression.  
                                                
75 Land rights continue to be a source of angst for the Kanak. In 2014 Bergé Kawa, a descendant of Chief 
Ataï, describes a lifetime of fighting for the return of tribal land: ‘Toute sa vie […] il se sera battu pour la 
restitution des terres dont son clan s’estime spolié.’ (Le Monde 29 August 2014). 
76 The definition of ‘civilised’ in the Oxford dictionary is ‘brought to an advanced state of social 
development’. But this begs the question of whether technological advancement and materialism equate 
to greater social advancement than life in a shared community which lives in harmony with the natural 
environment. 
77 In 1857 for example; on 2 January 136 hectares were granted to Vial d’Aran, Bérard et Cie, at Boulari; 
on 25 October 200 hectares went to the relatives of M. Bérard and on 15 December 3200 hectares were 
provided for the Marist mission at Conception and St Louis. In 1858, on 17 February 40,000 hectares 
were attributed to MM Byrne and Brown, on 23 August 500 hectares at Boulari to M. Darnaud Ernest, on 
12 December 4000 hectares to M. J. Paddon at Païta and on 19 December 4000 hectares to M. Joubert. 
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Free settlers were slow to arrive. The lure of land in a country which was set to become 
a penal colony, and which was inhabited by cannibals,78 failed to attract immigrants. 
When New Caledonia, by Imperial Decree, gained independence from the EFO on 
14 January 1860, the European civilian population was a mere 420 (Gille & Leca 2012, 
p. 107) and colonisation was stagnant. 
Civiliser, produire, réhabiliter: Charles Guillain, the First Governor 
(1862-1870)79 
Étrange personnage à visage multiple, brillant par son intelligence, 
fascinant par ses initiatives, déroutant par son ambigüité, et menaçant par 
son autoritarisme qui n’exclut nullement la ruse et la duplicité. Partisan 
du principe qu’il faut diviser pour régner, il s’efforcera, mais en vain de 
jouer du clergé colonial de Nouméa contre le pro vicaire, des Sœurs de 
Saint-Joseph contre les Maristes, des protestants contre les catholiques, 
des chefs et des tribus païens contre les chefs et les tribus chrétiennes.  
(Delbos 1993, p. 136). 
The first Governor of New Caledonia, Charles Guillain, was heralded as ‘[…] the 
legitimate hope for a better future for New Caledonia’ (Sydney Morning Herald 
23 August 1862, p. 2). He arrived on 2 June 1862 with instructions to open a penal 
settlement, to encourage free migration and to civilise the indigenous cannibal 
population. Inspired by the revolutionary French philosopher François Fourier, Guillain 
had ambitions for a socialist utopia, France Australe in the Pacific. He aimed to put into 
practice his Saint-Simonien ideals of utopian socialism by combining the disparate 
groups in his charge: convicts, free settlers and Kanak in closed communities, 
phalanxes, with a central communal building, the phalanstery. It was expected that the 
phalanx community would work together in harmonious collaboration and become 
self-supporting. Bound in this melting-pot environment, people would become more 
tolerant, convicts would be rehabilitated, and natives would be assimilated as civilised 
                                                
78 Montrouzier (1870, p. 32) describes the chef of ‘Jengen’ (Hienghène) slaughtering humans for 
consumption, while Garnier refers to ‘nos malheureux cannibales’ and also describes cannibal feasts. 
79 ‘Civiliser, produire, réhabiliter’ was the motto Guillain proposed for the New Caledonian coat of arms. 
It was to appear below the figures of a convict and a Melanesian (Clifford 1982, p. 47). 
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Kanak Frenchmen in a French Pacific paradise: ‘C’est le contact permanent, le travail et 
la patience qui unifieront les peuples d’Orient et d’Occident’ (Reuillard 1992, p. 477).  
Little consideration was given to the Kanak. Decisions that would affect them 
profoundly were made unilaterally and without consultation. When the phalanstery was 
built, land of a Catholic tribe near Yaté was chosen. This led to conflict, the destruction 
of property, police intervention and its ultimate abandonment. Undeterred, the Governor 
decided to attempt a more gradual assimilation by corralling the natives in reserves 
where they could be more readily controlled: 
[…] traitant ainsi les indigènes comme des troupeaux de bétail que l’on 
met sous la garde de tel ou tel stockman et groupant ceux-ci sous 
l’autorité d’un stockman principal. Il ne s’occupe pas de savoir s’il n’y a 
d’inconvénients à ce groupement arbitraire et si on ne va pas par là 
exciter les susceptibilités, la jalousie des tribus, des familles.  
(Legeard 2004, p. 66). 
In 1868, Le Moniteur published the details of this project undertaken by M. Mathieu, 
the Colonial Secretary. The aim was to create ‘inalienable and non-transferable 
reservations’ that would protect the natives from the inescapable progress of 
colonisation and the ‘retrograde influence’ of the Marist priests (Reuillard 1992, 
p. 514). It seems incongruous that, concomitant with the establishment of native 
reserves, was the intention that Kanak contact with the Western world should be 
increased in order to facilitate assimilation and decrease chiefly dominance. Guillain 
had been informed by his predecessor, Jean Durand,80 of the power of the Melanesian 
chiefs, of their hostility to foreign interference in tribal matters and of the importance of 
gaining chiefly support. The plan to reduce chiefly dominance could therefore only 
further strain relations (Reuillard 1992, p. 501).81  
                                                
80 Jean Durand was Administrator from 20 March 1859 to 10 January 1860. 
81 M. Mathieu on 22 January 1868 reported: ‘La propriété individuelle ne sera longtemps, pour le plus 
grand nombre, qu’un mot, les plaçant entre un droit et un fait contradictoires, c’est-à-dire entre une 
propriété qu’on leur reconnaît et des coutumes enracinées leur défendant d’en disposer […] l’indivision 
est dans leurs mœurs, nous le pouvons avoir la prétention de changer des mœurs par notre seule volonté. 
La propriété collective est un fait consacré par le temps et la tradition, acceptons-la, mais seulement 
comme moyen de transition […] car telle qu’elle est l’expérience nous révèle que partout où la 
surveillance de l’Administration ne peut s’exercer, les indigènes sont livrés à l’arbitraire du chef dont la 
domination matérielle et morale est une cause de retard dans leur progrès.’ (Le Moniteur 26 January 
1868, cited in Reuillard 1992, p. 501). 
 52 
Guillain’s idea of using the native reserve as a buffer between the native and Western 
world was not shared by his superiors in France who believed that the establishment of 
reserves would limit rather than promote assimilation. For this Guillain received a 
Ministerial rebuke. In fact, when Guillain arrived in New Caledonia in 1862 large tracts 
of tribal land had already been appropriated, and the relationship between the 
administration and native was tense. Guillain’s initial intention was to restrict military 
intervention, as he wrote to the Minister in April 1863: 
Ce n’est pas la politique d’expédition et d’occupation militaire que je 
plaide ici, c’est simplement la politique d’organisation et de civilisation, 
cette politique pacifique qui consiste à lier de bonnes relations avec des 
indigènes, à nous faire connaître et aimer d’eux en les conseillant et 
dirigeant suivant leur propre intérêt. 
(Reuillard 1992, p. 484). 
To bring Kanak and European together in peaceful coexistence, Guillain created a 
model farm at Yahoué and agricultural centres at Fonwahy and Néméara. However, the 
situation became untenable and this experiment was aborted (Gille & Leca 2012, 
p. 108). In the quest for assimilation, Guillain was single-minded, there was no 
dialogue, and neither Church nor Kanak was consulted. Guillain was committed to the 
development of the colony. He began work on the essential infrastructure of roads, port, 
military hospital, a legal system and schools, but his intransigence and strong 
anticlerical views soon brought Church and Government into the field of combat. 
Guillain was a visionary leader; his reforms were rapid and progressive. He introduced 
a smallpox immunisation program for European children and natives,82 an eight-hour 
working day, and free schooling, which was compulsory and secular.83 Along the way, 
he made many enemies. Decisions made in haste were at times ill-conceived. Land was 
demarcated for tribal use, but when more was required for penal settlement and free 
settlers, the area set aside for native reserves had to be revised downwards. With each 
wave of immigrants, the Kanak were pushed onto less fertile land so that food 
                                                
82 ‘The Government of New Caledonia having received lymph from Paris has called upon parents to 
present their children at the Colonial Secretary’s Office for vaccination.’ (Sydney Morning Herald 
25 March 1869, p. 14). This may be a reference to smallpox. 
83 Free compulsory and secular schooling was introduced in New Caledonia thirteen years before the 
Jules Ferry laws in France. 
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production for the clan was jeopardised. According to Delbos, the removal of natives to 
the fringes of white settlement left them with a diet of coconuts and fish, with neither of 
these in reliable supply: 
Sans parler de l’injustice à expulser de leur terre ces pauvres naturels, il 
y aurait la perspective de les voir disparaître en peu de temps, soit par la 
famine car le cocotier ne peut suffire et la pêche n’est pas toujours 
heureuse ni possible, soit par la maladie soit par leur contact avec les 
européens.  
(Delbos 1993, p. 138). 
Between 1868 and 1872, the area of appropriated land increased from 30,000 hectares 
to 150,000 hectares which, in 1872, was distributed between 402 titleholders, fourteen 
of whom owned 56% of the land. For the establishment of a penitentiary, 110,000 
hectares was claimed, which included the entire Île Nou. While the Kanak struggled to 
eke a living from limited acreage, for others the distribution was generous and at times 
incongruous. For example, by decree, Empress Eugénie’s chamberlain, M. le Marquis 
de Trazégnies d’Ittre, received 500 hectares which he never intended to inhabit (Gille & 
Leca 2012). The resettlement of tribes on the land of hereditary rival tribes and the 
reorientation of native hierarchies was disastrous and led to violent conflict. 
The paternalistic and philanthropic ideals of Guillain were often lost in their translation, 
and violent confrontation was found to be a more effective way of establishing law and 
order. He wrote to the Minister in April 1863:  
Politique pacifique et conciliatrice tant que le développement normal de 
nos établissements n’exigera pas que nous reculions les limites de notre 
domination, si alors les moyens diplomatiques ne nous ont pas permis 
d’y arriver sans coup férir, il sera temps d’employer la force et ceci avec 
un succès d’autant plus prompt que nos moyens d’action se seront 
accrus. 
(ANSOM, fonds Nouvelle-Calédonie, carton 42 Memoire de Guillain. 
Essai de colonisation pénale à la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Paris 9 juillet 
1861, cited in Reuillard 1992, p. 484). 
Towards the end of 1862, conflict erupted in the region of Koumac. European settlers 
were attacked and their properties were burnt and ransacked. A general exodus of 
settlers followed and, by governmental decree, coastal traders were forbidden to engage 
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with the natives of that area. Guillain dispatched a detachment of sixty soldiers to the 
area to establish peace. His instructions to Mathieu, the Colonial Secretary, in 
November 1863 state: ‘nos soldats devront s’abstenir de le faire et se garder de tout 
mauvais traitement envers les indigènes; ordre, modération, prise d’une bonne position 
pour être maître de terrain’. (Reuillard 1992, p. 486). Hope for a peaceful submission 
was in vain. The soldiers, greatly outnumbered, were forced to act and this resulted in 
the death of many natives and the destruction of native homes and villages. Tombonna, 
the militant chief, despite losing his land to the military, refused to acquiesce and for a 
year an administrative ban remained on the north of the island (Reuillard 1992, p. 487). 
From the time of his arrival, Guillain was faced with outbreaks of tribal resistance to 
European settlement around Wagap and Touho. The Marist missions were attacked and 
burnt in 1862, settlers were menaced, their plantations destroyed and cattle killed. In 
1864 the war chief of Gaté, Gondou, with a thousand Ponérihouen warriors attacked 
and ate the crew of La Reine des Iles, and a month later the crew of Le Secret.84 When 
Taillard, a settler near Wagap, was assassinated by Poindi-Patchili,85 an ally of 
Gondou,86 Guillain dispatched military reinforcements to protect the settlers and 
missionaries. As aggression in the area intensified, the tribes of Bourate and Kahoua 
from Hienghène joined forces with the military to establish law and order in the region. 
Guillain’s Saint-Simonien ideal of bringing together in situ European values and the 
primitive practices of the indigenous world was severely challenged. As attacks 
increased and several villages between Touho and Koné were destroyed, Guillain feared 
widespread aggression and had little alternative other than to establish more military 
outposts and rally sympathetic tribes. Those tribes that had been dispossessed by 
Gondou were happy to join the French. The military and pro-French natives set out on a 
mission of destruction, traversing the country, burning villages and destroying crops. 
The toll of these military expeditions was considerable: several French were wounded 
and several hundred natives were killed (Sydney Morning Herald 21 October 1865, 
p. 5). It was not until 1869 that an expedition from Wagap captured and killed Gondou. 
                                                
84 These assassinations occurred on a bay which has since been named ‘Plateau des massacres’. 
85 Poindi-Patchili was a minor chief from the village of Tiouano (Wagap). 
86 Gondou, ‘quittant parfois les montagnes qui lui servent de repaire, il fond sur ses voisins, saccage les 
villages, enlève les femmes, dépossède les chefs […] La case de ses ancêtres dissipait sous les crânes des 
victimes qu’il dévorées ; le farouche Gondou n’est pas un homme, c’est un chien altéré de sang ; il ne 
parle pas, il aboie. Il mord ceux qui l’approchent. Il est tellement affamé qu’il vous dévorera tous et finira 
par se manger lui-même lorsqu’il sera seul sur la terre.’ (De La Hautière 1869, p. 171). 
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This rebellion led by Gondou predated that of Ataï who, in 1878, organised widespread 
resistance to colonisation in the La Foa area. 
The Marists and government in opposition 
Conflict in the area around Pouebo flared again in 1867. Tension arose in 1865 when 
the land of a Catholic tribe was expropriated to accommodate newly arrived settlers. 
The local priests, Fathers Villard and Guitta,87 drew up a petition of protest for the 
Catholic chief Hippolyte to present to the Governor, whereupon the Governor, who was 
no friend of the Catholics, exiled Hippolyte to the Isle of Pines where he died six 
months later.88 The rumour was that he had been assassinated. The anti-governor, 
anti-settler priests became a target for the pro-Administration press.89 Such was the 
coverage of the media that Guitta took action against the radical press and won a 
defamation case. The affair ended when settlers, their children and a gendarme were 
massacred.90 Guillain mobilised soldiers in the area, and ten of the assailants were 
arrested and transferred to Noumea where they were tried and after seventeen lengthy 
hearings sentenced to death by guillotine (L’œuvre de la Mission Mariste en 
Nouvelle-Calédonie 1901, p. 31). Adolphe le Boucher91 was charged with the defence 
of some of the accused before the criminal tribunal in Noumea. In his pleading, by 
reference to customary law, he found the chief Napoléon Ouarébate not guilty. The 
priests, Villard and Guitta, were condemned for inciting native hostility toward the 
settlers and removed from the mission (Colquilhat 1989; Guiart 1994, p. 117). These 
events led to the redistribution of customary land and the restructuring of customary 
                                                
87 Father Guitta reappeared on Maré during the conflict which resulted in the expulsion of Rev. Jones. 
88 In 1865 the sénatus-consulte impérial gave authority to colonial administrators to bypass judicial 
authorities in matters relating to crime and punishment of subjects. It also deprived the Catholic Church 
of supremacy on colonial soil. 
89 ‘À peine débarqué, le 2 juin, Guillain se met tout de suite du travail. Son premier soin dès le 7, est 
d’assurer le contrôle de la presse et par suite de l’opinion en prenant ce jour-là un arrêté qui fait de son 
chef d’état-major, M. Mathieu, le directeur du journal, Le Moniteur de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Geste très 
significatif de celui qui veut accaparer l’influence en l’arrachant aux maristes. L’organe officiel de la 
colonie devient, en effet, à partir de ce jour-là, le porte-parole officieux du gouverneur. Très tôt baptisé 
« Le Menteur », par l’opposition.’ (Delbos 1993, pp. 141-142). 
90 See Sydney Morning Herald (4 November 1867, p. 5) and Delbos (1993, p. 155). The victims included 
M. Bailly, Quartermaster of the guards and Commander of conscription at Pouebo; Venturini, a private; 
Démené, colour-sergeant; his two sons, one aged six years and the other four months; a native of 
Eromanga; four natives of the Sandwich Islands and one from Lifou. Fourteen others were wounded. 
91 Governor of New Caledonia from 22 July 1884 to 13 May 1886. 
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authority whereby hereditary chiefs were replaced by administrative chiefs who were 
prepared to cooperate with the government. To encourage natives to adopt a Western 
work ethic, a contingent of thirty men was to be sent each day to work at the Military 
base in Pouebo (Saussol 1969, pp. 116-117). A final military expedition in 1869 with 
almost three hundred soldiers and native allies destroyed the villages and crops of the 
last of the rebellious tribes.92  
The early years of Guillain’s governorship were difficult; his republican ideals could 
not be reconciled with the Imperial reality, battles broke out around the country, land 
had to be found for settlers and convicts, and worst of all was the ‘enemy of progress,’ 
the Church on the mainland, where the Marists reigned supreme.93 To contain their 
influence, new and draconian restrictions were placed on Catholic schools, and 
members of Catholic tribes were sent to work for the Government in Port-de-France 
(Noumea). This led to conflict (Delbos 1993, p. 143). 
Wars of religion on the Loyalty Islands 
The situation became dire on the Loyalty Islands when Marists, aided by the French 
Administration, entered the fray and a French Catholic, British Protestant intertribal 
battlefield was drawn. On Lifou there was a strong Protestant following and the 
possibility of a French–Catholic takeover was heeded by the LMS who countered the 
move by installing two British missionaries. Guillain entered, tilting on all fronts; the 
Saint-Simonien ideal of a Universal Family had become an impossible dream and the 
gap between civilisations, religions, and tribes had widened.  
                                                
92 According to Mathieu: ‘J’ai pensé que […] vous (les indigènes) et nous pouvions vivre les uns à côté 
des autres […] Comprenant que l’Union fait la force, il faudra que les divers éléments de la population 
coloniale se rapprochent dans le but, de la part des indigènes d’aider la colonisation européenne par le 
travail de la part des colons, de concourir aux progrès de la colonisation chez les aborigènes en se 
montrant bienveillants et justes dans leur relations avec ces derniers ; de la part de tous, en donnant 
satisfaction au gouvernement voulant faire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie une colonie chrétienne, industrielle, 
digne du drapeau qui la couvre.’ (Le Moniteur 28 June 1869, cited in Reuillard 1992, p. 498). 
93 After French annexation, both John Jones and Samuel Macfarlane sought permission to establish 
mission stations on Grande Terre but this was refused. On Grande Terre, the Catholics reigned supreme. 
It was not until 1854 (Ouvéa), 1857 (Lifou) and 1866 (Maré) that the Catholics arrived on the Loyalty 
Group which the Protestants had evangelised since 1841.The situation became explosive. 
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Guillain’s intolerance of religion, both Catholic94 and Protestant, exacerbated 
pre-existing problems and the islands became a stage for tripartite discontent and 
conflict. The Marist priests were suspicious of the Protestants and the encroachment of 
heresy, and the Protestants were wary of the intentions of the Marists:  
[…] dangerous individuals whose influence saps the foundations of 
public tranquillity […] whose efforts tend rather to the injury than 
advantage of society […] Popery is as much the wolf as ever […] it 
prowls along on the frontier of the heathen world. 
(Macfarlane 1873, p. 99, p. 117)  
From this cauldron of roiling hatred, ‘primitive’ man was introduced to ‘civilisation.’95 
The government, with control of the military, held the upper hand and by means of 
bullets, bayonets, galleys and prisons, the ability to rule. Cloak and dagger activity ran 
high. The Government believed that the Protestant missionaries were covert British 
agents who were working to extend the political and commercial interests of England 
(Macfarlane 1873, p. 158). This was clearly illustrated in a decree of 3 July 1864 which 
was signed by the Governor M. Guillain, ‘considering that, under cover of the 
Protestant religion, strangers have sought to denationalise the population of the Loyalty 
Islands’ (Le Moniteur 3 July 1864, cited in Sydney Morning Herald 1 September 1864, 
p. 5). 
To discourage Protestant expansion, the Governor reclaimed land that had been 
purchased by the Protestant Church and outlawed teaching in languages other than 
French,96 which effectively closed Protestant schools, which had taught in the local 
languages for around twenty years. The Marists were not exempt from the rancour of 
the anti-clerical Governor who decided to open a secular school at Chépénéhé. One 
hundred natives from the newly converted Catholic tribes were recruited for the 
construction. A protest mounted by the High Chiefs of Wetr and Gaica, Ukeneso and 
Sainou, about this forced labour earned them ten months incarceration at 
Port-de-France. Until this time, the Marists had continued their work which had often 
                                                
94 ‘Le christianisme est le grand obstacle au progrès ; et le catholicisme en est la forme la plus 
dangereuse. La présence du prêtre parmi les indigènes retardera leur civilisation de cinquante ans.’ 
(Forestier, cited in Delbos 1993, p. 137). 
95 The natives were quick to capitalise on religious and national differences that existed between the 
missions.  
96 By decree published in Le Moniteur October 1863 (cited in Macfarlane 1873, p. 132). 
 58 
been openly facilitated by the Commandant, but this support was due to their nationality 
and not their religion (Macfarlane 1873, p. 221).  
Lifou is declared a military zone 
Until 1864, the definition of ‘French dependencies of New Caledonia’ was unclear. 
France had not taken formal possession of the Loyalty Islands, French sovereignty of 
the islands was in doubt, and so the Protestants continued to pursue their mission of 
preaching, teaching and establishing their own code of law and order. These laws were 
embraced by the natives who applied them with gusto. So enthusiastic were the native 
‘policemen’ that law enforcement often led to friction, violence and a decline of the 
public order they were attempting to uphold. Trouble arose when a Catholic colonist, 
Williamson, complained to Governor Guillain of the treatment he received at the hands 
of the native ‘police’ as they as they went about applying the laws of the British 
missionaries (Macfarlane 1873).97 A fact-finding mission sent to the island exonerated 
Macfarlane, but the attention of the Administration had now been drawn to troubles in 
the Loyalty Islands. 
The French disapproved of the application of laws other than those of the French 
Government. To clarify the situation, an instruction arrived from the Minister of Navy 
and Colonies, the Marquis de Chasseloup-Larbat, to Governor Guillain advising him to 
ensure that the authority of the French over the Loyalty Group was understood and 
undisputed. This was duly achieved by flag and warship.  
On 2 May 1864, a detachment of twenty-five soldiers under the command of Eugène 
Bourgey was sent to Chépénéhé. The Commandant requisitioned the Protestant church 
for a garrison, ordered the Protestants of Wainya’s tribe to build accommodation for the 
soldiers and threatened to burn down their houses should there be any delay. Lifou was 
declared a military zone. With a military camp on his doorstep, Macfarlane began a 
campaign of formal written protests to Guillain in Noumea. A month later Guillain, 
with battles now raging in all directions, retaliated by sending Commander Testard and 
three hundred soldiers, ‘a large proportion of whom are armed convicts’ (Sydney 
                                                
97 Williamson, according to Macfarlane (1873, pp. 212-213), was a slave-driver who arrived at Lifou 
from South America. He found that the people of Lifou were not prepared to submit to his discipline and 
when they tied him to a coconut tree for half an hour he was ‘enraged and indignant’ and resolved to see 
what he could do through the Government at New Caledonia. 
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Morning Herald 25 February 1865, p. 4), to Chépénéhé. The force of the attack put any 
resistance out of the question.  
During a prayer meeting the Protestant Church was attacked and the surrounding 
buildings were burnt, which was a blow for the Reverend Macfarlane, who had 
encouraged and instructed the natives in the building of lath and plaster houses. 
Chépénéhé had become a model village for others to follow. The conflict continued, 
land was seized and property destroyed. Natives were fair game, some were shot and 
others were imprisoned. Native teachers were escorted from the island in irons, 
missionaries were silenced, schools were closed and the distribution of books printed in 
the native language using the LMS press on Maré was prohibited.  
These actions were justified according to Guillain by virtue of the following laws: 
9 August 1849 (the state of siege), 9 June 1857 (Code of Military Justice for the Army), 
4 June 1858 (Code of Military Justice for the Navy), 21 June 1858 (regulation of public 
administration of the Code of Military Justice in Naval affairs), 5 March 1864 
(reorganisation of military jurisdictions of Oceania), 26 June 1860 (by ministerial 
instruction), and finally, by decree, the island of Lifou was declared to be in a state of 
siege. The military authority was provided with all the powers required for ‘the 
maintenance of order and of police’ (Sydney Morning Herald 8 September 1864, p. 7). 
These actions met with condemnation in the Australian press. Guillain was criticised for 
his Draconian behaviour whereby French authority was enforced by the encouragement 
of conflict: ‘burning, slaughtering and ruthless intimidation’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 
8 September 1864, p. 7). The same report questioned the ban on teaching in languages 
other than French, as the LMS missionaries taught in Drehu, the native tongue, and not 
English: 
Could anything be more monstrous than to call this denationalising the 
natives. The French have shown their flag for a few days, and they say, 
to teach the poor people in their own tongue is to denationalise them.98 
(Sydney Morning Herald 8 September 1864, p. 7).  
                                                
98 The article does provide a disclaimer: ‘It is not unknown to us that in questions arising between the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, the intense opposition of their views will scarcely admit that 
exact and dispassionate representation which as honourable men both parties would tend to make.’ 
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The Guillain Herald: Le Menteur 
Shortly after his arrival, Guillain determined that the only local newspaper should 
become an instrument for his political propaganda. By decree, on 27 June 1862, the 
Governor appointed Adolphe Mathieu, his ‘Chief of State’ and ‘Colonial Secretary,’ as 
editor. This newspaper, Le Moniteur, was recognised as the official mouthpiece for the 
Governor’s political and social views. It became known as the ‘Guillain Herald’ 
(Colquilhat 1989, p. 4) and to Guillain’s adversaries as Le Menteur (Delbos 1993, 
p. 142).  
The Sydney Morning Herald noted the anomaly of the Chief of State being the editor in 
a report it reprinted from the Le Moniteur. This account was totally at odds with 
previous articles written about the Lifou reprisals. Le Moniteur praised the military 
efforts of Commandant Testard and his sang-froid as he ‘received the enemy with a 
well-directed fire then routed them by a charge with the bayonet’. The same report 
disclaimed the article that appeared in Revue du Monde Colonial on January 1865, 
which claimed that Commander Testard was ‘deprived of his command’ following the 
military charge on Lifou. This report met with a sharp rebuke from Le Moniteur, which 
warned the press in Paris to be more discerning when accepting anything that may 
affect the reputation of devoted officers and functionaries (Sydney Morning Herald 
21 June 1865, p. 3).  
Injustices instigated by Guillain provoked the ire of the Reverend Macfarlane who 
during the ‘paper war’ requested the same religious liberty for Protestants on Lifou as 
was enjoyed by Protestants in France, and for good measure he sought the appointment 
of a British Consul to New Caledonia. As already noted, international dialogue resulted 
in the Protestants being assured of the freedom ‘to diffuse among the natives of the 
archipelago the benefit of Christianity and civilisation’ (Macfarlane 1873, p. 198). This 
victory was short-lived; the Governor’s interpretation of the Emperor’s letter enabled 
him to implement his own agenda and vision for a secular indigenous system of 
education. For this, the Governor received a rebuke from the Minister of Navy and 
Colonies:  
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…notre civilisation repousse les moyens terribles de répression auxquels 
vous avez dû recourir ; et l’émotion qu’ils produiraient dans l’esprit 
public, s’ils étaient connus, serait de nature à créer des embarras sérieux 
au Gouvernement de l’Empereur. 
(Reuillard 1992, p. 500). 
Guillain justified his actions by referring to the ministerial instructions of 28 January 
1859 that provided the Governor of New Caledonia with the authority to disallow 
Protestant propaganda in the colony. A response from the Minister criticised Guillain’s 
reading of the instruction on two counts: first, that the authority given in 1859 referred 
only to Grande Terre and not to the Loyalty Islands; and secondly, that it was difficult 
to reconcile Guillain’s interpretation of ‘religious liberty’ with the suppression of all 
means of religious instruction (Zorn 2012, p. 160). Undeterred, Guillain continued his 
program of ‘slash and burn’ management. 
Schools could only be opened with government approval and then only with qualified 
teachers. Religious instruction in schools was also banned and this angered the Marists 
as Article I of the Concordat of 180199 clearly states: 
La religion catholique, apostolique et romaine, sera librement exercée en 
France. Son culte sera public, en se conformant aux règlements de police 
que le Gouvernement jugera nécessaires pour la tranquillité publique.  
(Napoleonica La Revue 2008). 
The priests believed that this Article provided them with the freedom necessary to teach 
and evangelise. Guillain, on the other hand, believed that mission schools were an 
obstruction to public peace, and from 1 January 1864 any non-compliant school was 
declared illegal and closed.  
Mission schools, which had been operating on Grande Terre for twenty years, closed 
their doors. In the embryonic colony, there was a paucity of qualified teachers and so 
the Governor was ultimately obliged to utilise the only personnel available, the military. 
So stringent were the restrictions that even after Sisters Marie de la Présentation and 
                                                
99 The French Revolution in 1789 saw a head-on clash between the Catholic Church and the State. 
Church assets were confiscated and priests were made to swear allegiance to the Republic. The Vatican 
resisted, the French marched on Rome in 1798 and a peace deal was struck in 1801 with the signing of 
the Concordat. 
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Marie de la Croix qualified as teachers in order to open schools on the Isle of Pines and 
at Saint Louis, more obstacles were presented. The Governor decided that teachers 
should provide the government with their work programs: a day plan as well as a 
progress report every three months. Education for those in remote communities became 
impossible (Delbos 1993, p. 147), and on the Loyalty Islands ‘no native could exercise 
the functions of a teacher without the sanction of the commandant […] no teacher 
would be allowed to exercise the functions of his office, except on the island to which 
he belonged’ (Macfarlane 1873, p. 237). It followed that teachers from Lifou who were 
working on Ouvéa were forced to return to their place of origin.  
Macfarlane’s gadfly attack on the Governor 
Throughout the governorship of Guillain, Macfarlane continued his gadfly attack and 
continued with constant outpourings from his ‘prolix pen.’ Letters sent to the 
Governments on either side of La Manche bore fruit. The French ordered a commission 
of inquiry to investigate the claims.  
A letter from Guillain to Macfarlane on 16 January 1865 informed him that His 
Majesty’s Government would allow Protestants freedom to ‘worship and to pursue the 
intellectual advancement of the population’. However, there was a distinction between 
politics and religion so that administrative and judicial affairs were the domain of the 
Governor (Sydney Morning Herald 21 March 1865, p. 7). The following day, 
Commandant Trève produced a signed copy of an oath which was to be sworn by each 
of the Protestant ministers, in his presence. The Ministers were to pledge obedience to 
the Colonial Government, to act in accordance with the established order of the colony 
and, ‘if in my church or elsewhere I learn that anything is being concocted prejudicial to 
the colony, I will make it known to the Government’ (Macfarlane 1873, p. 201). The 
Commandant’s lack of confidence in the integrity of the missionaries brought a speedy 
rejoinder from Macfarlane. In a letter dated 31 January 1865 Macfarlane made it clear 
that the mission had no desire to be connected with any government, nor to receive 
State pay, nor to become a government agent (Macfarlane 1873, pp. 201-202).  
Battles continued to be waged over Church property on Ouvéa, and the Reverend Ella 
began a ‘long and fruitless’ correspondence with the Commandant. His complaints were 
referred to the Governor who, as already noted, either ignorant of, or in arrogant 
disregard of tribal politics, divided the island into three, and appointed in each division 
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a Catholic chief. These divisions and appointments could only cause dissent. It was not 
until 1871 and the appointment of a new Governor, Eugène Gaultier de la Richerie,100 
that the resident Commandant was dismissed and a new Commandant, Xavier Caillet, 
was appointed. Caillet denounced: 
Des faits regrettables provoqués presque toujours par l’intolérance de 
missionnaires catholiques auxquels on peut reprocher de confondre trop 
volontiers les intérêts de la France avec ceux de leur congrégation et de 
ne mettre ni assez de discrétion dans leurs actes, ni assez de prudence 
dans leurs moyens de propagande. 
(Zorn 2012, p. 161).  
No action was taken by the Governor on this report. In 1874, Gaultier de la Richerie 
was recalled to France, and his replacement, Louis Alleyron,101 requested an 
investigation into the massacre and mutilation of Protestants. Caillet remained steadfast 
in his criticism of Catholic fanaticism, and for this, he was dismissed. The militant 
priests, Jean Bernard and Eugène Barriol, were found by a Commission of Inquiry to 
have urged Bazit and the Catholics to attack the Protestants and they were both 
dismissed.  
Arnaud Emprin102 who had been a missionary in New Caledonia since 1858, was 
installed on Ouvéa and with his arrival, the island returned to peace and religious 
tolerance. Samuel Ella stayed on Ouvéa until 1879. His replacement, James Hadfield, 
after working on Ouvéa for seven years, continued the work in a supervisory capacity 
from Lifou until 1920 when the reins were eventually relinquished in favour of the Paris 
Missionary Society (Garrett 1982, pp. 202-203).103 
The problems of the Governor were not restricted to Protestants, Catholics and natives; 
they were also exacerbated by those within his own administrative ranks. Commander 
Bourgey, who led an expedition to Lifou in order to annex the Loyalty Islands, arrived 
                                                
100 Eugène Gaultier de Richerie, Governor, 26 August 1870 to 25 September 1874. 
101 Louis Alleyron, Commandant, 25 September 1984 to 27 February 1875. 
102 Armand Empirin (1821-1898) arrived in New Caledonia in December 1858 and died on the Isle of 
Pines on 14 May 1898 (Escoffier 1993, p. 74). 
103 James Hadfield spent 42 years on Ouvéa and Lifou before handing over to the Paris Mission in 1920, 
at which time there were 36 schools about 1800 students and 6000 adherents in the Loyalty group 
(Garrett 1992, p. 366). 
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with reckless determination. His treatment of Protestant tribes and property caused a 
furore in Australia, Britain and France, and a ministerial reprimand for Guillain. 
Bourgey was relieved of his position as Commandant of the Loyalty Islands within a 
month. A second military expedition to Lifou, led by Commander Testard, resulted in 
the violent repression of natives who were fleeing from the military stronghold in 
Chépénéhé. This caused further dissatisfaction in France and an Imperial reprimand for 
Guillain. Articles in the French press blamed Testard for this vicious attack and less 
than a month later, he was relieved of his command by the Governor. 
As noted above, the report in Le Moniteur on 20 April 1865 which was published nine 
months after the event, described a very different scene. In the article Testard is thanked 
for his ‘wise conduct’, his ‘conciliatory spirit’ and the ‘rectitude of his acts towards 
all—whether Catholics or Protestants.’ Reports vary throughout the literature: Samuel 
Macfarlane reported that those Protestant chiefs, who were replaced by Catholic 
‘administrative chiefs’, were taken as prisoners to Port-de-France. This is in sharp 
contrast to the coverage of the event that appeared in Le Moniteur: ‘Protestants […] 
became reassured and sent their chiefs to the Port-de-France to assist at the birthday fete 
of his Majesty’ (Sydney Morning Herald 25 May 1865, p. 5) where they were provided 
with quarters near the house of ‘their friend Testard’. This article also reports the 
withdrawal of troops from Lifou and the recall and promotion of that ‘admirable 
officer’ Testard. The article ends with a warning that ‘special intelligence’ cannot 
always be ‘depended upon.’ Captain E. Trève replaced Testard as Commander of the 
Loyalty Islands after the military operations on Lifou (Sydney Morning Herald 25 May 
1865, p. 5).104 He was a zealous Catholic, an enemy of the Governor and a friend of the 
Catholic chief, Ukeneso.  
Ambiguities and the tactical use of violence made life difficult for the Protestant 
mission. 
Marists and the irascible Reverend Jones in conflict 
In 1866, two Marist priests, Jérôme Guitta and François Beaulieu, began a mission on 
the island of Maré. By this time Protestantism was well established. Polynesian 
                                                
104 This report includes that of Le Moniteur 30 April 1865. 
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evangelists had been on the island for twenty-five years, the LMS missionaries for 
twelve years and some of the people of Maré had been educated at St Johns College in 
Auckland. The most powerful tribe on the island, the si-Gwahma tribe of High Chief 
Naisseline, was Protestant,105 and when his rivals adopted Catholicism, religious 
differences caused old tribal feuds to intensify. Further trouble arose when the Governor 
delimited tribal boundaries in favour of Catholic tribes. The Protestants revolted, war 
broke out and the Protestants were victorious. Worse was to come when the priests, due 
to cultural misunderstanding, prevented Catholic tribes from performing the post-war 
customary exercise of making a submission to the conquering tribe. There was further 
bloodshed and another twenty-one lives were lost.  
A French man-of-war was sent to the island and an inquiry accused the Reverend Jones 
of urging the Protestants to fight. This was strongly denied. Jones was a long-term 
resident of Maré, and in his opinion, a customary submission from the rebels was the 
only way to secure ‘immediate and durable peace.’ He insisted that that he, a European, 
‘could not have instituted a custom which reaches far back into the unhistoric past’ 
(House of Commons 1988, p. 5). According to Jones, the problems of the present were 
rooted in the past, and dated back to the arrival of the Marists.106 The Catholics were 
ultimately judged to be responsible (House of Commons, p. 6) and the Governor, 
Amédée Courbet,107 whose singular concern was for French subjects, not Catholics or 
Protestants (House of Commons 1988, p. 9) responded by banishing the Protestant 
chiefs to Noumea and Indochina. The Catholics in the meantime had fled with their 
priests to join their companions on the Isle of Pines.108  
British–French rivalry reignited Kanak intertribal rivalry, jealousy and conflict. To rid 
the island of British influence, Protestant hereditary chiefs were replaced with Catholic 
                                                
105 Of the six districts of Maré, only one is Catholic, the Western half (chief Naisseline). The eastern half 
is divided into five districts, governed by Wanakami, Hmaene, Washoema, Lali and Tinewami. Only 
Tinewami is Catholic. According to Jones, Naisseline defeated the ‘Papists’ in battle and, by the 
submission of the defeated tribe, Naisseline became by native right the Chief of the whole island (Garrett 
1982, p. 204). 
106 ‘The sore is too deep-seated to be simply skinned over; it will always break out. It is the priests who 
are the fomenters of all native troubles, and until the French authorities remove them from the islands, 
and allow the natives to settle their tribal differences in their own native fashion, they will never have any 
peace.’ (House of Commons 1888, p. 6)  
107 Amédée Anatole Prosper Courbet, Governor, 8 August 1880 to 29 September 1882. 
108 Five years after fleeing to the Isle of Pines, the Catholics returned to Mare and under Governor 
Adolphe le Boucher, 22 July 1884 to 13 May 1886, further conflict erupted. 
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administrative chiefs, which upset the established tribal order and reignited the tension 
it was intended to resolve. Further pressure was applied to the LMS mission and this 
resulted in a spate of letters from Jones: to Earl Granville in the British Foreign Office; 
to Viscount Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris; to de Freycinet, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs; to J. Janteanous, Director of the Interior; and to Admiral 
Jauréguibery. Meanwhile, the Director of the Interior visited the island and closed 
mission schools, insisting that all teaching should be conducted in French, and that a 
French National should regulate questions of religion (House of Commons 1888, 
pp. 18-19). Letters to the Editor in the Sydney Morning Herald were forwarded to Earl 
Rosebery, who had recently become Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. These, via 
the British Ambassador in Paris, were relayed to the French Government, which refuted 
the reports of French atrocities (Sydney Morning Herald 17 January 1885, p. 8). The 
Reverend Jones was considered a troublemaker intent on causing problems for the 
Government and the Governor wanted him removed. In a letter to the Minister of Navy 
and Colonies, Georges-Charles Cloué, Courbet warned that he would be forced to 
employ whatever powers were legally at his disposal in the treatment of foreigners 
unless the missionary changed his attitude. In reply, the Minister wrote: 
Le procédé d’expulsion pourrait susciter des embarras internationaux 
[…] un pasteur français pourrait succéder au missionnaire anglais […] ce 
qui amènerait les indigènes à comprendre que la question de nationalité 
est indépendante de la question des religions. 
(Zorn 2011, p. 123) 
Meanwhile the French Government seized the moment and took matters into its own 
hands. Louis Cru, a Pastor from the Reformed Church of France109 was appointed to 
counterbalance the Jones effect. This effectively bypassed the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society (SMEP) and met with the disapproval of the LMS and Pasteur 
Lengereau, the chaplain of the penitentiary. The arrival of Pastor Cru resulted in 
additional protest and the scission of the Protestant Church of Maré. 
Most Protestants remained loyal to Jones, but the ambitious high chief Yeiwéné of the 
Naisseline line supported Cru and formed a church to challenge the power of Jones 
                                                
109 The Reformed Church of France was a Protestant Church recognised by the State and, as such, the 
pasteur became a political pawn. The SMEP ally of the LMS was a Protestant society and was not 
recognised by the French government. 
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(Garrett 1982, p. 205). When Cru, the French Protestant head of the island, attempted to 
commandeer Jones’ church at Ro, the rival tribes, which were representative of the 
British–French division within the Protestant Church, resorted to violent conflict. The 
subsequent native rebellion was such that le Boucher110 dispatched the Director of the 
Interior, Lacascade, with a hundred soldiers and instructions to strengthen the position 
of Cru, and to close the church at Ro which according to Jones had become a véritable 
tribune politique. The conciliatory Lacascade refused to close the church and formally 
refused to obey, whereupon the Governor, who had already published a notice of the 
closure of the Church in Noumea, dismissed Lacascade and ordered him to return to 
France and to explain his conduct to the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies. In the wake 
of the fracas, le Boucher was also relieved of his duties in New Caledonia and sent as 
Governor to Guadeloupe while Lacascade became Governor of Tahiti (Le Matin 5 May 
1886, pp. 1-3).  
In December 1887 a decree from the new Governor, Louis Nouet,111 in accordance with 
a Ministerial telegram, charged the Reverend Jones with compromising public order and 
tranquillity in the Loyalty Islands. At the suggestion of the Director of the Interior, 
Delphino Moracchini, and the Head of the Judicial Service it was decreed:  
Article 1.  Mr Jones, Pastor, residing at Maré, is expelled from the 
territory of the Loyalty Islands; he is enjoined immediately to quit the 
said territory, which is forbidden him. 
Article 2.  In case of refusal or resistance on his part, he shall be 
constrained to it by force. 
(House of Commons 1888, p. 32). 
The Pastor was given thirty minutes to leave the island. 
This old English Tartuffe has at last met with his desserts, and has been 
expelled from the country where he has sown trouble for years and years, 
incensing by all the means in his power the hate of the aboriginals […] 
against the Roman Catholics and against France. 
(Sydney Morning Herald 28 December 1887, p. 8). 
                                                
110 Adolphe le Boucher, Governor, 22 July 1884 to 13 May 1886. 
111 Louis Hippolyte Marie Nouet, 5 June 1886 to 30 July 1888. 
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Except for reports in the Australian press (Sydney Morning Herald 19 December 1887, 
p. 4), Jones’ expulsion was generally kept under wraps. An exception was a letter from 
the Free Protestant Church of Paris, which condemned the measure taken by the 
Governor: ‘La mesure prise contre le Rev. Jones n’est pas une solution, elle n’est que le 
commencement des difficultés sérieuses’ (Zorn 2012, p. 179). This schism within the 
Protestant Church foreshadowed that which occurred on the Grande Terre at Houaïlou 
seventy years later in 1957. 
After the departure of Jones in 1887, the gap between the two sectors of the Church 
broadened. Pastor Cru, who was unable to gain the support that Jones had achieved, 
failed to live up to expectations and fell out of favour with the French government. The 
Governor, Noël Pardon,112 in exasperation wrote to Franck Puaux of the French 
Evangelical Church informing him that Cru was not up to the task and asked for a 
replacement, someone capable of wiping out the memory of Jones. Cru was withdrawn 
in 1891, whereupon François Langereau, the chaplain of the penitentiary, wrote to 
Alfred Boegner, Director of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, proposing his 
son, an ordained minister, as a possible candidate. This proposal was accepted and 
finally, after almost fifty years of British domination, the Société des Missions 
Evangéliques de Paris (SMEP) was installed in the colony (Zorn 2012, p. 179).  
These turbulent years in the Loyalty mission saw a deluge of dismissals: priests, 
pastors, governors, commandants, natas and chiefs. Protestant–Catholic, French–
English and intertribal rivalry was compounded by governors who, absorbed in their 
own agenda of colonisation, were oblivious of deteriorating relationships which were 
spiralling out of control. Politico-religious disaccord contributed to the hostility, but 
central was the centuries old intertribal enmity which was thrown into sharp relief with 
the arrival of the missionaries and the French. 
Religious rivalry was restricted to the Loyalty Islands. It was only after the SMEP took 
control of the New Caledonian mission that Protestants were able to establish on 
Grande Terre. In the early days of the Ouvéa mission, boundaries were established in 
order to avoid disputes. When the priests, Fathers Palazy and Fabre visited Fayaoué, the 
Protestants who were surprised to discover the similarities of the two religions 
                                                
112 Noel Pardon, Governor of New Caledonia, 12 January 1889 to 14 April 1891. 
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welcomed them. Macfarlane on Lifou, despite his criticism of Catholics, welcomed 
them on fete days when no-one was excluded and everyone was welcome. In the 
opinion of the Reverend Jones, whose thirty-three years on the islands had not always 
been easy, the battles between Catholics and Protestants were not wars of religion: 
C’est simplement un ancien antagonisme ; mais étant divisés sur des 
questions de terres ou de chefs, les partis en cause ont choisi d’être 
également opposés religieusement.  
(Howe 1978, p. 38). 
This was also the opinion of Father Gaide: 
Les catholiques et les protestants vivent séparés, ont peu de rapport entre 
eux ; c’est moins la religion que les questions de chefferies et de 
territoires qui les divisent. 
(Howe 1978, p. 38). 
These opinions underscore the fundamental use of violence to expand tribal power and 
the grasping of whatever may prove to be of advantage in this quest. 
The scission of the Protestant Church on Maré provides an interesting example of 
disastrous conflict management where disregard of ‘the other’, ignorance of Kanak 
custom, unilateral decision-making and the absence of dialogue between all interested 
parties had devastating and far-reaching consequences. Attempts were made on many 
levels to stem conflict, but with each attempt, a new and ever-increasing cycle of 
hostility was set in place. Central to the conflict was intertribal rivalry, fuelled by 
religious difference and the neglect of the native custom. Custom had been obstructed 
by the priests, either in ignorance or with the desire to stamp out ‘heathen’ practices. By 
means of sanguinary retribution, justice was seen to be done when the Governor 
resorted to firearms and the military for the resolution of the conflict. This 
heavy-handed approach to conflict resolution angered the LMS missionary who, with 
pen and paper, enlisted the support of the Australian press, the British Government and 
the French Government. The French Government weighed into the argument on the side 
of their representative in New Caledonia, and the LMS missionary became the victim of 
forces beyond his control. The decision was made to replace British Protestant 
missionaries with their French counterparts.  
This decision, which was intended to resolve conflict, set in motion a new cycle of 
discord as the divided Protestant movement of France was brought into play. In France, 
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the self-funded and LMS-supported SMEP was not recognised by the French 
Government. It was a Minister from the Government-funded Reformed Church who had 
been chosen to go to Maré. This antagonised the LMS which had been working on Maré 
for over fifty years, and aroused hostility when the LMS missionary, who had been 
working on the island for over thirty years, became the subordinate of the new French 
appointee.  
British–French rivalry aroused intertribal rivalry and the rebellion which followed 
divided the Protestant Church on Maré. Again, the local Governor became involved and 
the LMS missionary was unceremoniously removed from the island. After 1891, 
dialogue between France and the LMS resulted in the appointment of an SMEP Pastor, 
in consequence of which the French and British missions worked in collaboration on the 
Loyalty Islands until the Reverend Hadfield retired in 1920. 
In the early days of colonisation, tribal warfare became enmeshed in a web of external 
feuds, all of which affected Kanak lifestyle. The goal was to replace native political, 
judicial and belief systems with those of the West. Military reprisal and incarceration 
were chosen to resolve conflict rather than dialogue and reconciliation and, as has been 
described, this frequently led to an increasing cycle of conflict and instability. The 
attempt of the Church to take a conciliatory role was frequently limited by 
interdenominational warfare and the opposition of the anticlerical governors of an 
increasingly secular State. Although the Church provided a buffer between the Kanak 
and the European, the message of peace and love was frequently lost in tribal warfare, 
hatred and division. 
Convicts, land and conflict 
As well as establishing peace and order in the colony, Guillain had instructions to make 
the necessary arrangements for the installation of a penal settlement. The suitability of 
New Caledonia for this purpose had been a decisive factor in the decision to annex the 
country: 
Le gouvernement était désireux depuis longtemps de posséder dans les 
parages d’Outre-mer quelques localités qui pussent, au besoin, recevoir 
des établissements pénitentiaires. La Nouvelle-Calédonie offrait toutes 
les conditions désirables. 
(Le Moniteur 14 February 1854). 
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Prison reform was a major concern in France where the mouldering bagnes had become 
nests of crime. In cities, crime was rife and the establishment of an overseas penal 
colony was seen as a beneficial and humane means of ridding the métropole of a 
dangerous element as well as providing a workforce for the construction of the new 
colony. A year after annexation, 30 May 1854, the Transportation Law was passed and 
this allowed common law criminals to be sent to penal colonies where they would be 
engaged in hard labour and the worst tasks of colonisation. Women sentenced to hard 
labour could also be transported to the colonies, where they would be employed in tasks 
tailored to their age and sex. According to the law, those sentenced to less than eight 
years were to remain in the colony for an additional period of time equivalent to the 
term of the sentence—doublage—while those sentenced to eight years or more were to 
remain permanently in the colony. For good conduct the prisoner could, at the 
discretion of the Administration, be employed by local inhabitants or the local 
Administration and at the end of his or her sentence receive a parcel of land and the 
means of cultivating it for his own benefit. 
By decree on 2 September 1863, Napoleon III authorised the creation of a penal colony 
in New Caledonia, and on 9 May 1864, the first convoy of 250 prisoners arrived on 
L’Iphigénie. The welcome speech given by the Governor to these ouvriers de la 
transportation was extraordinarily warm: 
Vous êtes envoyés en Nouvelle-Calédonie pour participer aux travaux 
importants à exécuter dans la colonie, je vous y attendais impatiemment 
comme les auxiliaires dévoués dans cette œuvre […] Votre conduite ici 
peut faire oublier les funestes égarements… 
(Bonnichon & Gény 2012, p. 747). 
In the social, economic and political turmoil of nineteenth-century France, the intention 
of Napoleon III was not only to close the bagnes113 and build new colonies, but also to 
transform prisoners into honest citizens by exposing them to the redemptive quality of 
the land. The popular philosophy of the era was that of J-J Rousseau: ‘man is born free 
yet everywhere he is in chains’; it is nature which makes man happy but society makes 
him depraved and miserable.114 
                                                
113 Bagnes closed in Rochefort in 1852, in Brest in 1858 and in Toulon in 1873. 
114 This is also the perspective of Saint-Simon (Reuillard 1992). 
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The liberation of the felon and confinement of the native  
The welcome speech of the Governor heralded a prosperous future for his ouvriers as 
they settled into the rural idyll. As the penitentiary expanded to become a major force 
on the island, vast tracts of land were acquired and this put the original inhabitants at a 
great disadvantage. For the Kanak, land is life and as large areas of land were removed 
from the symbiotic Kanak–land balance, the fight for Kanak survival took root. The 
liberation of the felon came at a cost, namely the confinement of the native. The 
penitentiary effectively divided the colony into three: free settlers for whom life was a 
battle; criminals, the unwanted of France who emerged as kings in France Australe; and 
the Kanak who were the most numerous and the most ignored.  
The humanitarian vision of rehabilitation by way of hard labour in the construction of 
the new colony and the subsequent reinsertion of the liberated prisoner into honest 
society fell short of expectations. What seemed a possible form of reconciliation 
between the State and those it condemned was in reality quite different. An oversized 
penitentiary administration caused problems and after almost twenty years of 
transportation, there were only 57 kilometres of passable roads on the entire island 
(Dousset-Leenhardt 1969, p. 307). According to Moncelon, in addition to the shortage 
of roads there were no bridges, no public gardens, no docks, no facility for large boats, 
no sewers, and the streets of Noumea were a cesspool. To provide this infrastructure 
France had paid a huge cost for transportation (Moncelon 1885, p. 16). Many believed 
that transportation to the penal colony was an expensive reward rather than punishment, 
an Eldorado where prisoners lived ‘like foxes in a henhouse’ (Toth 1998, pp. 245-246):  
L’Administration de la transportation a fait des bagnes une sinécure pour 
les malfaiteurs. Le territoire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie est offert en prime 
aux plus grands scélérats. Sous prétexte de régénération, l’État comble 
de faveurs les condamnés aux travaux forcés et leur fait une situation que 
l’honnête homme malheureux peut envier sans jamais y parvenir.  
(Moncelon 1886, p. 1). 
The libéré115 was provided with two to six hectares of arable land (Dousset-Leenhardt 
1969, p. 306), clothing, food rations and free hospital care for thirty months, the right to 
                                                
115 Libéré: prisoner who had completed his sentence. 
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choose a wife from the convent at Bourail, and an indemnity of 150 to 300 francs, 
depending on the size of his family. Food rations were also generous: the prisoners 
received 250 ml of wine and 60 ml of tafia on alternate days, a daily 750 grams of 
bread, 120 grams of dried vegetables, 20 grams of coffee and 25 grams of sugar five 
days weekly, 250 grams of fresh meat and two days a week salted lard (Moncelon 1886, 
p. 42; Delacour 1872, p. 29). Conditions were further improved when reforms were 
introduced by Governor Pallu de la Barrière116 who, impatient with the rate of free 
colonisation, prevailed upon the Minister to allow the attribution of concessions to 
prisoners before their sentences had transpired. This was granted not to ensure an easy 
life but to expand the colony, as justified by Governor Noel Pardon:  
Cruel laws can only guarantee cruel morals […] The tilling of the soil is 
the most powerful rehabilitive force because it is the most direct and 
reveals most clearly the moral effect of the land upon the man serving a 
sanction.  
(Cited in Toth 1999, p. 63) 
Some prisoners, instead of engaging in the heavy labour required to found the colony, 
were able to find employment as domestics and gardeners; others became assistants for 
engineers and land surveyors. They wandered around the countryside with wine and 
cigarettes, or joined the prison orchestra, the Musique de la Transportation, and 
provided entertainment in the rotunda at the Place de Cocotiers. This deployment of 
prisoner labour met with criticism as being in contravention of the 1854 law which was 
intended to enforce hard labour. The daily report from the Isle Nou, New Caledonia, 
April 1883 stated:  
The employment of convicts as scribes constitutes an abuse of power by 
the administration and should be stopped at all costs. To choose among 
the most intelligent of prisoners and transform them into workers for the 
bureau of affairs […] is to leave them with no practical surveillance […] 
and in consequence, one often finds them involved in illegal traffic. 
(Cited in Toth 1999, p. 63).  
In this ‘Kingdom of the Prison’, the penal administrator was king. Despite outside 
criticism, the budget, manpower and property holdings of this state within a state grew 
                                                
116 Pallu de la Barrière was Governor from 29 September 1882 to 22 July 1884. 
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out of all proportion. Costs escalated; in 1864, the wages for the year were 143,000 
francs and by 1877, they had risen to 4,500,000 francs. Staff employed by the 
penitentiary service outnumbered those of the civil service by 843 to 587 and in 1885 
110,000 hectares was attributed to the penitentiary (Toth 2003, p. 47). The libéré 
enjoyed a lifestyle that would have remained a dream in the métropole.  
George Griffith, in his inspection of the prison system, although generally critical of the 
leniency of corrective punishment in the colony, described the success of the program in 
Bourail, a thriving township of libérés. One libéré, transported for forgery and 
embezzlement, was the local photographer, editor and journalist of the Bourail 
Indépendant, and an ‘emeritus assassin’, a lawyer, transported because he ‘chose to 
make himself a widower’, was running the Bourail lending library. Despite pockets of 
success Griffith also found the transportation, regeneration and rehabilitation regime 
divisive, and noted the schism which separated free and bonded colonists. The two did 
not mix, they refused to live beside each other and this in his opinion left the 
Government with the choice of abandoning either the system of concessions or that of 
free colonisation (Griffith 1901, pp. 179-180).  
The excessive privileges received by prisoners were drawn to the attention of the 
Ministry in France where it was believed that colonisation was being achieved at the 
expense of prisoner discipline and punishment. A ministerial commission of enquiry, 
the Dislère Commission, was set up in 1889-1900 to investigate and discard the 
‘excessively humanitarian ideas that were dominant when the decree of 1880 was 
issued’ (Dislère cited in Toth 1998, p. 261). The outcome was to stop provisional land 
concessions to transportés immediately and to ensure that the law of 1854 and the ‘hard 
work of colonisation’ were applied in spirit and to the letter. The humanitarian 
experiment ended. In the philanthropic social, economic and political considerations of 
the era the Kanak remained a phantom figure, deprived of land and any of the 
‘humanitarian’ ideals that the prisoners enjoyed. Rather than lead to reconciliation, this 
would produce resentment and conflict in the years ahead. 
Political prisoners: The Communards 
Prussian victory over France in 1871 and the signing of the Frankfurt Peace Agreement 
left many in France demoralised and angry. The proletariat of Paris, after proclaiming 
the fall of the second Empire, established a revolutionary council, the Communards, 
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which vowed to continue the fight. In the midst of social unrest and political turmoil, 
the French army attacked the city commune and during a week of human butchery, la 
semaine sanglante, an estimated 20,000 Communard lives were lost.117  
The Government of Adolph Thiers took repressive action and about 38,000 of the 
commune were arrested; of these, 3417 were sentenced to ‘simple deportation’, 251 to 
hard labour and 1169 to prison cells (Pisier 1971, p. 103). Simple deportation according 
to the law of 1810 meant a life sentence to a place outside Europe, which was to be 
determined by law. As New Caledonia had penitentiary and prison personnel, it was 
decided that the simple deportees would be sent to Isle of Pines, hard labour prisoners to 
the penitentiary at Nou Island and those to be incarcerated to the Ducos promontory. 
The Ducos promontory was uninhabited but the Isle of Pines was self-governing 
according to a treaty signed by Chief Vendegou and the French at the time of 
annexation in 1853 (Pisier 1971, p. 105). 
The island was already overpopulated, as the High Chief and Father Goujon had 
welcomed nine hundred Catholics from Maré during the war of religion on that island. 
However, the decision had been made and Governor de la Richérie had been instructed 
to inform High Chief Samuel and his wife Queen Hortense, the daughter of Chief 
Vendegou. Apart from the concern of overpopulation, Father Rougeyron doubted the 
wisdom of placing Communards amidst the Catholic community on the island. He was 
aware that these urban savages, the Communards, had decreed the separation of Church 
and State, that they had converted churches into ‘clubs’, massacred the Archbishop of 
Paris and twelve Dominicans d’Arcueil, and imprisoned another sixteen priests at 
La Roquette (Pisier 1971, p. 106). 
The Governor had two alternatives: either to ignore Hortense and her concern of 
overpopulation or to disobey the Minister and find another destination for the ‘simple 
deportees.’ Despite the treaty, which provided the Kunies with self-government, and 
against the wishes of the Chief, the decision was made to split the island. There was no 
place for an independent Kanak community; the choice was made in favour of the local 
Governor and the Ministry in France. Land was confiscated from a fervent Catholic 
population for the benefit of violently anticlerical Parisian brigands. The Kanak were 
                                                
117 The operation was led by Marshall MacMahon who later became President of France, 24 May 1873 to 
January 1879. 
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doomed as France determined to cleanse its shores of its ‘savage’ urban population 
(Bullard 2000, p. 11). 
It was decided that the infertile west coast would be evacuated by the tribes, the 
Catholics from Maré would be transported to Grande Terre and the deportees would 
use the evacuated areas of the west coast. Half of the Catholics from Maré were offered 
refuge with Ukeneso and Father Fabre on Lifou. De la Barrière provided the 
dispossessed, by decree of 12 December 1872, with transport, 250 kilos of rice and 200 
kilos of biscuit (Bulletin Officiel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 1872, cited in Pisier 1971, 
p 107). In the bisection of the island, the prison received 4000 hectares and the Church 
9500 hectares (Pisier 1971, p. 107).  
In a history of errors, the French had placed anticlerical fanatics, who found that the 
sight of a soutane added to their punishment (Pisier 1971, p. 111), on the land of devout 
and fervent Catholics. The hatred of the Communards for Catholics was facetiously 
noted by Father Janin, the prison Chaplain, by the absence of their ‘clientele’ from his 
office (Pisier 1971, p. 111). European rivalries were being played out between the 
Church and ‘urban savage’ in New Caledonia. 
Within a month, 1132 deportees had arrived on Isle of Pines and with later arrivals, this 
number swelled to 3021. Many of the political prisoners were well educated and soon 
managed to earn a reprieve and find employment in Noumea. These included Jourde, an 
accountant who found employment at a sawmill, Ballière, an architect who designed 
theatres for Higginson, and Dr Rastoul, who was employed as a medical practitioner. 
Two hundred of the deportees found employment on the mainland and contributed 
experience and expertise that was sadly lacking in the capital. The successful escape of 
Henri Rochefort, writer and politician, with five others put paid to these employment 
arrangements, which had worked so well for all concerned. Security was tightened and 
all deportees were returned to prison. The death toll among those deported was high; 
almost one in every ten died on the Isle of Pines due to illness, execution or simply 
disappearance. Dr Rastoul and nineteen others, with little seafaring knowledge in a bid 
to escape, added to this number (Brou 1978, p. 506).  
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The Kabyles swell the numbers, Kanak land further alienated 
The burgeoning numbers on the Isle of Pines were further expanded by some 200 
Kabyles, prisoners of the 1871 war in Algeria. In 1871, the French were fighting on all 
fronts: the Franco-Prussian war in which Louis-Napoléon was defeated, the French civil 
war with the demise of the Paris Commune and the French-Kabyle war which led to the 
suppression of the Kabyle. All had an impact on New Caledonia. The Kabyle, 
discontented with the oppressive politics of French colonialism, rebelled when the 
Crémieux Decree gave French citizenship to Algerian Jews, but not to Muslims, Arabs 
and Berbers who remained ‘indigenous’ under the Régime de l’Indigénat.  
While the French troops were fighting the Communards, the Kabyle uprising was 
successful, but with the suppression of the Commune the Prime Minister deployed 
troops to Algeria and the war was bitter and sanguinary. During the fighting which 
followed, some ten thousand were killed. Villages were burnt, crops were destroyed, the 
chief, Mohamed El Mokrani118 was killed, and thousands more were thrown into prison. 
In indemnities, the Kabyles were forced to pay in excess of 30,000,000 francs and 
forfeit 446,406 hectares of their best land. To keep the rest, they were required to pay 
the French an additional 27,000,000 francs (Robin 1901, pp. 521-528), the population 
was reduced to extreme poverty and a great nationality disappeared. Finis Kabyliae 
(Robin 1901, p. 543). 
The captured Kabyles and Communards, ‘brothers in arms’ against a shared enemy, 
were imprisoned together in Thouars and arrived together in New Caledonia. 
Paradoxically, most of those who had fought against French imperial values with such 
determination in 1871 joined ranks with their old enemy, the French, to suppress the 
Kanak uprising in 1878. Chikh-Aziz-ou-Haddad fought with a fearlessness that earned 
him a reprieve for good conduct (Robin 1901, p. 529). When the Communards were 
amnestied in 1879, the Kabyles were not included. On their return to France, the 
Communards campaigned for an extension of the amnesty for their ‘companions in 
misfortune’, but the situation in Algeria remained tense and the Government feared that 
the return of the insurgents of 1871 could create further disturbance to public order. 
                                                
118 El Mokrani’s brother, Bou Mezrag, and the son of Sheik El Haddad were deported to the Isle of Pines 
(Pisier 1971, p. 134). 
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Amnesty was eventually granted to the Kabyles in 1895, but it was not until 1904 that 
they were finally able to return to Algeria. 
The French Recidivist Bill: Australia and New Zealand join the protest 
In May 1885, the French Government broadened the scope of the Relegation Law to 
include recidivists. Until then only political and common law criminals were able by 
law to be transported to penal settlements. This law provided the ability to sentence 
repeat offenders to life imprisonment, in French overseas possessions, for as little as 
four misdemeanours such as theft, fraud and vagrancy. This Bill caused such a furore in 
New Zealand and Australia that the Bill was passed with ‘the names of the colonies 
struck out’ (AtoJsOnline 1886). The French anti-slavery politician, Victor Schoelcher, 
wrote a scathing letter of condemnation to the French Government. He criticised the 
‘sordid egoism’ of a country of thirty-three million, which had the capacity to absorb 
50,000 to 60,000 incorrigible recidivists but preferred to cleanse her shores by shipping 
them off to a country with a population of 16,000. France presented a deaf ear to this 
criticism and to the suggestion that the Bill mocked the sacred principles of the 
Republic (Schoelcher 1885, pp. 1-14).  
In New Caledonia, the Relegation Bill was poorly received: agriculturalists and miners 
who were happy to employ forçats refused to employ recidivists. The Governor Pallu de 
la Barrière declared emphatically that: 
New Caledonia could not receive any recidivists They would not be able 
to find work any more than the libérés. There were no industries in the 
colony and the libérés furnished more workers than were wanted. 
(The Brisbane Courier 7 May 1885, p. 3). 
Mining magnate and entrepreneur Higginson considered the Bill to be ‘disastrous.’ 
Land was earmarked for their arrival on the Baie de Prony, Île Brun and Ouaménie 
(Bernard 1805, pp. 399-400) and the Communard housing on the Isle of Pines was to be 
used.119 Although the recidivists were unable to claim land, land was still required for 
housing. Again, the Kanak were further dispossessed as another tier of felons was added 
to the ‘civilising mission’, a mission which in its heartlessness was more destructive 
                                                
119 Decreed as places for recidivists: 26 August 1886 Isle of Pines, 12 February 1889 Ouaménie, 
12 February 1889 Baie de Prony, 22 April 1909 Ducos, 29 January 1913 Île Nou (Barbançon 2008). 
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than the savagery it purported to influence (Bullard 2000, p. 93). Again, violence was 
exacted on the indigenous population, which in turn engendered further violence. 
The Reunion sugar workers: Another wave of immigrants and further 
reduction of Kanak land 
Free settlers from France were slow to take up offers of land, and Governor Guillain 
sought other means of improving the economy and boosting population numbers. As the 
sugar industry of Reunion had suffered a downturn, he believed that the larger 
producers might be interested in expanding their holdings in New Caledonia where 
sugar was already being successfully produced. In 1862, Ferdinand Joubert, on a 
concession of 4000 hectares at Dumbéa, produced sugar which gained recognition at the 
International Exhibition in London. Other planters followed and with them their 
indentured workers. To encourage production, Guillain offered 500 hectares free of 
charge to the first two to import sugar mills capable of producing 700-800 tons of sugar 
per year (Speedy 2008, p. 6). For many years, sugar mills and rum distilleries produced 
well until cyclones, grasshoppers and drought took their toll. 
These huge concessions especially around Dumbéa, Païta and Mont-Dore added to the 
growing exasperation of the indigenous population. An additional 620 indentured 
labourers and large family groups added considerably to land requirements: Jolimont 
Kabar had eighteen children and the Douyère family of three siblings had twenty-nine 
children (Speedy 2008, p. 8). Land, for the Réunionnais was to be the key to success, 
but for the Kanak, another element of dispossession.  
Arrivals from Alsace-Lorraine 
For the Kanak in New Caledonia the Franco-Prussian war was not without effect. With 
the defeat of France and the signing of Treaty of Frankfurt, Alsace and most of Lorraine 
were reclaimed by Germany.120 Sixty thousand who wished to remain French migrated 
mainly to France but also to Algeria, which the Kabyle rebels had evacuated. Others, 
the optants, were offered a financial inducement to relocate to French overseas 
                                                
120 These provinces had been German in the 17th and 18th centuries. Benefits of re-annexation included 
the strategic value of the Vosges mountains in the event of a future war with France and the large coal 
and iron deposits. 
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territories and several opted to go to New Caledonia where they received 10 hectare 
allotments, free of charge, at Moindou.  
In the late nineteenth century, New Caledonia became a repository for the unwanted of 
France and with each new wave of settlement, transportees, deportees, Communards, 
Kabyles, Creoles, Alsatians and Lorrains, the Kanak became further dispossessed and 
more resistant to the dehumanising and subordinating pressure of colonial expansion, 
until in 1878 the situation culminated in violence.  
The 1878 insurrection 
The revolt of 1878 burst ‘like a bolt from the blue.’ For twenty-five years, the Kanak 
had been forced to abandon the land of their ancestors and move further into the less 
hospitable areas of the central mountain range. From 1853, the question of land rights 
had been ambiguous for the French and a major source of conflict for the Kanak for 
whom the du Bouzet declaration had only provided a usufructuary right. In an 
amendment on 10 April 1855 Du Bouzet added: ‘Un dixième des terrains ruraux 
destinés à être vendus sera mis en réserve pour les indigènes’.121 The decisions made on 
land usage by military Administrators were criticised by the Conseil Général as lacking 
clarity and failing to provide the sense and scope intended by the Minister.122  
Subsequent changes to this decree were no less confusing and attracted similar 
criticism: ‘Cette confusion, si facile à expliquer quand on songe que le législateur de 
1862 était lui aussi un marin peu familiarisé avec la délicate question domaniale’ 
(Conseil Général 1887, p. 6). 
The indiscriminate distribution of land in response to the demands of each new wave of 
immigrants increased the frustration of the Kanak (Conseil Général 1887, p. 12). Within 
a year from 1 January 1876 until 1 January 1877, the number of settlers increased from 
                                                
121 Article 3 of the decision of the Governor of the EFO (Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 
1901). 
122 Criticism centred on the lack of legal expertise of those naval officers who had been responsible for 
drawing up the document: ‘C’est un marin qui prend possession d’une terre lointaine au nom de 
l’Empereur ; va-t-il entrer dans des questions de droit qui lui sont étrangères et qui sont d’ailleurs 
très-ardues ? Va-t-il déclarer que cette terre sera la propriété de l’État et que les concessions ne pourront 
être accordées que dans les conditions prescrites par la loi du 22 novembre, 1er décembre 1790 ? Il s’en 
gardera bien.’ (Conseil Général 1887, p. 6). 
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777 to 2752, boosting the immigrant population to 15,620. This included 3032 military 
and civil servants, 3836 déportés and 6000 transportés (Guiart 1968, p. 111).  
Discontent arose from not only land confiscation but also the unauthorised theft of 
women from the tribes. Twenty-five kilometres from Boulouparis a libéré, his native 
Dogny partner and two children were massacred by Dogny tribesmen.123 This led to the 
arrest and imprisonment of the chief of the Dognys as well as other local chiefs. A 
counterattack by the Dognys on the La Foa gendarmerie to free the chiefs left four 
gendarmes and a convict dead. On the same day, 20 Europeans and Pacific Island 
labourers were also killed in La Foa. Lives lost in further fighting included gendarmes 
and eighty foreigners: Europeans, New Hebrideans, Loyalty Islanders and Indians.124 
The military, under the command of Colonel Gally-Passebosc, was sent in, and the war 
was on. 
On 3 July 1878, Gally-Passebosc was killed. Reinforcements from France and 
Indochina as well as Kabyles and Communards were recruited.125 Traditional tribal 
enemies were mobilised to assist the French track the rebel tribes. After two months of 
fighting, Ataï, the Vercingétorix of the revolt, was killed by a tribal rival from 
Canala.126 Still, the fighting continued until the following January when typhoid broke 
out among the troops and the fighting stopped.  
                                                
123 Guiart (1968, p. 111) believes that the female was the young wife of the polygamous chief of the 
Dogny. 
124 These would have been Réunion sugar workers from the sugar mill at Ouameni which was attacked by 
the Ouameni tribe on 26 June 1878 (Latham 1975, p. 53). 
125 It might seem surprising that the déportés would fight with the French who only a few years earlier 
had been their enemy; the Kabyle fighting against colonialism and loss of land in Algeria and the 
Communards against, among other things, the ceding of French territory to the Germans. The 
Communards were, however, also patriotic. Their fight was for a certain future for France after the 
humiliating defeat of their country at the hands of the Germans. A noted exception was Louise Michel 
whose sympathy was pro-Kanak. She is reputed to have given part of her red Communard scarf to Ataï. 
When amnesty was granted, almost all the Communards returned to France. 
126 Jérémie Karé (Mwà Véé 1997, p 29) believes that the people of Canala were with the soldiers to warn 
the Kanak that the soldiers were approaching and to hide: ‘Si les gens de Canala et de Houaïlou vont avec 
les soldats français ce n’est pas pour collaborer avec eux et pour les renforcer mais pour jouer un rôle à 
l’intérieur pour les noyauter’. Saussol (2013, pp. 169-180) suggests that the Canala tribe may not only 
have been informed of the rebellion but may have instigated it; they may have been double agents. 
References indicate the hatred of the Canala for the French (Rivière 1881, p. 174 Trentinian cited in 
Dousset-Leenhardt 1969, p. 176). In the march across the Chaîne centrale, the Canala were undecided 
about their support of the French: ‘The tension was palpable’. Then Servan, the commandant leading the 
expedition, gave Nondo his gun. This was a very powerful customary geste, an offer of alliance. By 
accepting the offer Nondo validated it. There is also the suggestion that Ataï and Nondo were brothers or 
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During the period of massacres, ‘Melanesian acts of violence’ accounted for the death 
of 200 Europeans, and in reprisal ‘European acts of violence,’ 1000-1200 Kanak were 
killed. The press applauded the European victory, and attacked the natives for their 
violence:  
Murdering wretches who have desolated this land […] have lately 
disgraced the name of man. Like beasts of prey they have killed for the 
love of killing, and whether a stranger, whom they never had seen, a 
strong hale man who had extended the hand of friendship […] the 
natives were insane enough to imagine that by killing all in their way, 
man, woman or child, friend or foe, they could drive the white man from 
the island, and once again enjoy their cannibal feasts. 
(Sydney Morning Herald 28 November 1878, p. 7). 
The cause of the conflict in 1878 
Although the trigger that started the revolt was the death of a ‘mixed blood’ family, it is 
unlikely that the insurrection of 1878 was in response to the removal of a Dogny 
woman from her tribe. Cohabitation was common practice in New Caledonia: ‘Il existe 
actuellement, à la Nouvelle-Calédonie un grand nombre de métis, provenant de race 
blanche et de race indigène’ (Moncelon 1886, p. 10). Kanak women were married to 
French men and living in France. Among the military, cohabitation was common; 
Captain Bourgey returned to France with a Kanak wife and mixed blood children and 
James Paddon’s wife was New Hebridean. Some Kanak men may have sought revenge 
but it is unlikely that this would have led to war.  
Several causes were suggested for the rebellion, including land expropriation, the 
violation of native burial sites, the devastation of Kanak gardens and the antagonism 
between the conquered and the conqueror. As Rivière states:  
Mais la grande cause de l’insurrection, la seule pourrait-on dire, c’est 
l’antagonisme qu’on a vu de tout temps, du peuple conquérant et du 
peuple conquis. Il faut que ce dernier soit absorbé par l’autre ou qu’il 
                                                                                                                                          
cousins (Delathière 2004, p. 177). In spite of a reconciliation ceremony between the tribes in 2014, the 
intertribal relationship remains sensitive. 
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disparaisse. Or ces races noires ou cuivrées, qu’elles soient de 
l’Amérique ou de l’Océanie, n’absorbent pas. 
(Rivière 1881, p. 281). 
As much as the Kanak detested the whites, they detested their cattle even more. Ataï 
complained to Governor Orly127 about the unreasonable acquisition of land and the 
devastation caused by cattle. Separate bags of soil and stones were used to illustrate that 
which the Kanak had, and that which they retained after colonisation. Ataï also 
complained to the Governor about marauding cattle, which were destroying native yam 
and taro plantations. When it was suggested that the Kanak should fence their 
plantations, Ataï responded: ‘we will build fences the day our yams and taros leave the 
plantation and eat your cattle’ (Le Monde 13 May 2014).128 When the early settlers 
arrived, their numbers were few and they were welcomed, but when they started buying 
land without consulting the elders and desecrating native cemeteries, negotiations 
became violent as fertile coastal land was confiscated and the Kanak were pushed 
further into the less fertile central mountain range. As whites took over the land, hatred 
grew and led to rebellion. 
The pressure on available land was compounded by the establishment of the 
delimitation committees of Governor de Pritzbuer in 1876,129 which provided 
pro-French tribes with a distinct advantage. Ataï’s tribe was anti-French. After 
delimitation, his tribe was left with 922 hectares, while his smaller pro-French 
neighbour received over 2000 hectares; Ataï’s allies, the Dogny, had 632 hectares, 
while the pro-French rival Mandiai and Pocquereu tribes received 1107 hectares and 
1286 hectares respectively (Latham 1975, p. 61). Pro-French allegiance was rewarded, 
sowing further seeds of conflict and violence. 
At the time of the insurrection, the Kanak had been treated with contempt for 
twenty-five years; their only support had come from the Church and anti-clerical 
Governors had hampered that. During this time, the Kanak had lost land, crops, tribal 
                                                
127 Jean-Baptiste Orly, Governor, 11 April 1878 to 8 August 1880. 
128 An oral history as told by Berger Kawa, a descendant of Ataï’s clan. In 1859, 1000 head of cattle were 
imported from Australia; by 1878 there were 80,000 (Dousset-Leenhardt 1969, p. 302). 
129 Léopold Pritzbuer, Governor, 27 February 1875 to 11 April 1878. 
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burial grounds and identity.130 Father Apollinaire, a Melanesian priest from Moindou, 
spoke with pride and admiration of Ataï,131 who fought to the death in an unwinnable 
battle and who, due to his ‘exceptional personality’, was able to rally the villages of the 
Grande Terre in a quest for liberty, family, and custom. According to Apollinaire, the 
reason for Kanak discontent could be traced back to Du Bouzet’s declaration that the 
native ‘never had and would never have the right to own land’. Land expropriation 
policies ignored Kanak custom and tradition. The cause of the revolt was listed simply 
in La Nouvelle Calédonienne as: ‘They are black. We are white. They were the first 
occupants of the island. We arrived later. Formally, the vast land was free. Now the 
stations move closer together and the colonists increase to crowd the natives out. They 
revolt.’ (Cited in Clifford 1982, p. 48). 
The Trentinian Report 
Following the insurrection, the Government requested a report on the cause of the 
revolt. The report was prepared by General Arthur de Trentinian but when presented it 
was discarded and ignored. This did not escape the notice of a Sydney Morning Herald 
journalist: ‘The French authorities have held an inquiry into the causes which have led 
to the New Caledonia revolt, but up to the present, the result of this inquiry has been 
kept secret.’ (Sydney Morning Herald 22 February 1879, pp. 4-5). 
The report was considered subversive due to its criticism of the French, and remained 
hidden and unpublished until 1965. Trentinian concludes in his report: ‘Avoir signalé 
nos torts, c’est prendre la promesse de les éviter désormais et d’empêcher ainsi le retour 
des massacres qui ont eu lieu.’ (Dousset-Leenhardt 1969, p. 159). In the report, the 
Kanak are described as people who work for their chief, family and tribe producing 
from the land that which is necessary for survival. In a thirty-page report Trentinian 
lambasted the colonial regime and the lack of respect of the Europeans for the Kanak.132 
                                                
130 From an official publication for the colonial exhibition of 1889 published by order of the 
Under-Secretary of State for colonies and protectorates of the Pacific Ocean: ‘Une insurrection indigène, 
amenée en grande partie par des déprédations continuelles du bétail des éleveurs dans les plantations, par 
la distribution souvent inconsidérée de grandes étendues de terres prises aux naturels sans compensation 
d’aucune sorte, par des violations de sépulture, par des vexations dont les indigènes ne peuvent obtenir 
justice, éclata le 25 juin 1878.’ (Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 1901, p. 21). 
131 Latham (1975, p. 50) lists the Moindou tribe of Moméa as an enemy tribe of Fr Apollinaire. 
132 His report included as the major reasons for the insurrection: insufficient investment in native 
education; insufficient effort to maintain lawful and just relations between Europeans and Kanak; and 
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The potentially reconciliatory nature of this analysis was unheeded at the time. French 
interests had been defended by violence and as a peacekeeping measure, after the battle, 
1200 native prisoners were sent in exile to the Isle of Pines and Belep. The barriers that 
segregated European and Kanak were raised, the seeds of further violence were sown. 
Governor Nouet: L’Indigénat 
When Louis Nouet became Governor133, the inhabitants of New Caledonia were still 
traumatised by the events of 1878. Throughout the island, Europeans were demanding 
greater security and more control over Kanak activity. The findings of the Trentinian 
report had not been released and the Kanak had no voice. The decree of 11 July 1887 
gave the Governor the ability to set tribal boundaries and on 18 July 1887, the 
repressive Régime de l’Indigénat134 was introduced. The Indigénat divided the country 
further and the schism between natives and Europeans increased. French native subjects 
and French European citizens were subjected to two different systems of government, 
two different legislations and two different justice systems. French citizens were 
governed by Republican law and French subjects the Imperial law of the colonial 
jungle. The Indigénat, which applied only to the native non-citizens, protected the 
authority of the Administration. It provided Commandants with the power to accuse, 
condemn, intimidate and imprison without appeal. White supremacy was absolute, 
authoritarian and dictatorial. The hapless natives were ruled by a regime of decrees and 
statutes, which were variously described as being brutal, cruel and sadistic, 
intimidating, heavily policed and heavily taxed. The Indigénat defined tribal 
boundaries, allowed the appointment of administrative chiefs, determined infractions 
and terms of punishment and subsequently introduced a head tax135 to fill the coffers of 
a moribund economy and provide workers for an under-supplied labour market.136  
                                                                                                                                          
above all, imprudent concessions of land and dispossession of Kanak in violation of previous 
administrative guarantees (Dousset-Leenhardt 1978, pp. 129-133).  
133 Louis Nouet, Governor, 5 June 1886 to 30 July 1888. 
134 L’Indigénat, although often called Code de l’Indigénat, was never a Civil Code or a Penal Code. It 
was a collection of rules which should perhaps be called a régime (Merle 2004, p. 142). These rules were 
imposed on all French colonies except the old colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, Réunion, 
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon and the Établissements français dans l’Inde (Delathière 2004, p. 16). 
135 An edict on 23 December 1887 lists criminal offences for non-French citizens (Merle 2002, p. 87): 
 not obeying orders;  leaving reserve without permission;  possession of Kanak weapons in areas 
inhabited by Europeans;  practice of sorcery or accusations of such against others;  presence in bars 
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Natives, administration, and the French State viewed the Indigénat differently. The 
Republican State justified the regime with empty rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice, of 
assimilation en route to eventual inclusion. The colonial government was empowered 
by Kanak incarceration and oppression, and for the Kanak the Indigénat meant 
degradation and despair. 
In 1996, fifty years after the Indigénat had been abolished, older Kanak who had 
experienced the régime were interviewed for a special publication of the Agence de 
développement de la culture kanak (ADCK) journal Mwà Véé, entitled L’Indigénat 
(Mwà Véé 1997). Until then, literature relating to the Indigénat had been almost totally 
legalese and European. The period for the Kanak was a sad memory, a period of non-dit 
and la nuit coloniale. The intention of this issue of the review was to expose memories 
of the past in order to inform the present generation and to build a strong base for the 
future. The Indigénat years had been a period of population decline, and alcohol had 
become a coping mechanism for the unsatisfactory psychosocial environment of the 
reserve. Prostitution and gonorrhoea had led to infertility and the Kanak population fell 
from an estimated 38,000 in 1887 to 27,000 in 1921 (Filippi & Angleviel 2000a, p. 33). 
Wakolo Pouyé, a teacher from the Embouchure tribe at Ponérihouen, recalled the 
intimidation, the loss of authenticity and identity.137 It was apartheid, and he 
remembered the segregation: ‘on ne mange pas à la même table à cette époque’ (Mwà 
Véé 1997, p. 25). Yet there were signs of reconciliation, notably in the role played by 
the Protestant Pastor Maurice Leenhardt. In Pouyé’s view, it was Maurice Leenhardt 
who, by introducing the ‘temperance society’, saved the Kanak from extinction in the 
reserves. Memories of the Indigénat had remained dormant for fifty years for the old 
Kanak: ‘C’était comme si je découvrais à mon tour la réalité de l’Indigénat !’ (Mwà Véé 
                                                                                                                                          
and cabarets;  nudity in European centres and along the road;  presence in European houses without 
authorisation;  clearing of bush by fire;  disrupting public order or work in houses, shops, factories, 
etc.;  circulating in the streets of towns and cities after 8 p.m.  
In 1892 the following was added:  disrupting public order in Noumea and in rural centres.  
136 ‘Avant d’augmenter les charges déjà si lourdes qui pèsent sur la situation européenne, il me semble 
qu’il existe à notre portée une autre source importante de revenus qu’il convient de ne pas négliger plus 
longtemps ; je veux parler de l’impôt sur les indigènes. Nous avons là, près de nous, une population de 
plus de 40,000 âmes qui est devenue française par l’occupation et qui, j’en suis convaincu, ne tardera pas 
à le devenir par les sentiments [...] Certains peuples adoptent une politique coloniale très habile peut-être 
qui consiste soit à supprimer les indigènes soit à en faire de véritables esclaves. La France est un pays 
généreux ; c’est elle qui la première, a proclamé l’émancipation des Noirs ; ce n’est pas elle qui 
consentira jamais à détruire ni à asservir des hommes soumis à sa domination.’ (Extract of speech 16 
August 1886 by Governor Nouet, cited in Delathière 2004, p. 17).  
137 Wakolo Pouté was born in 1928 into the Embouchure de Ponérihouen tribe (Mwà Véé 1997, p. 23). 
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1997, p. 26). In the interview, Wakolo turned questions of the past into answers of hope 
for the future: the ‘two colours, one people’ of the Union Calédonienne, of a multiracial 
tomorrow, the new present and not the old past: ‘Il va falloir aboutir à une société 
mélangée, unifiée, réunie.’ (Mwà Véé 1997, p. 27). 
Jérémie Karé, who was born in 1925, attended Maurice Leenhardt’s school Do Neva, at 
Houaïlou. When he was asked what happened to the traditional chiefs when they were 
replaced by those chosen by the colonial administration, he seemed to be surprised: 
‘Mais ils sont là, ils sont respectés. Ils sont toujours chefs coutumiers.’ (Mwà Véé 1997, 
p. 29). The administrative chief was merely a mouthpiece with no real customary 
power. The Kanak approached the regime with flexibility rather than rigidity and this, 
as in La Fontaine’s fable, helped them to survive.138 The clan was also a support:  
Chez nous, il y a la guerre mais il existe une façon de retrouver la paix, 
c’est le pardon. Il concerne un clan tout entier et pas seulement la 
personne offensée. La faute d’une personne engage l’ensemble de son 
clan. Elle n’est pas individuelle, elle est communautaire. 
(Mwà Véé 1997, p. 3).  
The maintenance of customary practice provided the Kanak with a way of responding to 
European violence, and a traditional pathway towards reconciliation. 
The decree was to be revised and renewed every ten years, according to the needs of the 
colony. It was not until after the Second World War, in 1946, that the Indigénat was 
finally abolished.  
Paul Feillet, Governor of New Caledonia 1894-1902: Contradictions in 
vision, reconciliation denied 
When Governor Feillet arrived in the colony in June 1894, the country was teetering on 
bankruptcy. Mining revenue had slumped and mines were closing due to competition 
from Canada. Livestock production was down and floods and grasshopper plagues had 
destroyed crops. Feillet realised that the future of the country was dependent upon 
minerals, livestock and coffee and in the economic climate it was coffee, the ‘nickel of 
agriculture,’ upon which his hopes were pinned. To sustain the development of the 
                                                
138 This fable of the Oak and the Reed: the oak, rigid and proud, could not survive the wind, but the reed 
with flexibility and humility survived. 
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coffee industry free settlers were needed and these had been slow to arrive due to the 
stigma of the ‘prison land’ image: ‘Ce pays, si beau, si riche, souffre de ne pas être 
connu. On l’a toujours vu sous l’aspect sinistre et décourageant d’une geôle lointaine.’ 
(Feillet 1894, p. 12).  
The ‘dirty tap’ of transportation is turned off 
The decision was made to stop transportation and ‘to turn off the dirty water tap’ 
(Delbos 1993, p. 275). The Governor began an advertising campaign with guidebooks 
and brochures published under the direction of the Ministry of Colonies.139 In France, 
the Union Coloniale Française published a fortnightly journal, La Quinzaine Coloniale, 
which promoted New Caledonia not as an Eldorado, but as a country where success was 
assured for those with resources who were prepared to work. The immigrants targeted 
were those with a reserve capital of 5000 francs, but in four years, only 1200 new 
settlers had taken up the offer. The Feillet target was 10,000 to 20,000. 
By stopping transportation, the flow of convict manual labour came to a halt and with it, 
the cheap workforce required to build the colony. It was now necessary to replace this 
workforce by recruitment in Indochina, the New Hebrides and Batavia. 
Marists and Governor in conflict 
In New Caledonia, the two dominant powers were the Marist mission and the prison. 
The new Governor favoured neither of these. Having decided to stop transportation, he 
was now faced with the opposition of the Church. In France, the move was towards 
anticlericalism, radical secularity, the abandonment of the Concordat with the Vatican 
and the termination of financial patronage of the Catholic Church (Garrett 1992, 
p. 107). On Grande Terre, the Catholics had reigned supreme, and when State funding 
was withdrawn, Church property was reclaimed. When Protestants, whose activity had 
been restricted to the Loyalty Islands, were provided with religious liberty, the 
                                                
139 These brochures included Notice sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie by Gallet, La plantation du café en 
Nouvelle-Calédonie by Camouilly, L’Émigrant en Nouvelle-Calédonie by Dr Davillé the initial print run 
of this publication in 1894 was 10,000 copies; this was followed by a second edition in 1901), Les Débuts 
d’un Émigrant en Nouvelle-Calédonie by Villaz, La vie du colon en Nouvelle-Calédonie by Devillers, 
Reverchon and Vigoureux, and the monthly Bulletin of the Union Agricole Calédonienne (Colquilhat 
1990, p. 2). 
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Catholics rebelled. They began a lobby against the Governor using André Ballande, an 
influential businessman and benefactor of the Catholic Church in New Caledonia, as an 
intermediary. For the eight years of his governorship Feillet was dogged by Catholic 
opposition and conflict. In addition, between Protestants and Catholics, the Church and 
Government and the Church and State, the cycle of conflict resurfaced. 
The Marist mission enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the ‘House of Ballande,’ a 
powerhouse in the development of New Caledonia, and the Bishops Fraysse and 
Chanrion used this relationship to advantage in their attack on the Governor. André 
Ballande was an astute businessman and devout Catholic. He ran his business from 
France and for him to have a trusted source of local information from an uncompetitive 
ally provided him with a commercial advantage. When the influence of the General 
Council increased, Ballande saw the benefit in having a representative on the council. 
Bishop Fraysse obliged with a candidate who had the ability to defend both the House 
of Ballande and the Catholic mission, and informed Ballande of his choice by coded 
telegram (Shineberg & Kohler 1990, p. 7). For thirty years Gabriel Laroque filled this 
role to the satisfaction of merchant and mission, and for this, the Church was 
handsomely remunerated. As the convict labour market disappeared, the Bishop also 
arranged, through his confreres in Haipong, a shipment of 750 prisoners from the Poulo 
Condore Island jail for ‘the House of Ballande’.140 This was a lucrative transaction, and 
for the Church’s role in this unholy alliance it was paid ten francs per head. The Church 
also received large gifts of money and a levy on the profits of certain business ventures. 
At the peak of Church–Government hostility, which translated into intra-French 
conflict, Ballande, in collaboration with Bishop Fraysse, stood for the Chamber of 
Deputies in Paris to promote the mission and to counter antagonism.141  
Feillettistes and anti-Feillettistes: The war of the press 
The press was not immune from Church-Government rancour.142 When the Bishop 
refused to endorse the newly established Agricultural Union of Caledonia differences 
                                                
140 Evenor De Greslan was one of the Grands Blancs sugar planters from Réunion Island who was 
instrumental in the development of the sugar industry in New Caledonia (Speedy 2008, p. 7). 
141 This antagonism concluded in 1905 with the complete separation of Church and State. 
142 ‘La mission de la Nouvelle-Calédonie est horriblement attaquée, on peut dire persécutée […]. La 
Liberté défunte a été remplacée par Le Radical néo-calédonien. Deux fois par semaine, il vomit des 
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between Church and Government became irreconcilable. The Governor called for the 
removal of Fraysse from the colony, calling him the ‘enemy of free colonisation’ 
(Delbos 1993, p. 282), and in an attempt to turn the tables, Fraysse prevailed upon his 
friend André Ballande to acquire a controlling interest in the local pro-Government 
newspaper, Le Radical.143  
The Government weighed into the conflict, accusing the Church of opposing its policies 
of forced labour and head tax (Shineberg & Kohler 1990, pp. 3-21). 
Tribal land further reduced 
One of the problems facing the free colonisation policy was the acquisition of land for 
the anticipated new arrivals. The first land reserved was that of the penitentiary which 
in 1885 amounted to some 110,000 hectares but more was needed for the Governor’s 
ambitious project. Feillet justified the confiscation of additional land by referring to the 
act of annexation when all land became that of the State and to the tenet that the Kanak 
had a purely precarious title to the land that they occupied. Moreover the ‘revision’ of 
land was never imposed, it was always negotiated and the price received by the chief 
was not payment but merely ‘le signe palpable du consentement’ (O’Reilly 1953, 
p. 224). The restriction of native land facilitated administration and controlled the 
primitive population, which the Governor, imbued with the evolutionary ideology of the 
day, considered a lower species in need of taming and civilising. Dispossession was 
also justified by the claim that new settlers would add value to the land and provide 
salaried employment for dislodged and dislocated natives. In the vast reorganisation of 
territorial land, the Kanak holding was reduced to three hectares per head of population 
(Merle 1999, p. 16). O’Reilly, in his investigation, found that in a period of thirteen 
months, from November 1898 to December 1899, no fewer than 74 ordinances related 
                                                                                                                                          
blasphèmes affreux contre Dieu, Jésus Christ, la Sainte Vierge et la religion et insulte grossièrement la 
Mission et les missionnaires. Il est soutenu et probablement dirigé par les gouvernants qui en veulent à la 
Mission’. (Delbos 1993, p. 279).  
143 The Bishop in an outburst of vituperative railing described the newspaper as ‘[…] cette horrible feuille 
a dépassé en violence ce que vous voyez de pire dans les plus mauvaises publications de Paris. C’est de la 
rage, de l’épilepsie, du satanisme. Ce qui n’est pas étonnant, car l’inspiration est prise à la loge dont les 
adeptes sont malheureusement bien nombreux dans ce pauvre pays.’ (Delbos 1993, p. 284).  
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to the limitation of native reserves and the acquisition of land for settler use.144 Included 
in these transactions was the removal of 4717 hectares from the Houaïlou tribe which in 
exchange received 995 francs and a list of restrictions: 
Les indigènes ne pourront rien réclamer en sus, soit pour privation de 
récoltes ou de plantations, soit pour tout autre motif […] Ils devront 
également déguerpir de ces terrains désignés ci-dessus. Ils devront 
également déguerpir de ces terrains dès que l’ordre en sera donné. Si, à 
leur départ, des récoltes en taros ou en ignames, restaient à faire, ils 
auraient le droit de venir enlever les dites récoltes de leur maturité. 
(Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 1901, p. 16). 
Other parcels of land transferred between 1899 and 1900 included 6217 hectares in the 
Kouaoua valley for the sum of 1110 francs, 483 hectares from the Gomen and 485 
hectares from the Tieti tribe for which they received 200 francs and a ‘Lefaucheux’ rifle 
(O’Reilly 1953, p. 224). The law as it related to tribal land was vague. An inspector in a 
report ‘Rapport de l’inspecteur des colonies Fillon du 15 mai 1907’ described this lack 
of durability of the law: ‘Je ne crois pas que le caprice d’un gouvernement local ait, 
dans aucune autre colonie, soumis à plus de variations les droits des premiers occupants 
autochtones.’ (Cited in Merle 1999, p. 17). These new land claims were in flagrant 
contradiction to previous land settlements and caused an increase in intertribal tension 
that would inevitably lead to open conflict. 
The Feillet head tax on natives: Conflict and the Committee for the 
Defence and Protection of Natives145 
The head tax which was introduced by Feillet and the General Council on 22 November 
1895 can also be viewed as an act of violence and a source of discontent. This tax 
applied only to adult male Melanesians, who were forced to pay 10 francs per annum, 
                                                
144 Details of the orders for the spoliation of Kanak land from January 1899 to January 1900 inclusive are 
detailed in Spoliation des indigènes de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Mémoire du comité de protection et de 
défense des indigènes (Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 1901, pp. 14-20). 
145 The Comité de protection et de défense des indigenes (CPDI)—Committee for the Defence and 
Protection of Natives—was a committee set up in Paris by Paul Viollet in 1892 for the defence and 
protection of indigenous people against colonial excesses. 
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which equated to the native working for a settler for ten days.146 In February 1901, 
Hippolyte,147 Chief the Catholic tribe of Touho, accused Amane, Chief of the pagan 
tribe of Poyes, of not paying the tax. The Poyes people denied this and took to the bush. 
They were pursued by the military, houses were burnt, crops were destroyed and lives 
were lost in les troubles de Touho (Legeard 2004, p. 51). In a report in Le Temps, 
12 May 1901, Feillet declared that this violent attack was an isolated case that had only 
occurred after all means of conciliation had been attempted. The Comité de protection 
et de défense des indigènes (CPDI) responded to this with incredulity: 
Brûler un village abandonné par des désespérés qui ne peuvent payer 
l’impôt, et déclarer ensuite qu’on se propose avant d’engager une 
poursuite sans merci, de tenter tous les moyens de conciliation, est un de 
ces traits admirables, où se révèle naïvement l’étonnante inconscience de 
certaines administrations coloniales. 
(Comité de protection et de défense des indigènes 1901, pp. 1-2). 
The CPDI in a letter to the Minister of Colonies appealed for the removal of this tax on 
natives whose land on Grande Terre had been seized: ‘la plus cruelle qui puisse être 
signalée dans nos possessions coloniales’ (Comité de protection et de défense des 
indigènes 1901, p. 4). As well, the CPDI demanded, in the name of humanity and 
justice, the repeal of several decrees: the decree of 12 March 1897, which gave the 
Governor power to intern natives without representation or trial for an undetermined 
period of time; the decree of 18 July 1887, which gave the Governor the right over 
indigenous property; and the law of 23 November 1897, which regulated the 
dispossession of natives. Recognising the gross injustices to which natives, who were 
legally French, had been subjected, the CPDI also demanded the restitution of tribal 
land that had been confiscated since November 1897. These claims were supported by 
certain settlers who complained of a return to indigenous slavery.  
                                                
146 With an estimated population of 40,000 Kanak in 1880 (Filippi & Angleviel 2000a, p. 33), this was 
seen as an additional source of revenue. Note that this population decline [from the 40,000-60,000 in the 
early to mid-1800s estimated by Filippi and Angleviel (2000a, p. 33)] is disputed by Shineberg (1983).  
147 Hippolyte, who spoke French, was supported by the whites with whom he had good relations. The 
Poyes was an enemy tribe which after the ‘troubles’ became Protestant (Legeard 2001, pp. 51-89). 
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In the Hienghène area tribal hatred had existed for generations148 and when ‘inalienable’ 
land in the area was attributed (Duroy 1988, p. 68),149 war broke out. The war was 
quelled in a military operation lead by René Moriceau, the head of the newly formed 
Native Affairs Bureau. This expedition was criticised in a letter written by Dr Normet, 
the colonial doctor in Hienghène, who believed that a simple incident between the 
tribes—Chiefs Amane and Bouillant (Poyes tribe) and Chief Hippolyte (Touho tribe)—
had resulted in the répression d’une rébellion imaginaire. In the name of civilisation 
this murderous reprisal gained legitimacy; fourteen were killed and thirty were injured. 
In the aftermath of this war, major changes were recommended. The Governor banned 
the sale of firearms to natives and Moriceau recommended the reinstallation of 
customary chiefs due to the respect and influence they had over tribal members 
(O’Reilly 1953, p. 227).  
Feillet was authoritarian and ambitious and consequently made many enemies including 
the members of the Conseil Général. With widespread unrest, it seemed as though the 
Feillet idea of civilisation was more destructive than the savagery it intended to conquer 
(Mwà Véé 1997, p. 29).150 The Conseil demanded an explanation for the dispossession 
of native reserve land and the country was soon divided between the Feillettistes and 
the anti-Feillettistes. The local press and Bishop Fraysse entered the fray. The Bishop 
disagreed with the Governor’s treatment of natives and the resumption of tribal land, 
and in particular the handling of the confiscation of land of the Ina tribe near Pouebo. 
Feillet had been eager to acquire the land of this small Catholic tribe for his free settlers, 
and even though the chief of the tribe had agreed with the proposition, the tribe did not. 
The tribe sought the help of the Marist missionaries.151 Bypassing and ignoring the 
                                                
148 ‘Les tribus de la vallée de la Hienghène n’a pas disparu (sic) et ne disparaîtra pas (sic) de longtemps. 
Les indigènes se méfient les uns des autres et font des détours très longs pour ne pas traverser les terres 
de leurs ennemis.’ (O’Reilly 1953, p. 226). 
149 Already settled in the area were the forebears of those involved in the Hienghène massacre in 1984: 
Jean-Louis Sangarné who had fought in the Sedan, Claude Petitjean, a communard, and the Lapetite 
family with their eleven children were Feillet colons. Between the years 1895 and 1905 the amount of 
land provided for colonisation in the Tiendanite Valley alone, in the Hienghène area, increased from 469 
hectares to 1234 hectares (Duroy 1988, p. 62). 
150 According to Jérémie Karé, the Governor found it difficult to communicate with the Kanak and 
attempted to do things his own way: ‘il se met à nommer des chefs sans se rendre compte de la structure 
coutumière existante. Il le base, entre autres, sur des Kanak qui connaissent un peu de français et peuvent 
lui permettre de communiquer avec cette société Kanak qu’il ne connaît pas.’ 
151 ‘Les Canaques n’ont jamais accepté la spoliation foncière dont ils étaient constamment les victimes. 
Ils n’ont pas cessé de s’en plaindre à tout témoin, en particulier à ceux qui avaient vocation à les écouter, 
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Church, the Governor visited the tribe and took the land. This blatant demonstration of 
the power of the State had the potential to gravely affect the faith that the natives had in 
the authority of the Church.  
According to Delbos, as the Governor was unable to have the Bishop expelled, he 
decided to destroy the monopoly previously enjoyed by the Marists by approving the 
installation of Protestant missions on Grande Terre (O’Reilly 1953, p. 238).152 Some 
natas with family on Grande Terre had already been engaged in clandestine mission 
work but when discovered they were rapidly removed (Guiart 2003, pp. 40-42). Mataia 
from Ouvéa had made several visits to Houaïlou and Kapéa, a nephew of chief Mindia, 
had spent five years training with the Protestants on Ouvéa. Following Feillet’s 
approval, two natas were authorised to work at Houaïlou, providing that one was able to 
speak the language of Houaïlou, Ajië, and the other French. To rub salt into the Marist 
wounds, the natas from the Loyalty Islands were offered free transport to Grande Terre 
by the Governor. Within a short time, the number of natas in the Houaïlou area had 
increased to fifteen or sixteen. In 1898 M. Lengereau, the pastor of the European parish 
in Noumea, in a letter to his superiors in France, commented on the success of natas: 
J’attire l’attention des Églises de France sur les vingt-cinq ou trente 
tribus de la Côté Est de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, et les vingt tribus à 
l’ouest, qui, évangélisées par une quinzaine de pasteurs Maréens ont fait 
adhésion au protestantisme… 
(Guiart 1959, p. 14). 
Pastor Delord arrived from Paris in 1898, and in response to his request for another 
Pastor, Maurice Leenhardt and his family arrived. Leenhardt was well received and he 
believed that he was fortunate during his early years at Houaïlou to be dealing with 
friendly governors (Clifford 1982, p. 51).153 It was the Marists who bore the brunt of 
Feillet’s antagonism. 
                                                                                                                                          
comme les missionnaires, qui ont généralement transmis et même publié leurs plaintes.’ (Guiart 2003, 
p. 54). 
152 O’Reilly goes on to quote from a ‘note’ written by the Governor: ‘la paix religieuse et politique ne 
peut être ramenée dans le pays que après le départ de Monseigneur Fraysse’. 
153 Leenhardt was a distant relative of Feillet, and this may have helped the Leenhardts. Any aid would 
have been short-lived, however, as Feillet returned to France in the same year as the Leenhardts arrived in 
New Caledonia. 
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In 1902, Feillet, after almost eight years of visionary but difficult administration, was 
recalled to France. He was a man with a grand vision for the colony and for the 
grandeur of France. Jérémie Karé described the Governor: ‘Feillet essaie vraiment de 
mener une politique coloniale qui soit celle de la France, tout en s’interposant entre les 
colons et les Kanak de façon à préserver ces derniers d’une colonisation trop radicale.’ 
(Mwà Véé 1997, p. 29). He was a man in a hurry, impulsive, violent, angry and 
authoritarian. His closing words of the Conseil Général, ‘Vive la Colonne, Vive la 
France, Vive la République’, indicated his patriotism but his republican ideals and 
colonial reality were ill-matched. The contradiction between reconciliation and colonial 
violence became more pronounced as France moved towards a more secular State, and 
as the Church lost its bargaining power it was less able to defend native rights. For the 
hapless Kanak it was a mortal blow. As the despair of the natives increased, their 
population decreased, and there was little means of recourse. 
Maurice Leenhardt: The first Protestant missionary on Grande Terre 
and the prospect of reconciliation 
In 1902, Maurice Leenhardt was the first Protestant European missionary to establish a 
mission station on Grande Terre. He established the mission station Do Neva, ‘the true 
country’, at Houaïlou on the East Coast of the island where the High Chief of the region 
Mindia Néja had converted to Protestantism.154 The success of the natas in this region 
had inspired a Marist counterattack, and two Marist fathers had been sent as a 
counterbalancing force. When Leenhardt arrived on the doorstep of the Catholic 
mission, political manoeuvring became more conflictual.  
Leenhardt soon realised the injustices of the colonial process and of the impossible 
situation of the native population. His attempt to provide the natives with access to 
education and justice brought him into conflict with the administration and with settlers 
who had an insatiable demand for land and forced native labour. Soon after his arrival, 
he became aware of a petition that had been sent by colonists to the Governor 
requesting the expulsion of natas, and Protestantism, from Grande Terre: ‘These 
foreigners […] were stirring up resistance to white rule and impeding the recruitment of 
                                                
154 This region had been evangelised by the Ouvéa nata, Mathaia (Clifford 1982, p. 59). 
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Canaque labour.’ (Clifford 1982, p. 32).155 Feelings ran so high that a posse of natives 
would accompany the pastor on mission voyages into the Chaîne centrale for fear of an 
ambush in some deserted place.  
Leenhardt’s missiology was fundamentally different from that of his Loyalty Island 
colleagues, Philadelphe Delord on Maré, and James Hadfield on Lifou. Delord was a 
veteran evangelist whose charisma was able to sway audiences and provide much 
needed support for the mission; however, in in true evangelistic style he believed the 
goal was the conversion of primitive people to Christianity.156 In this, he and Leenhardt 
had differing views. Leenhardt believed that the Kanak needed support and the means to 
survive ‘the deadly breath of civilisation’. In Leenhardt’s opinion Protestantism had 
‘gone soft’ in the Loyalty Islands and was ‘not actively experiencing the spiritual 
revivication of continual translation’ (Clifford 1982, p. 116). In a colony where 
Protestantism lacked prestige and where Catholicism reigned supreme,157 the Catholic 
priests, backed by the military, gendarmes and administrative chiefs, were formidable 
opponents for the lone Protestant missionary. In Leenhardt’s early years he was warned 
by friendly Governors Picanon and Rognon,158 to avoid political involvement, but this 
went against his strong sense of justice: 
But I would think myself profoundly egocentric if I didn’t try to get 
justice for these poor people. Anyway how can I, in simple everyday 
morality, oppose the natives stealing of coconuts if I accept their 
expulsion from the coconut groves to which they are attached like 
mistletoe to its tree. 
(Clifford 1982, p. 52).  
                                                
155 The natas taught arithmetic and encouraged the checking of weights and prices in dealings with the 
whites: ‘This was unheard of insolence.’ (Clifford 1982, p. 59). 
156 Delord, the ‘friend of the lepers’, had gained support and much-needed funding for the establishment 
of leprosariums on Lifou, Chila, Maré and Bethesda. His treatment of leprosy was described as 
innovative (Clifford 1982, p. 76) and appealed to French benefactors. In reality, his treatment with 
Chaulmoogra oil had been in practice for some sixty years, and despite his reputed success with the drug, 
it was not until the advent of ‘sulpha drugs’, sulphones and sulphonamides, in the 1930s, that a more 
effective treatment of mycobacterium leprae was achieved. 
157 Despite this, the Protestant mission was amazingly successful. At the time of Leenhardt’s departure in 
1926 one third of the island professed to be Protestant. 
158 Edouard Picanon was Governor from 14 November 1902 until 17 May 1905 and Charles Amédée 
Rognon was Governor from 17 May 1905 until 17 September 1905. 
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Leenhardt found it impossible to avoid political conflict. He was in constant 
confrontation with gendarmes and settlers over land, labour and the human rights of the 
native population. He fought against a Government which aimed to repress the natives 
and a gendarmerie which, encouraged by Government, harassed natas.  
In Houaïlou, political manoeuvring between Leenhardt and the Catholics led to 
hostility; intra-French rivalry resurfaced, with Protestant opposed to Catholic and all 
missionaries at odds with the Administration. This conflict was not without 
ramifications for Kanak society. The method of evangelism of each Church differed. 
The Catholics relied entirely upon European priests and it was not until after the Second 
World War, in 1946, that the first two indigenous Catholic priests were ordained. In 
contrast, the mainstay of Protestant evangelism was the native catechists and teachers, 
with the missionary playing a supportive role of the ‘white corks supporting the black 
net’ in Bishop Selwyn’s words. When Leenhardt first arrived in the colony, the Marists 
were well established. They had extensive property holdings and political power, and 
the newly arrived Protestants on Grande Terre were considered to be foreigners. This 
situation was to change in 1905 with the final separation of State and Church in France. 
This scission, while not affecting the Protestant Evangelical Mission, would reduce the 
power of the Catholic Church.  
Leenhardt’s initial criticism of the educational standard of natas and monitors became 
more moderate with time. He directed that no native custom should be abolished until 
its full implications were understood and even then, only when an alternative ritual of 
social cohesion had been found. He fought the administrative bodies which condemned 
the use of native languages in schools on the premise that at least a few native 
languages should be preserved and that language was as much a part of the native 
culture as the attachment to land, but he also recognised that cultural change was 
occurring: ‘The life of culture is change—at its own pace and on its own terms.’ 
(Clifford 1982, p. 54). 
Within the Protestant mission, cracks were beginning to appear due to inter-missionary 
conflict between Grande Terre and the Loyalty Islands. Leenhardt realised that there 
were fundamental differences between his mission and that of the Loyalty Islands; they 
were two separate entities which had been built upon very different cultural and 
historical foundations. Leenhardt’s colleague, Etienne Bergeret, on Lifou favoured the 
tradition of a single person being responsible for both religious and general education: 
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the ‘pastor-teacher’. This halved the cost of training and kept the mission under the 
paternalistic control of the white missionary, within the hierarchical system favoured by 
the SMEP Leenhardt, on the other hand, separated education and pastoral care. On the 
mainland, the tyranny of distance prohibited the system in existence on the Loyalty 
Islands, where distances separating schools were such that the white missionary was 
able to engage in a supervisory role. Teachers trained on the Grande Terre had more 
authority and this was not part of the French colonial vision. As Jean Guiart noted: 
Le système colonial détestait tout progrès canaque et en particulier tout 
effort d’enseignement visant à donner aux Mélanésiens la connaissance 
des moyens techniques dont les blancs prétendaient se réserver 
globalement la maîtrise. 
(Guiart 2003, p. 26).  
Leenhardt’s mission provided natas with a more functional training to equip them better 
for work in the ‘bush schools’. As the missions on Grande Terre and the Loyalty 
Islands each pursued their own agenda, the schism broadened, and ‘the spirit of Do 
Neva became suspect among the Loyalty missionaries’.159  
The separation became so pronounced that Leenhardt obtained formal recognition in the 
constitution of the SMEP of the differences between Protestants of the Loyalty Islands 
and those of the Grande Terre.160 The acceptance of Leenhardt’s request was in the 
hope that, with time and dialogue, inter-island differences would vanish. Meanwhile, 
the situation between the two missions deteriorated as missionary egos took centre stage 
and the Melanesians were reduced to ‘bit players’ in the theatrics. Philippe 
Rey-Lescure, a young missionary at Do Neva, had been influenced by his uncle, 
Maurice Leenhardt, and sought to weave native custom into the fabric of the Christian 
faith. When he suggested reconstructing the Grande Case as a ‘symbol of regional 
pride’ and ‘cultural authenticity’ (Clifford 1982, p. 120), his suggestion was met with 
the derision of his colleagues. The schism widened and attack followed counterattack in 
what became known as l’affaire Rey-Lescure and the problems of the natives were 
pushed into obscurity. At the point of no return the SMEP took the line of least 
                                                
159 M Anker (SMEP missionary) to Allegret (Director of SMEP) 19 January 1932 (cited in Clifford 1982, 
p. 119). 
160 In Leenhardt’s opinion, evangelism in the Loyalty Islands had become pastoral and was too concerned 
with the everyday running of the church. His idea of the missionary was as an educator and interpreter of 
cultural and religious difference (Clifford 1982, p. 116). 
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resistance and Rey-Lescure and his family were transferred to Tahiti (Garrett 1992, 
p. 368). With the departure of the mission, Do Neva languished, trainees were sent to 
Lifou to be trained as pastor-teachers and the Houaïlou language was relegated to 
second position behind Drehu, which became the accepted language of mission 
education and publicity (Clifford 1982, p. 120). As Guiart points out, the practices of 
Leenhardt and Rey-Lescure have since been vindicated.161 
Conclusion: Chapter 2 
Following an initial antipodean outburst of protest, the French settled into the task of 
establishing a colony. All land became the property of the State and vast areas of tribal 
land were distributed by the early Administrators, military men with little regard for, or 
knowledge of native culture. The Kanak were not consulted. This led to conflict and 
discontent which culminated in the 1878 insurrection. In conflict, disparate tribes which 
spoke different languages became reconciled to join with Ataï in the battle against the 
Administration, settlers and traditional tribal enemies. In what could have been a step 
towards reconciliation a report was presented by Trentinian which provided 
recommendations to avoid further conflict. This report was ignored. To re-establish 
peace, hundreds of Kanak were deported in a move which could only lead to discontent 
and bitterness. 
The distribution of tribal land, the Indigénat, the head tax and the appointment of 
administrative chiefs from enemy tribes kept Kanak and government in constant 
opposition. With each wave of new arrivals, transportés, déportés of the Paris 
Commune, Kabyles, Alsatians and Lorrains, recidivists and manual workers, more land 
was expropriated, the Kanak were pushed further into the less fertile land of the central 
mountain chain, and the spiral of conflict intensified. Intertribal battles were frequently 
terminated by violent military intervention, the burning of villages and the destruction 
of crops. The understanding was that white is might, and white is right. As Kanak pleas 
for justice fell on deaf ears conflict was the only way to restore self-respect and 
autonomy.  
                                                
161 ‘Aujourd’hui la validité de la thèse de Leenhardt, séparant la fonction sacerdotale et celle de 
l’enseignement, est empiriquement reconnue de tous.’ (Guiart 2003, p. 26).  
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On the Loyalty Islands conflict spiralled out of control when Catholic–Protestant rivalry 
aggravated pre-existing intertribal enmity and anti-clerical governors sent in the troops. 
The Church, by defending native rights, was frequently at odds with anti-clerical 
governors and the secular State, and this left the Kanak with conflict as the only means 
of recourse. Conflict around the countryside was multi-layered and seemingly 
intractable. 
Between communities there was little communication: different languages were spoken, 
different world views were held, and pioneering families were generally fully occupied 
in the battle of establishing themselves in a harsh new country. There was a glimmer of 
hope for the Kanak when Protestant missionaries were granted the right to work on 
Grande Terre and Maurice Leenhardt established a vocational school, Do Neva, at 
Houaïlou. In collaboration with the Marists, Leenhardt instituted a temperance 
movement and obtained legislation to ban the sale of alcohol to the indigenous 
population. Like Selwyn in the previous century (see Chapter 1), Leenhardt recognised 
the value of Kanak custom and culture and insisted that it should be retained and fully 
investigated.162 Gradually the native population regained confidence and the population 
decline was halted. Leenhardt was an exceptional voice of potential reconciliation but 
even for him the battle lines were drawn. By encouraging the Kanak, he found himself 
in opposition with the authorities, such were the antagonisms of the day. 
In the clash of cultures and absence of a common language, multiple forms of violence 
and conflict erupted and left little hope for reconciliation. Incarcerated in reserves and 
yoked to the dispensation of L’Indigénat, it was not until World War II threatened 
world peace that the Kanak re-emerged as a viable opposition to French hegemony, 
leading to the prospect of reconciliation but also in fact to further violence. We shall 
now turn our attention to this post-war period to pursue in detail the political and 
religious context in which opposing forces were to evolve in New Caledonia. 
                                                
162 Maurice Leenhardt worked on Grande Terre from 1902 until 1926. He returned to Paris to teach at the 
École Practique des Hautes Études, taking over the Marcel Mauss chair of anthropology until 1951 when 
it was passed to Claude Levi-Strauss. He was first President of the Société des Océanistes and the Institut 
Français d’Océanie. He also worked at the Musée de l’Homme (Clifford 1982, p. 2). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
World War II and its Aftermath 
Pétain, de Gaulle and the Americans: Conflict averted 
It was not until the dramatic events of World War II, bringing a new international form 
of conflict, that the possibility of internal reconciliation could exist. For this reason, this 
chapter will proceed to the significant context of New Caledonia after the fall of France 
in 1940. 
In June 1940 Marshal Pétain, the hero of Verdun, signed an armistice with Germany. 
France was divided; the north was under the control of Nazi Germany and the south, in 
economic and political collaboration with the Germans, was governed by Marshal 
Pétain in Vichy. Before this surrender General de Gaulle had fled to London where, 
unprepared to capitulate, he launched an appeal for the French to join the Allied Forces 
in the war against Germany. De Gaulle realised the value of the untapped source of 
manpower within the Imperial Empire in his call to arms broadcast on the BBC.163 His 
appeal was endorsed by the British Government, which offered support to those French 
colonies prepared to join the resistance movement.  
For Georges Pélicier, the Governor of New Caledonia, the advantages of aligning with 
the Allied Forces in the British dominated Pacific were evident. Amidst the uncertainty 
of a divided France, an opportunistic lawyer, Michel Vergès, saw this was the chance to 
push for local autonomy in defiance of the Vichy Government. His proposal was well 
supported, but opposition was soon brought to bear by the Catholic Church, which 
supported the German puppet regime in Vichy. 
For the Church, it was a case of ‘one good turn deserves another.’ Bishops and 
Archbishops of the Catholic Church rallied to marshal support for Pétain as the 
legitimate Head of State, and as quid pro quo, the buildings which had been taken from 
                                                
163 De Gaulle in his broadcast from London on 18 June 1940 called the Empire to arms: ‘France is not 
alone. She is not alone! She has a great empire behind her. Together with the British Empire, she can 
form a bloc that controls the seas and continue the struggle. She may, like England draw upon the 
limitless industrial resources of the United States.’ (Cited in Munholland 2005, p. 10). 
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the Church by the State in 1905 were returned. Also provided was State aid to Church 
schools and the permission to resume religious education in public schools.164  
In New Caledonia Governor Pélicier was directed to cut ties with Britain. This placed 
him in an unenviable position, as New Caledonia relied heavily on Australia for 
supplies of food and for coal for the nickel smelter at Doniambo. Pélicier found himself 
in an unenviable position: he was facing a cacophony of calls for independence, 
demands from the Vichy Government, isolation in an Anglophonic ocean, and the 
prospect of the Japanese siding with the Germans to take over New Caledonia with its 
lucrative nickel industry.165 The Governor found himself in an untenable position. It 
was decided to bring the potential calamity to an end by undercover political 
intervention. The Australians decided to act. 
To facilitate this move, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, John McEwan, 
asked a French-speaking lawyer in the New Hebrides, Bertram Ballard, to be 
Australia’s representative in New Caledonia. Ballard accepted the offer. High-level 
confidential cablegrams flew between Noumea, Canberra and London. As tension 
increased, Governor Pélicier became jittery and was recalled to France. His 
replacement, Maurice Denis, resigned when Henri Sautot, who had been the French 
Resident Commissioner in the New Hebrides, was appointed by General De Gaulle of 
the Free French movement to govern the island (The Argus 20 September 1940, p. 1): 
I desire that the situation in New Caledonia should be urgently settled in 
accordance with the population. I confirm your appointment as 
temporary governor of New Caledonia […], and I request you will 
proceed urgently to Noumea […] as a French operation […] and under 
the French flag with merely contingent support from H.M.A.S. Adelaide. 
(De Gaulle, cited in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016a). 
Included in the same letter is a message from the Admiralty Reporting Officer, which 
acknowledged the plan of HMAS Adelaide to land Sautot. In this clandestine operation, 
even the President of the Free French Committee was unaware of the plans afoot. The 
                                                
164 Many Marist missionaries had parish and family connections within parts of France where 
conservative Catholic opinion supported the regime established by Marshal Georges Pétain at Vichy after 
the fall of France in 1940 (Garrett 1997, p. 62). 
165 On 25 August 1940 Vichy’s Minister of Colonies instructed Pélicier to reserve all of New Caledonia’s 
mineral production for the Japanese (cited in Munholland 2005, p. 42) 
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arrival in Noumea of M. Brunot, a Free French diplomat, caused tension with Sautot 
who less than one year later was replaced as High Commissioner by Commandant 
D’Argenlieu. De Gaulle was aware of the ‘cesspool of intrigue’ existing in the Pacific 
and of the possible conflict which might result from his latest appointment. According 
to Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, ‘De 
Gaulle has been at special pains to spare Sautot’s feelings. He maintains him as a 
member of the Council of Defence and has decorated him with the Cross of Liberation.’ 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016b). 
Broader Pacific conflict in New Caledonia and a chance for 
reconciliation 
A surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 brought the 
Americans into the war in the Pacific. As the Japanese pushed south, New Caledonia 
seemed a likely target as it would offer little resistance, an abundance of mineral 
resources and was strategically well located. With this turn of events, all hope was 
pinned on the United States, at the same time as ‘the honour of the French flag and that 
of Christianity’166 were in the hands of Admiral d’Argenlieu.167 On 12 March 1942 an 
initial convoy of fifteen thousand American troops arrived. This was soon to expand to 
forty thousand, thus causing the population of New Caledonia to almost double. In 
1942, the population of New Caledonia was estimated to be 57,000, composed of 
29,000 Kanak, 17,000 Europeans and 11,000 Asians. ‘One might have said that the 
Martians had landed’ (Munholland 2005, p. 91) was how Gabriel Païta, a Kanak student 
at the Catholic mission school at Canala remembered the arrival. For the residents of 
New Caledonia, the magnitude of American equipment and supplies was ‘stupefying,’ 
and their generosity astounding. Gabriel Païta believed that ‘it was the Americans who 
led to the advancement of the Kanak people’. He remembered the gifts of shoes and 
clothing and even a jeep for Father William (Munholland 2005, p. 91). Displays of 
                                                
166 De Gaulle to d’Argenlieu 24 December 1941 (cited in Munholland 2005, p. 88). 
167 D’Argenlieu, after serving the French Navy with distinction during the First World War, turned to the 
Church, and became a superior in the Carmelite Order, Father Louis de la Trinité (Munholland 2005, 
p. 74). 
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American affluence caused the French to suspect an American ulterior motive and a 
plan to claim the mineral-rich, strategically-placed island.168 
Kanak liberation 
The Kanak, living under the Indigénat regime and incarcerated in tribal reserves, were 
now in demand to help the war effort. More than one million allied servicemen were 
estimated to have passed through New Caledonia during the 46 months of US military 
occupation. This sudden population explosion had far-reaching effects. In Noumea 
eighty-six bars and fifty-three shops opened, wages quadrupled, and the Kanak were 
able to find employment with the US armed forces for previously unheard-of wages. 
The American occupation was a time of awakening for the Kanak, it provided a glimpse 
of the liberty, equality and fraternity that France had promised but failed to deliver. 
Kanak employed by the American Army were well paid, well housed, fed and clothed. 
Indentured Asian workers in New Caledonia were not so fortunate; they were bound by 
the terms of their contracts and when prices rose they were unable to afford the 
essentials. Their discontent provided a fertile environment for the newly established 
Communist Party of Madame Tunica y Casas, a French woman who had been educated 
in New Caledonia.  
At Brazzaville in January 1944, with war still raging, General de Gaulle paid tribute to 
the vaste empire that had rallied behind the Free French movement. In the crude light of 
warfare, the value of the Imperial Empire had become apparent:  
                                                
168 The accusation was made by the Free French that the United States was ‘trying to set up an octopus; of 
trying to fragmentise the old French Empire in the hope of seizing it for themselves’ (Munholland 2005, 
p. 178). Such a claim was indeed suggested due to the huge wartime investment America had made in 
New Caledonia and the realisation of the need to keep open the transpacific route to the Philippines and 
China (Le Monde 15 May 1946). New Caledonia, a country unable to defend itself, was seen by the 
American committee of Naval Affaires to be a vital link in the American chain of security (Le Monde 4 
January 1947). The suggestion that Australia should take control of New Caledonia was rejected by 
Doctor Evatt, Minister for Foreign Affairs: ‘Derrière cette île se trouve la France, qui reste grande malgré 
ses épreuves.’ (Le Monde 30 March 1946). 
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S’il est une puissance impériale que les événements conduisent à 
l’inspirer de leurs leçons et à choisir noblement, libéralement, la route de 
temps nouveaux où elle entend diriger les soixante millions d’hommes 
qui se trouvent associés au sort de ses quarante-deux millions d’enfants, 
cette puissance, c’est la France. 
(De Gaulle 1944). 
In the aftermath of the war, as France struggled to regain pre-war grandeur, and retain 
the power provided by its far-flung Empire, for the first time France’s overseas 
territories were recognised in the Constitution. The preamble to the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic refers to a union of France and the peuple d’outre-mer, founded on 
equality, irrespective of race and religion. This Constitution generally adhered to the 
promises made at Brazzaville: it recast institutional design, provided each province with 
an elected assembly (Article 77)169 and, in order to reduce the gap between legislative 
advance in France and its application in the colony,170 allowance was made for 
Territorial representation in the French National Assembly (Article 76).171 France had 
no intention of relinquishing administrative sovereignty of her territories, which 
continued to be remote-controlled from France so that the promises of the Constitution 
and the reality in situ were not always in accord: 
Fidèle à sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples 
dont elle a pris la charge à la liberté de s’administrer eux-mêmes et de 
gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires ; écartant tout système de 
colonisation fondé sur l’arbitraire, elle garantit à tous l’égal accès aux 
fonctions publiques et l’exercice individuel ou collectif des droits et 
libertés. 
(Conseil Constitutionnel 1946). 
The possibility of self-government or independence was soundly rejected: ‘Il n’est 
certes pas encore question d’indépendance, mais la voie de l’émancipation est ouverte.’ 
                                                
169 Article 77: ‘Dans chaque territoire est instituée une assemblée élue. Le régime électoral, la 
composition et la compétence de cette assemblée sont déterminés par la loi.’ 
170 In 1946 Roger Gervolino was the first Member of Parliament to represent New Caledonia in the 
National Assembly. He was followed by Henri Lafleur in 1947. 
171 Article 76: ‘Le représentant du Gouvernement dans chaque territoire ou groupe de territoires est le 
dépositaire des pouvoirs de la République. Il est le chef de l’administration du territoire. Il est responsable 
de ses actes devant le Gouvernement.’ 
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(De Gaulle 1944). De Gaulle’s ‘certain idea’ of France as a great power was 
unwavering, and as the country’s glory was greatly enhanced by her overseas 
possessions they were to be retained come what may. For those previously restrained by 
the Indigénat it was a time of awakening, a time to escape from the colonial shackles 
and to contemplate an indigenous destiny in terms of political, social and economic 
freedom. 
Liberated after almost 100 years of denigration, incarceration and dispossession, for the 
indigenous, education and employment became a priority: ‘ils ne pouvaient s’élever, 
peu à peu, jusqu’au niveau où ils seront capables de participer chez eux à la gestion de 
leurs propres affaires’ (Le Guevel 1945). However, decrees, statutes and laws 
originating 18,000 kilometres away in France were not always in tandem with their 
implementation in New Caledonia and conflict was again a possible outcome. Statutes 
which favoured Kanak liberation were met with the resistance of the predominantly 
loyalist Conseil Général, and frequently their application was delayed. The 
Houphouët-Boigny law of 11 April 1946, 172 which prohibited forced and obligatory 
labour, was to take immediate effect; in New Caledonia, its implementation was 
delayed until the following August. The right of indigenous suffrage in French overseas 
territories which became law on 22 August 1945, was deferred in New Caledonia by 
referring to an earlier law of 13 April 1945 which states: ‘tous les non-citoyens de 
quelque instruction sachant lire le français, travaillant ou ayant travaillé plus de deux 
ans comme salariés peuvent voter’. This meant that most Kanak were unable to vote. 
The law 46-940 of 7 May 1946—the Lamine Guèye Law—states: 
À partir du 1er juin 1946, tous les ressortissants des territoires 
d’outre-mer (Algérie comprise) ont la qualité de citoyen, au même titre 
que les nationaux français de la métropole et des territoires d’outre-mer. 
Des lois particulières établiront les conditions dans lesquelles ils 
exerceront leurs droits de citoyens.  
                                                
172 Loi No. 46-645 du 11 avril 1946, Article No. 1: ‘Le travail forcé ou obligatoire est interdit de façon 
absolue dans les territoires d’outre-mer.’ Article No. 3 : La présente loi abolit tout décret et règlement 
antérieur sur la réquisition de la main-d’œuvre, à quelque titre que ce soit.’ This law was adopted by the 
National Assembly and executed as a Law of the State by Félix Gouin, President of the Provisional 
Government of the Republic, and Marius Moutet, Attorney General and Minister for Justice. 
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This law was incorporated into Article 80 of the French Constitution in 1946,173 but still 
the Melanesian right to vote was limited to Melanesian pastors, customary chiefs, 
school teachers and returned serviceman (Henningham 1992, p. 49). Universal suffrage 
was finally introduced in New Caledonia in 1957.174 Inconsistency led to confusion, 
discontent and, ultimately, conflict. 
Communism and the Churches: Antagonism and reconciliation 
The wartime alliance of the USSR and the Free French provided a springboard for the 
‘Association of Friends of the USSR’ to enter the political scene in New Caledonia, a 
push which was led by Florindo Paladini, Jeanne Tunica y Casas and the Melanesian 
High Chiefs Henri Naisseline and Vincent Bouquet. After years of colonial oppression, 
the communist promise of social equality and political emancipation offered hope, and 
the party gained ready acceptance. In New Caledonia, the three branches of the 
Communist Party—Melanesian, Indo-Chinese and European—were answerable to a 
central coordinating committee which united the three ethnic groups. The communist 
promises of employment, improved working conditions, voting rights and racial 
equality met with Melanesian and Vietnamese approval. Although the agreements were 
long on rhetoric and short on sustainable outcomes, the Communist Party opened the 
way to Melanesian political awareness. In August 1946, after a bomb attack on her 
home, Jeanne Tunica y Casas left New Caledonia for Australia and the party limped on 
for a couple of years, but the force had dissipated (Kurtovitch 2000, p. 178).175 
The broad acceptance of the party among the tribes as confirmed by Pasteur Raymond 
Charlemagne in Houaïlou, Father Patrick O’Reilly in Poindimié and Charles 
Marchandon, a gendarme on Lifou, caused a degree of malaise among the Catholics and 
Protestants in the Territory. Disapproval of the Communists by the established 
Churches was unanimous. Emphasis on the segregation of religion and politics aimed to 
                                                
 
174 ’Enfin, la loi du 26 juillet 1957 pour l’élection de l’Assemblée territoriale issue de la loi-cadre 
« Defferre » du 23 juin 1956 octroya le droit de vote à tous les Calédoniens sans distinction.’ (Lenormand 
1991, p. 141). 
175 Cf. ‘Le fantôme communiste bientôt évanoui’ (Guiart 1959, p. 54). In Australia, the Minister for 
Immigration, Arthur Calwell, gave Mme Tunica y Casas, the proprietor of the Coq d’Or restaurant, 
eleven weeks to leave Sydney, with the threat of deportation if she failed to comply (Sydney Morning 
Herald 12 March 1949). 
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draw converts from the church, and this was recognised by priests, pastors and 
catechists. Christianity had played a major role in the care and education of the Kanak 
people for over 100 years and was firmly implanted in Kanak culture. Nevertheless, the 
Churches were wary and quick to respond to the communist challenge. In March 1947 
the Catholic association UICALO, l’Union des indigènes calédoniens amis de la liberté 
dans l’ordre, took shape and was soon followed by the Protestant Association des 
Indigènes Calédoniens et Loyaltiens Français (AICLF) (Kurtovitch 2000, pp. 163-179). 
In the face of communist opposition, Monsignor Bresson, like Bishop Selwyn before 
him, saw strength in Christian unity and, in a gesture of reconciliation, approached his 
Protestant counterpart, Pierre Bénignus, with the suggestion that Churches should work 
together to form a Christian political alliance (O’Reilly 1952, p. 186).176 An appeal for 
unity was published by the UICALO in its booklet Revendications de l’Union des 
Indigènes calédoniens amis de liberté dans l’ordre. There was a call to raise the 
standard of liberty, equality and fraternity ‘qui ne doivent avoir ni deux faces, ni deux 
poids, ni deux mesures […] unissons-nous tous étroitement pour être plus forts, et plus 
puissants, et plus écoutés’ (O’Reilly 1952, p. 182).  
Although the Protestants initially agreed to this proposal, the union was short-lived, due 
to ideological differences. A message of apology was sent to Monsignor Bresson from 
Pastor Bénignus.177 In the view of the Protestants, the Pastors were not in favour of 
joining with the Catholics for fear of a Catholic takeover and in Bénignus’ opinion, 
Luneau178 and Bresson were too militant. The anomaly of a union between hitherto 
                                                
176 ’Certains auraient désiré voir fusionner ces deux associations, si fraternelles par leur but’. On 12 
August 1947 Henri Naisseline, Protestant High Chief of Netché Maré, and Rock Déo Pidjot, Catholic 
chief of Conception and president of UICALO, met and agreed to the fusion of the two associations ‘mais 
des influences extérieures s’y opposent’. According to O’Reilly this union was possible and would have 
brought together the 30,000 members of the two associations: ‘Les indigènes, quand ils ne sont pas 
excités extérieurement par des fanatiques ou poussés par des initiés particuliers, s’accordent, 
naturellement, une mutuelle tolérance, très supérieure à celle que se témoignent entre eux des Européens, 
par exemple.’ 
177 ‘Après avoir pris contact avec nos Indigènes des Iles et reçu les rapports des différents districts de 
Calédonie, j’ai le regret de vous informer que nous ne pouvons faire partie de l’Union des Indigènes 
Calédoniens. Soyez assurée cependant, Monseigneur, que l’Association de nos Indigènes travaillera aux 
mêmes fins que l’Union et que nous serons toujours prêts à présenter, avec vous, à l’administration toute 
revendication légitime et nécessaire touchant à l’élévation progressive de l’Indigène pour lequel, vous et 
moi, avons été envoyés ici par Dieu.’ (Archives de d’Archevêché de Nouvelle-Calédonie (Nouméa), cited 
in Kurtovitch 1997, p. 37).  
178 Fr Luneau, Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur, was a priest in New Caledonia for twenty-eight years; 
he was a founding father of the UICALO and died tragically in a DC4 accident, in Bahrain in 1950, en 
route to Rome. Also on the plane was Luc Amoura, who in 1946 became one of the first Melanesian 
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enemy religions was not lost on the native pastors who for more than a century had been 
denounced and discredited by Catholic priests who had warned their congregation 
against the soul-destroying error of Protestant heresy. Religious conflict was never 
dormant for long; it erupted again when Catholics who attempted to recruit for their 
Union from the Protestant tribes were confronted by angry pastors.  
The UICALO, even without Protestant support, had political weight. It represented fifty 
percent of the indigenous population, 45 missionary priests, 40 brothers, 180 
Melanesian catechists 42 missionary sisters, 69 Melanesian missionary sisters and 46 
priests in training. There were 50 self-funded Catholic primary schools to cater for 2155 
students, and the Catholics were a force to be reckoned with (Kurtovitch 1997, p. 39). 
The Union aimed to maintain the religious influence of the Church over the natives, 
who had been newly liberated from colonial bondage imposed by the Indigénat 
(Kurtovitch 1997, p. 45). At the first meeting, which was held at Païta in March 1947, 
41 delegates were elected to represent 4000 adherents, and Rock Pidjot of La 
Conception was elected President (Kurtovitch 1997, p. 43; O’Reilly 1952, p. 184).179 
Membership was restricted to indigenous men and women of New Caledonia and its 
dependencies. Apart from warding off communist infiltration, the Union sought to 
establish democratically elected councils within the tribes to defend the native right to 
liberty. Following the example of the Communist campaign, the Catholics had seen the 
advantage of having a Party directed by natives for natives, and although Luneau and 
Bresson acted initially in an advisory capacity, total control was progressively handed 
to the Melanesians. The Administrative Council of the Union received reports from 
tribal delegates and drew up a list of laws and sanctions to deal with alcoholism, 
indigenous employment, training programs and hygiene in relation to housing, clothing 
and food. The reserve was to remain the property of the tribe in order to preserve 
economic, cultural and social stability, and it was non-transferable. A two-tiered legal 
system, French and customary, was proposed so that problems of an indigenous nature 
could be resolved by customary law. This initiative, endorsed by the Governor, predated 
the Sénat Coutumier of the Noumea Accord by some forty years, yet one can see in it an 
aspect of the latter’s attempt at reconciliation:  
                                                                                                                                          
priests to be ordained (Garrett 1997, p. 211). ‘La mort du R. P. Luneau vient priver la Mission Catholique 
d’un de ses rares éléments véritablement capables de s’adapter et de prévoir.’ (Guiart 1959, p. 55). 
179 Note differing orthography: Pindio (O’Reilly 1952, p. 186), Pidjot (Kurtovitch 1997, p. 44).  
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[…] qu’il est juste que les Indigènes qui constituent les trois cinquièmes 
de la population du pays, soient consultés toutes les fois qu’une question 
les concerne ou les touche de près. Et ces questions sont nombreuses 
[…] sa préférence, l’élection par ces mêmes indigènes de quelques-uns 
des leurs au Conseil Général.  
(Territorial archives of New Caledonia, cited in Kurtovitch 1997, p. 72). 
Under the tutelage of the missions and within the framework of these institutions, the 
Melanesians successfully reconciled traditional and Christian values. The success of the 
project was celebrated by the clergy, who nevertheless remained cognisant of latent 
European aversion to native liberation, and of the possibility of conflict re-emerging at 
the slightest provocation, as O’Reilly (1952, p. 187) noted: 
Dieu veuille que les directions européennes ne viennent pas freiner 
malencontreusement cet essor, ni rompre l’harmonie par une 
incompréhension à contresens ! Dieu fasse également que les Indigènes, 
enhardis par leurs premiers succès, ne prennent pas à l’égard des Blancs 
une attitude de surenchères hostiles ! 
In 1945 the Protestant Church in New Caledonia was stagnant. The SMEP was unable 
to supply enough missionaries to meet the colonial demand, which meant that 
throughout the war years there were only two resident missionaries in New Caledonia: 
Marcel Ariège in Noumea, and Pierre Bénignus at Do Neva in Houaïlou. These two 
missionaries were aided by a lay preacher on Maré, two deaconesses on Lifou, one on 
Ouvéa and one at Do Neva and 124 Melanesian pastors under the direction of Apou 
Pwacili Hmae. Isolated, and with communication cut with France their only support was 
from the International Missionary Council in New York and American military 
chaplains stationed in New Caledonia. When communication to France was restored, 
Pastor Bénignus began to solicit help for the understaffed mission. Descriptions of the 
dire situation in the Church were sent to the Director of the SMEP, Emile Schloesing, 
with pleas for additional manpower. The mission was still functioning but he felt that it 
would not be able to withstand the social and political challenges being applied by the 
communists. The message was heard, and three missionary families, Lacheret, 
Charlemagne and Brabant, were sent to the Territory with three deaconesses. With 
additional human resources, it was decided that the Territory should be divided: a 
mission on Lifou would be responsible for the Loyalty Islands, and one at Houaïlou for 
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Grande Terre. However, signs of the schism, which was to rock the church in 1958, 
soon became apparent. 
Charlemagne, at Houaïlou, found himself in deep water. He was critical of the training 
of indigenous pastors, which, in his opinion, was inadequate and limited to such an 
extent that it was contributing to the ‘withering’ of the Protestant Church. At the same 
time, he was aware of their invaluable contribution, their ability to gain the acceptance 
of tribal chiefs, and of their success in combating the pervading communist forces. The 
training of the Loyalty Islander pastors was anathema to Charlemagne and he attempted 
to protect the people of Grande Terre from their influence. Conflict and confrontation 
between Grande Terre and Loyalty Islands missions was not new. Both Maurice 
Leenhardt and his nephew Rey-Lescure had been opposed to the paternalistic approach 
and colonial mentality of the Loyalty Island training programs, which, they believed, 
failed to embody Kanak verve, festivity and custom. However, it was the more 
authoritarian Lifou program which the SMEP considered to be a better way forward for 
the Church and the training of the future ministry was transferred to Lifou.  
The Protestant entry on the political scene encountered its share of pitfalls. 
Charlemagne, in a radio broadcast to explain the aims of the AICLF, was critical of 
European colonists, of their abuse of cheap labour and their inhumane materialism. The 
broadcast caused a flurry among the Europeans, silence from Lacheret, and a 
three-month ban on the Protestant use of radio broadcasting (Kurtovitch 1997, 
pp 87-88). Even Father Luneau was surprised by this attack on the colonial regime. The 
overriding concern of the Protestant Church, however, was the advance of communism 
and with it the possible loss of personal liberty.  
The inaugural meeting of the AICLF at Tibarama, Poindimié, in June 1947 was 
organised by Kowi Bouillant from Touho and Doui Matayo Wetta from Ponérihouen, 
with 4600 members in attendance. Later that year the AICLF claimed to represent half 
of the indigenous population (Territorial archives of New Caledonia, cited in Kurtovitch 
1997, p. 100). The AICLF brought together Protestant Christianity and native custom in 
an association whose membership was totally indigenous. The association brought 
ancient custom face-to-face with the modern technology of the printing press. The 
association printed a newspaper, Le Messager, which reconciled Catholics, Protestants 
and the secular in the publication process. Funds raised by the sale of the paper 
supplemented the voluntary contributions on which the association relied. Charlemagne 
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and Lacheret were often called upon for advice, as was Jean Guiart, Professor of 
Anthropology and friend, colleague and supporter of Maurice Leenhardt (Kurtovitch 
2000, p. 106).180 Although it was founded with the help of the Protestant Church, the 
AICLF was in fact secular. There were no pastors in positions of authority, and this 
allowed the Church to retain an apolitical stance. Wetta cast broadly for advice and 
sought to have the Association’s claims heard. He collaborated with Gabriel Monin, a 
socialist General Councillor, Maurice Bichon, a Councillor of the Assembly of the 
French Union, and Maurice Lenormand, Deputy in the National Assembly. Pressure 
was put on the Association when Maurice Leenhardt returned to Grande Terre to take 
up the position of Director of the Institut français de l’Océanie (IFO), in 1947. 
The return of Leenhardt, the first white Protestant missionary on Grande Terre, was met 
with suspicion. At Do Neva, the school he had founded in 1902 for the vocational and 
religious training of the predominantly indigenous local population, Leenhardt had 
encouraged teaching in the native language. This gained him the friendship of the 
natives and the enmity of the Government and settler population. Memories are long, 
and Leenhardt’s return during this period of indigenous political activity was viewed 
with reservation. To make his return even more difficult, the site chosen for the IFO 
offices was a building vacated by the Americans at Anse Vata, which had been 
earmarked by developers of Le Nickel as a potential tourist facility. The Government 
and the IFO were successful in their bid for the site due to the effort of René Catala, an 
entrepreneur, who was expecting to be appointed director of the institute. Leenhardt’s 
return to New Caledonia caused further discontent. Government and colonists were 
concerned about his pro-native reputation, developers were annoyed about the loss of a 
valuable site, Catala was unhappy because he had not been chosen as director of the 
IFO and the IFO feared that Leenhardt had been sent from France to merge the 
institution with the Paris Office de la recherche scientifique et technique Outre-Mer, 
(ORSTOM) (Clifford 1982, p. 192). Some of the opprobrium Leenhardt may have 
brought upon himself. Not being one to mince words he wrote:  
Beyond the scientific interest it presents, this Institute is the first creation 
in the French Pacific which can show the large French population of 
these islands that colonialism is something other than a money-grubbing 
                                                
180 This is confirmed in correspondence 24 April 1957 from Wetta to Charlemagne: ‘Je compte sur votre 
aide comme toujours, et veuillez me faire savoir si mes idées sont bonnes et aussi si elles sont 
mauvaises.’ (Cited in Kurtovitch 1997, p. 106). 
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enterprise for the benefit of Metropolitans and that its dignity resides in 
its extension of culture, furthermore he warned that big business will 
exploit the country without leaving her any other benefit other than that 
of making her people into a proletariat. 
(Clifford 1982, p. 192). 
Comments like this earned him the reputation of being a communist and political 
agitator who was dangerous, and in these circumstances, Leenhardt did not participate 
in any church assemblies or AICLF meetings.  
In many respects, the Catholic Union and Protestant Association ran in tandem. The 
religious rivalry which had torn the Loyalty Islands apart during the nineteenth century 
was unknown on the mainland where LMS Protestants had been barred by the French 
Administration It was only after missionaries of the SMEP had replaced those of the 
LMS on the Loyalty Islands that Protestants were able to establish missions on Grande 
Terre. This circumvented French–British religious antagonism on the mainland. 
Between French Catholics and French Protestants, fellow countrymen isolated in a 
strange environment, there was a certain religious tolerance and acceptance, which 
enabled the newly established indigenous associations to enjoy a degree of 
interdependence and social cohesion. The first sentence of the preamble to the Pensées 
de base de l’Association des indigènes calédoniens et loyaltiens français emphasises the 
need for unity in the quest for freedom and peace, as ‘un pays qui n’est pas uni du cœur 
cessera vite d’exister’ (Kurtovitch 1997, p. 113).  
Both associations considered as a matter of high priority the acquisition of adequate 
land for those tribes whose property had been reduced to such an extent that they were 
no longer able to support themselves. Also on the agenda were measures for an 
improved quality of life: the provision of work with adequate remuneration, issues of 
health, hygiene and education, and the need for political inclusion so that claims and 
complaints made by indigenous people would be given due consideration. The ‘Aims 
and Objectives’ of the Association included the prohibition of alcohol within the 
tribes,181 the right of those able to read and write to vote,182 the provision of a native 
                                                
181 Alcohol had become a major problem among the indigenous people, as Maurice Leenhardt noted : 
‘Mineurs, élévateurs, planteurs, s’accoutumèrent à obtenir tout du Canaque par de la boisson.’ (O’Reilly 
1952, pp. 166-167).  
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development bank and a weights and measures authority. Issues that had smouldered for 
years surfaced. There was a plea to France to allow Melanesians to live in harmony in 
their own communities, with their own customs and traditions, and to honour the 
promise of 25-hectare settlement blocks that had been made to native veterans of the 
First World War and which had never eventuated. 
After almost one hundred years of repression, the newly enfranchised Kanak voters had 
a voice on the political stage. Western democratic ideals and Melanesian custom were 
united and Melanesian requests were heard. New schools were built. In 1946, there 
were 34 public schools in tribal reserves; by 1952, this number had increased to 55, and 
by 1953 to 61. During this period, mission schools doubled from fifty to one hundred. 
An Inspector of Schools, Antoine Griscelli, was appointed to ensure equal opportunity 
for Melanesian students and to maintain the educational standard of schools (Kurtovitch 
1997, p. 126). Dispensaries and roads were built. Vaccinations for tuberculosis were 
made available for children in tribal areas. Professional schools were built to ensure 
vocational improvement and to train Melanesian teachers, nurses, midwives and 
mechanics. 
Although the early concerns of the AICLF and UICALO were based on social issues, in 
time they became increasingly political. With increased political awareness and the 
right to vote, Melanesians now had a powerful voice. This was seen as an advantage for 
those wishing to breathe new life into the colony by the inclusion of equal civil rights 
and the ousting of the ruling plutocracy. Maurice Lenormand was chosen as a suitable 
New Caledonian candidate for the National Assembly. He had studied with Maurice 
Leenhardt at the Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (School of 
Oriental Languages) in Paris (INALCO); he was married to Simone Wapata, a 
granddaughter of high chief Boula of Lifou and was a practising Catholic. In a vigorous 
campaign, support for the Lenormand candidature was obtained from Charlemagne, 
Mataio Doui Wetta, secretary of the AICLF, Rock Déo Pidjot, the president of 
UICALO and the High Commissioner (Guiart 1959, p. 62). The electoral success of 
Lenormand was attributed to the strength of the Kanak vote, and in victory he was 
dubbed the ‘Canaque Member of Parliament.’ The result for Charlemagne was 
                                                                                                                                          
182 The Indigénat reduced the possibility of Kanak achieving literacy and numeracy skills.  
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bittersweet since, by backing Lenormand, he had antagonised the Société le Nickel 
(SLN) which, as a financial benefactor of the mission, reduced its funding.  
The electoral list for the elections, drawn up by Lenormand, included militants from the 
UICALO and AICLF under the banner of a new political party, the Union Calédonienne 
(UC), which united Melanesians and whites under the slogan deux couleurs, un seul 
peuple.183 The objective of the UC appeared in the first issue of L’Avenir Calédonien, 
the weekly UC newspaper:  
We want to build a New Caledonia freed from the economic feudal 
system by which it is stifled and enslaved; we want to give to all 
Caledonians, white, black or yellow, the possibility of a better life in 
their small country. 
(L’Avenir Calédonien 11 September 1954, cited in Henningham 1992, 
pp. 50-51). 
The strong Melanesian vote gained nine Melanesian seats in the Conseil Général and 
brought into sharp focus the division between Noumea and the ‘bush.’ Once elected, the 
UC began a program of progressive economic and social reform. Approvals were given 
for a new dam to be built and for a new SLN factory. Workers went on strike to 
campaign for equal pay and social advantages for all workers. A fund, the Caisse de 
compensation des prestations familiales, des accidents du travail et de prévoyance des 
travailleurs salariés (CAFAT), was established to provide workers compensation and 
welfare benefits free of racial discrimination (Lenormand 1991, p. 142). The 
associations, which had begun as support for Kanak rights and justice within the 
established order, had with the emergence of the UC, become political, and in the 
context of New Caledonian society at the time, this would lead to conflict in spite of its 
vision for reconciliation. 
Protestants, politics and pastors 
The Paris Evangelical Missionary Society conscientiously refrained from political 
involvement. This distanced it from the Catholic Church whose adherents frequently 
continued to claim a union sacrée between Church and State. Despite his allegiance to 
                                                
183 The UC came into being during the year of the celebration of 100 years of French presence in New 
Caledonia and was seen as a good omen for the new political party (Lenormand 1991, p. 142). 
 116 
the SMEP, Charlemagne found in the UC an ally through which he was able to promote 
agricultural, technical and pastoral training at Do Neva. This went against the grain of 
the Paris Mission, which viewed the Charlemagne program with suspicion, it being 
apprehensive that he was returning to his Catholic roots184 and collaborating with 
Catholics. Rumblings of discontent began to rock the Protestant camp.  
Charlemagne found himself in more trouble when he sent Do Neva trained pastors to 
the New Hebrides, a territory which was already being evangelised by British 
Presbyterians. This intrusion was not viewed kindly: ‘On sentait que les Anglophones 
tiquaient quand les Français s’implantaient.’ (Mwà Véé 2000, p. 5). This was an 
extraordinary move by Charlemagne, as the Paris Missionary Society and the 
Presbyterian Church were both members of the Reformed Alliance of Churches, and an 
agreement of 100 years standing had been struck by the Protestant Churches as they 
carved up the Pacific. When Charlemagne needed more money for his pastors on 
Malekula and none was forthcoming either from the mission or from France, he was 
forced to turn to the Catholics for funding through the Society for the Propagation of the 
Faith in Lyon. With criticism growing, the SMEP disapproved of the practice of mixing 
religion and politics, and missionaries who had joined the Union Calédonienne with 
Charlemagne withdrew their membership. Tension between the missionaries increased, 
and this prompted the Director of the SMEP to visit New Caledonia in 1956. In an 
attempt to diffuse an explosive situation, the director isolated weaknesses in the 
organisation and decided on a redistribution of parishes.  
Charlemagne was to retain the directorship of Do Neva and the care of its alumni, the 
AICLF and the Maré mission. His colleagues were to control the rest of Grande Terre, 
the missions on Lifou and Ouvéa and finances. The Do Neva school, which had 
previously been able to manage its own financial affairs, was now dependent on 
Noumea. With 500 students in residence, Do Neva relied upon a regular income from 
Noumea, and this was not always forthcoming. Many in the capital opposed Kanak 
emancipation, and Charlemagne’s ideas were at odds with those of his colleagues. The 
situation between the mission stations deteriorated, and requests, including one from the 
Director of the SLN, were sent to Paris to have Charlemagne recalled. Like his forebear 
Maurice Leenhardt, Charlemagne was a forceful character with a strong sense of justice. 
                                                
184 Charlemagne had originally trained as a Catholic Priest. 
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He made many enemies. Amidst the clamour, his colleagues began to distance 
themselves from him, and this left Charlemagne isolated. As was the case with his 
predecessor Philippe Rey-Lescure, thirty years earlier, Charlemagne was not given the 
right of reply to settle differences and the missionary society acted sharply and 
decisively. 
The SMEP refused to recognise native opinion; missionaries threatened to resign; a 
stalemate was reached; and Charlemagne was recalled to France. When he refused to 
go, he was suspended from the Society and in 1959 he was excommunicated as a pastor 
of the Reformed Church (Garrett 1997, p. 214). In consequence, Charlemagne left Do 
Neva and began a new school a few kilometres away at Nediva with his wife, who was 
a missionary teacher, and their two sons. The breakaway group formed the Free 
Evangelical Protestant Church of New Caledonia or Église Charlemagne. 
Native pastors were reluctant to choose between the two Protestant Churches; they were 
mere victims of a ‘white’ conflict. In the aftermath of the fallout, most Protestant tribes 
on Grande Terre followed Charlemagne and became members of L’Église libre de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie, while Loyalty Islander Protestants remained overwhelmingly loyal 
to the SMEP and the Église évangélique en Nouvelle-Calédonie et aux îles Loyauté 
(Evangelical Church of New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands) (ÉÉNCIL) (Filippi & 
Angleviel 2000a, pp. 273-287).185 Protestant-Catholic religious antagonism, which had 
caused so much tribal angst in the mid-nineteenth century, had resurfaced in the mid-
twentieth century in the guise of a Protestant-Protestant divide.  
As Leenhardt had realised fifty years earlier, the missions on Grande Terre and the 
Loyalty Islands had been founded on different philosophical traditions and developed in 
differing historical circumstances. Divergent methods of British and French evangelism, 
dissimilarities in land expropriation and cantonnement which frequently involved the 
Church, and disparate educational methods, made conflict inevitable. In addition, the 
relationship between the Protestant Church and State had, for almost a century, been 
thorny, and rather than risk further aggravation, it was considered prudent to separate 
                                                
185 Currently 55 mainland tribes belong to the Free Church, 23 to ÉÉNCIL and 151 are Catholic; on the 
Loyalty Islands eleven tribes belong to the Free church, 46 to ÉÉNCIL and 21 are Catholic. ÉÉNCIL in 
2013 changed its name to EEKNCIL, the Evangelical Church of Kanaky, New Caledonia and the Loyalty 
Islands. 
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the two. The breakaway Church was not limited or controlled by either the State or the 
SMEP.186 
Some mainland tribes, such as the Embouchure at Ponérihouen on the East Coast, 
continued to support ÉÉNCIL. Philippe Gorodé of that tribe had worked with Leenhardt 
on his studies of the Paicî language and custom. His son Waia,187 after attending school 
at Do Neva, trained as a Pastor at Bethanie on Lifou. This tribe, as a member of the 
Evangelical Protestant Church has strong indépendantiste loyalties. In 1974, Waia’s 
daughter, Déwé Gorodé cofounded with Nidoïsh Naisseline the indépendantiste group 
Foulards Rouges, and in 2001 she became the first female Kanak Vice-President of the 
country.188 The Evangelical Church, which is based on a more vertical hierarchical 
structure than the Free Church, is firmly aligned with the indépendantiste movement. In 
2013, ÉÉNCIL, as a further demonstration of its political stance, made the controversial 
decision to change its name to the Evangelical Protestant Church of Kanaky New 
Caledonia.189 Although Charlemagne’s political activity was a major factor in his 
demise, his Free Church distanced itself from political involvement.190 Members of 
Charlemagne’s church were encouraged to accept their newly acquired democratic 
freedom and determine their personal political preferences. 
                                                
186 As has been noted, the Loyalty Islands never suffered the confiscation of tribal land as was seen on 
Grande Terre. From the end of the nineteenth century all land on the Loyalty Islands was declared 
‘reserve land’. 
187 Waia Gorodé was a writer and pastor who worked with Jean Guiart. He wrote Mon École du Silence 
and Souvenir d’un Neo-Calédonien, ami de Maurice Leenhardt (Mwà Véé 2002, p. 9). 
188 Déwé Gorodé has been an elected Member of Congress since 1999. 
189 The addition of the word ‘Kanaky’ was considered by many to be unacceptable and divisive. The 
President of the Protestant Church of Kanaky-New Caledonia, Pastor Wakira Wakaine, received 
complaints from Simon Loueckhote, Evelyne Lèques and Léonard Sam. Evelyne Lèques (wife of the 
recently retired Mayor of Noumea, Jean Lèques) and Léonard Sam were members of the church, and their 
fathers, Marc Lacheret and Léonard Sam, were both pastors who had been key figures in the 
establishment of the Church. Both were also members of the Congress of New Caledonia and were 
engaged in bridging the ethnic gap to facilitate the move towards a ‘common destiny’. Both agreed that, 
according to the terms of the Noumea Accord, a name change could only be decided by the approval of 
three-fifths of the Congress. Article 5 of the Organic Law states: ‘La Nouvelle-Calédonie détermine 
librement les signes identitaires permettant de marquer sa personnalité aux côtés de l’emblème national et 
des signes de la République. Elle peut décider de modifier son nom. Ces décisions sont prises […] à la 
majorité des trois cinquièmes des membres du congrès.’ This had not occurred, and in the opinion of 
many, the Church had acted inappropriately and outside the law. 
190 The schism had a destabilising effect on the UC as Charlemagne followers who had been active in the 
AICLF under the leadership of Matayo Wetta now abandoned the UC. Some turned to the 
anti-independence camp which, in some cases, reflected ancient rivalry between the clans and chefferies 
(Trepied 2010, p. 174). 
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Despite close family ties and similar Protestant histories, the Napoemien tribe at 
Poindimié and the Embouchure tribe at Ponérihouen chose divergent political and 
religious pathways.191 Eleicha Nebaye of the Napoemien tribe, and Philippe Gorodé 
were among the second group to graduate from the Do Neva School in 1912,192 and 
they both continued to work with Maurice Leenhardt on the translation of the Bible into 
the Ajië language of Houaïlou. This exercise of ‘intercultural translation’ was not only 
to translate the gospels, but also to provide them with ‘dynamic equivalences’ and local 
flavour. This task continued for 15 years (Clifford 1982, pp. 83-85).  
Notwithstanding that Waia Gorodé married Nebaye’s daughter Laura (Jouve 2014),193 
these tribes, at the time of the schism, chose to follow different pathways. Ancient tribal 
rivalries, believed to be buried in the mists of time, resurfaced as ideological differences 
during this period of religious trauma. Although Maurice Nenou of the Napoemien tribe 
believed that religion had broken down intertribal barriers and encouraged the 
abandonment of intertribal warfare (Mwà Véé 1994, p. 18), centuries old rivalries were 
not easily erased. Tribal conflict and language difference were often closely aligned. 
However, this was not the case for the Embouchure and the Napoemien tribes which 
both spoke Paicî. At Houaïlou, the site of Do Neva, Leenhardt’s pastoral school, Ajië 
was spoken, and even within the Christian milieu Waia found that ‘c’est déjà une 
frontière entre nous’ (Mwà Véé 1994, p. 18). Waia, on his engagement to Laura, 
speculated on alliances between rival linguistic communities: 
Il y avait à Do Neva des filles et garçons de Ponérihouen-Touho-
Poindimié-Koné […] Ces filles et garçons auraient beaucoup aimé que je 
prenne une fille paicî au lieu d’une fille ajië, car dans le temps il y avait 
toujours des querelles, disputes et bagarres entre les filles et garçons 
paicî et ajië. […] Car ici Wailu on n’aime pas le paicî. Et le paicî n’aime 
pas l’ajië. 
(Jouve 2014, p. 8). 
                                                
191 Discussions with these tribes and at Leenhardt’s school Do Neva on field trips I undertook in 2002, 
2006, 2009, and 2014 provided much background material. 
192 Eleicha Nebaye, a devout Protestant pastor, was an orator who spoke with ‘the eloquence of his clan 
and his habitat; his words, gestures, and breath express the Melanesian sense of local pride, of mythic 
attachment.’ (Clifford 1982, p. 8). 
193 Eleicha Nebaye was the grandfather of New Caledonian politicians Maurice Nenou and Déwé Gorodé. 
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In this land of contradictions, Waia, in an autobiography written after Laura’s death, 
muses about elitism of the Rey-Lescures in their desire for him to marry Laura, a 
surrogate daughter to them: ‘Ils voulaient que leur fille serait un jour une épouse pour 
l’un de leurs anciens élèves. Il était comme un homme des affaires.’ (Jouve 2014, 
p. 10).  
It would appear that Rey-Lescure, despite his championing of Kanak culture, an ideal 
which cost him his position in New Caledonia, retained remnants of occidental 
paternalism which, on occasion, came to the fore to overrule tribal custom. As 
Protestant unity crumbled and the protection that had been provided by the Church was 
torn apart, tribal members retreated to the security of ancient tribal customary bounds, 
boundaries which the politician Maurice Nenou thought had been destroyed by the 
Church: 
Mais si c’était par le côté traditionnel, moi, je ne suis pas le droit d’aller 
faire un discours politique dans le Nord: ma tradition me l’interdit, mais 
c’est par l’évolution, par l’Evangile, que je peux aller partout 
maintenant. Est-ce que nos ancêtres avaient le droit de traverser un creek 
ou la chaîne ? Non ! 
(Mwà Véé 1994, p. 18). 
For both European and Kanak, deep-rooted cultural traits were always on standby and 
ready to emerge into new forms of dispute. 
The Napoemien tribe followed Charlemagne in the establishment of the Evangelical 
Free Church, and it has remained firmly loyalist to this day. Maurice Nenou was 
eighteen in 1957 when he left his tribe to begin his education at Do Neva. He spoke no 
French but was well versed in native custom, which equipped him with a solid point of 
reference.194 Of equal importance to Nenou (later to be a signatory of the Matignon 
Agreements for the anti-independence Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la 
République (RPCR) and member of the National Assembly), was religion. Nenou 
considered custom and religion as his two feet, without which he would be unable to 
                                                
194 Kanak Custom is defined in the Charter of the Kanak People: ‘[Kanak Custom] is the action that we 
do in life on specific occasions (birth, death, marriage, etc.). It is also our way to see things and the values 
that we are giving to these things.’ (Customary Senate of New Caledonia 2014, p. 7).  
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walk. In an address to the National Assembly on 8 July 1986, Nenou defended Kanak 
identity and custom, which he placed firmly within the modern world of France: 
Mon clan a les droits et des devoirs dans un ‘périmètre coutumier’ pas 
au-delà. La Calédonie est ainsi faite que, avant l’arrivée des Français, 
elle était une mosaïque des grands clans dominants, indépendants les uns 
des autres, possédant chacun leur propre territoire, leurs propres règles 
coutumières et leur propre langue […]. C’est donc la France qui, au fil 
des années, a réalisé l’unité de la Nouvelle-Calédonie par l’organisation 
administrative et par la langue. Cette unité s’est doublée d’un 
apprentissage de la démocratie qui a trouvé son aboutissement dans 
l’égalité des citoyens français de Nouvelle-Calédonie entre eux, sans 
distinction de couleur de peau ni d’origine sociale. Elle a ainsi ouvert à 
tous, et notamment à nous, Mélanésiens, l’accès à la modernité dans un 
système économique et social évoluant vers le progrès. 
(Journal Officiel de la République Française [JORF] 9 July 1986, 
pp. 2967). 
The scission of the Protestant Church was, and remains, according to Bafue Huen, the 
chaplain at Do Neva, a sad occasion for Protestants. Elia Thidjinie also recalls with 
sadness the split, which was not brought about by Melanesian Pastors or by members of 
the Church, but was the result of a disagreement between Raymond Charlemagne, the 
white missionary, and his superiors in the Evangelical Mission of Paris who were 
responsible for the Church in New Caledonia. With the break in Protestant relations, 
Charlemagne had control of all of the schools except Do Neva and two other small 
schools (Mwà Véé 1993b, p. 51). The scission: 
[…] est restée comme une plaie ouverte, dans la société kanak 
protestante, il y a beaucoup de querelles dans les familles. On essaye 
d’en sortir par la réconciliation, mais le chemin reste difficile, car il y a 
encore beaucoup de vieux qui ont vécu cette division et il nous faut aller 
doucement. 
(Mwà Véé 2000, p. 13) 
The Evangelical Church of New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands gained autonomy 
from the Paris mission in 1960. In August 1979, the synod of ÉÉNCIL held at Houaïlou 
decided, as the result of a unanimous ‘yes’ vote, to endorse the independence 
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movement. The vote was taken only after lengthy deliberation and consideration. The 
suffering and injustices inflicted upon Melanesians in the past, and the overt and covert 
oppression of the present were recognised, and it was decided that the Church should 
take up the fight for independence. The synod was cognisant of the good intentions of 
France, but also of promises which were never fulfilled. The Church believed that the 
Kanak people should be responsible for their own destiny in their own country and 
should not be subjected to external domination. According to Pastor Weté, President of 
ÉÉNCIL, the decision was not political but a revival of the spirit of the AICLF: a 
renewed attempt to liberate the Kanak people in order that their aspirations and needs 
might be fully met. Successive waves of migration had forced the Kanak to become an 
economically and socially disadvantaged minority in their own country. The resolve of 
the Church attracted so much criticism that its President travelled to France and other 
European countries to explain the reasoning (Mwà Véé 2000, p. 14). In European 
circles, the decision was not well accepted, and in the hope of achieving a basis for 
dialogue and reconciliation, it was decided to unite the three major churches in an 
œcumenical week of prayer. 
According to Elia Thidjine, past President of the Evangelical Church, attempts to 
reunite the two branches of the Church have met with little success. Others, such as 
Marc Gowé, linguist and teacher at Do Kamo, continue to hope for Church 
reunification. At the exhibition at the Tjibaou Centre in 2002 to celebrate the 100th 
anniversary of Maurice Leenhardt and Do Neva, he stated; 
Il est à souhaiter que le centenaire de Maurice Leenhardt continue au 
rapprochement de l’Église protestante. Pour moi chaque fois que l’on est 
capable de surmonter les fractures liées à la méconnaissance de l’autre et 
à l’incompréhension on se rapproche du concept de citoyenneté. 
(Mwà Véé 2002, p. 47). 
Pastor Weté, while wishing for reconciliation between the Protestant Churches, 
considers the Église libre as a sister Church to the Evangelical Church with which it 
shares certain ceremonies. The Kanak adherents of the three major Churches remain 
closely bound by native custom, and on auspicious occasions, such as the inauguration 
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of the Evangelical Church at Windo in December 2006, they unite in the spirit of 
oecumenism.195 
Many of those who followed Charlemagne in the establishment of the Free Evangelical 
Church had been influenced by the work of Maurice Leenhardt. Charlemagne, like 
Leenhardt, saw the need to incorporate Kanak culture within a framework of higher 
education for indigenous students, and although the Société des Missions Evangéliques 
de Paris agreed, it was not prepared to ruffle colonial feathers. The Kanak educational 
ceiling thus continued to be the Certificat d’Études Primaires, CEP. Monitors, CEP in 
hand, were then sent into the bush to teach. Charlemagne continued to push for higher 
education and increased vocational training for his native flock. The first Kanak to 
achieve a college brevet from Nedivin College graduated in 1962. Charlemagne’s newly 
founded Church and school, the Free Evangelical Church of New Caledonia and the 
Federation of Free Protestant Education were independent, autonomous and free from 
French bureaucratic obstructions. Members of the Church were encouraged to pursue 
personal social, educational, political and spiritual goals. ÉÉNCIL gained autonomy in 
1960. Unlike the ÉÉNCIL, the Free Church has not ruled on matters of independence, 
enabling its heterogeneous membership to make personal political decisions as liberated 
Christian members of society. Within the Free Church, politics and religion are 
considered as two separate entities.  
The schism within the Protestant ranks was predictable. When the 
French arrived on the Loyalty Islands, the undercurrent of British–
French, Protestant–Catholic hostility was well established. This led to 
the ‘wars of religion’ when French priests, Protestant missionaries, 
Governors and Commanders were expelled in acrimonious 
circumstances. After fifty years of LMS evangelisation, the decision was 
made to replace the British Protestant missionaries with French 
Protestant missionaries.196  
                                                
195 Personal testimony. The High Commissioner of New Caledonia, Michel Marie, was also present, and 
the President of the Province Nord, Paul Néaoutyne, raised as a Catholic, also gave it his support.  
196 The request was made for a replacement by the Protestant Minister for the Navy and Colonies, who 
wrote to the Council of the Reformed Church: ‘[…] interpellé par le gouverneur de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie sur les agissements anti-français du pasteur anglais Jones et sur la nécessité 
d’envoyer un pasteur français pour contre-balancer dans ces parages l’influence fâcheuse du ministre 
anglais, il dispose de moyens (traitement, voyage, logement) pour qu’on trouve, sans tarder un pasteur qui 
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By this time, the roots of British Protestantism were firmly embedded in the Loyalty 
Islands. On Grande Terre, the only officially recognised missionaries were French. The 
Anglo-French divide was to know a long history, with echoes into the present day.  
Conflict in other forms: Laws, decrees and statutes 
Post World War II, France was in a state of constant flux, stitching together a country 
which had been shattered in defeat and deeply divided. To restore faith, improve 
confidence in the State, and preserve the grandeur of Empire, the French Government 
had to act quickly. To avoid the protracted deliberation generally associated with the 
introduction of new laws, the Government decided to introduce a framework law, the 
Defferre loi-cadre,197 which by decree could take immediate effect. The loi-cadre was 
designed to facilitate the transition to greater autonomy within the Territory.198 It was 
envisaged that administrative and political decentralisation would enable Melanesians 
to progress towards complete autonomy within the French Republic. The General 
Council was replaced by a Territorial Assembly, which was elected by universal 
suffrage, and from this a Governing Council of six Ministers and a Vice-President were 
chosen. The nominal Head of Government was the French High Commissioner and the 
State retained responsibility for defence, finance, public order, international transport 
and public relations (Chappell 2014, p. 44).  
With the support of a strong Melanesian vote, the UC claimed 18 of the 30 seats in the 
new Territorial Assembly, and Maurice Lenormand, a self-proclaimed gaulliste de 
gauche, was elected Vice-President.199 Advantage in Government did not translate to 
the successful realisation of demands for the UC. The newly elected Government was 
faced with opposition from the New Caledonian gentry, a right-wing government in 
                                                                                                                                          
fût disposé à accepter la mission patriotique d’aller fortifier l’influence française aux îles Loyauté.’ (Cited 
in Zorn 2012, p. 176). 
197 Gaston Defferre, socialist Minister for Overseas Territories, 1 February 1956 to 13 June 1957, in the 
Guy Mollet government. The loi-cadre took effect on 23 June 1956. 
198 The local conservative bourgeoisie, threatened by the expansion of the electoral roll, attempted to 
increase European control by resorting to a decree of 2 April 1885 which provided the Conseil Général 
with extended powers (Lenormand 1991, p. 142). See also Le Monde 2 February 1956, 15 March 1956 
and 23 March 1956, and JORF 24 June 1956, p. 5782. 
199 Lenormand was Vice-President from 22 October 1957 until 18 June 1959. His successor was Michel 
Kauma, chief of the Loyalist Catholic Fayaoué tribe, great grandson of Weneguei of Fayaoué and Boula 
of the Lossi district on Lifou, and married to the daughter of Nekelo. All of these chiefs were politically 
active before annexation (see Chapter 1). 
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France and its representative in New Caledonia, the High Commissioner. Opposition 
gave way to critical abuse. In 1957 the Prime Minister, Michel Debré, published his 
newspaper Le Courrier de la Colère, in which he criticised the ‘communist’ 
Government in New Caledonia (Lenormand 1992, p. 143). 
In 1958, with the fall of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle was swept into power and 
Imperialism was again in the spotlight. Many of the colonised countries were calling for 
independence, and de Gaulle, true to his word at Brazzaville, provided them with the 
option of choosing self-determination by way of a referendum. New Caledonia chose to 
become a territoire d’outre-mer. As the country emerged from the chrysalis of 
colonisation, the Union Calédonienne increased its demand for social, cultural, and 
economic reform; however, change was slow to come and as hopes were dashed, 
enthusiastic expectation, albeit in association with France,200 turned to disillusionment. 
Lenormand found himself further at odds with the powerful European community 
which accused him of ‘blind hatred’ and of ‘sowing disaccord and hatred among people 
who had lived in peace for one hundred years’ (Chappell 2014, p. 45). The 
Conservative campaign gathered pace with walkouts from the Assembly, shouting 
matches, an attempt to dynamite Lenormand’s home, an attack on Vice-President Rock 
Pidjot, and the imprisonment of 12 councillors by ‘activists’ in what Lenormand 
described as ‘le quatorzième des treize complots du 13 mai’ (Decraene 1963).201  
Colonial pressure on the French Government for change resulted in a revision of 
Section XII of the Constitution, which recognised the right of French Overseas 
Territories to independence but not to domestic autonomy in association with France 
(Decraene 1962). This amendment was a disappointment for the UC, which believed 
that the country should be responsible for local economic and social development 
within the French fold. The battle continued when an article published in L’Avenir 
Calédonien by the UC suggested that the Territory’s future depended on the installation 
                                                
200 Section XII, Article 77 of the Constitution of 1958 states:  
‘Dans la Communauté instituée par la présente Constitution, les États jouissent de l’autonomie ; ils 
s’administrent eux-mêmes et gèrent démocratiquement et librement leurs propres affaires. 
- Il n’existe qu’une citoyenneté de la Communauté. 
- Tous les citoyens sont égaux en droit, quelles que soient leur origine, leur race et leur religion. Ils ont les 
mêmes devoirs.’ 
(<http://www.legifrance.gov.fr>). [14 February 2015]. 
201 This referred to the coup on 13 May which saw the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the return of 
De Gaulle to power. Interestingly, Michel Debré was named as one of those involved in the plot. 
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of new mining ventures to break the monopoly of the SLN (Gendron 2009, p. 119). The 
recommendation was poorly received and brought upon the UC the opprobrium of the 
SLN,202 the local oligarchy, and the High Commissioner. The new High Commissioner, 
Laurent Pechoux,203 was experienced in the suppression of nationalism. As Governor of 
the Côte d’Ivoire, he had repressed the Rassemblement démocratique africain of Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny and he now had his sights set on ‘the skin’ of Lenormand 
(Lenormand 1992, p. 145).204 Pechoux supported the Rassemblement Calédonien, the 
local captains of industry, and under his tutelage local autonomy was short-lived. 
In the midst of the political maelstrom, the International Nickel Company (INCO), the 
world’s largest nickel producer, proposed an INCO-led nickel project in New Caledonia 
which was to include the building of a $100 million refinery. Because the French 
Government considered that such a project would weaken French–New Caledonian 
adhesion and pose a threat to the ‘national interest’, the plan was rejected.205 To stave 
off competition which had been welcomed by many in New Caledonia, certain powers 
previously held by the Territorial Assembly were returned to the State.206 The trend of 
reducing the power of the Ministers of the Territorial Government continued with the 
enactment of the Jacquinot laws in 1963.207 These laws were contested by Lenormand 
who considered them to be a retrograde step and a return to colonialism: 
Il semble impensable que le représentant du Gouvernement central 
puisse, en 1963, remettre en cause unilatéralement notre statut, alors 
qu’au moment du référendum et de l’option en 1958 le ministre de la 
                                                
202 The UC Government fell foul of the SLN, the major employer in the Territory, by refusing to fund the 
modernisation of the Doniambo smelter. With outdated technologies and equipment, the smelter had 
become uncompetitive and was unable to meet Japanese demand during the nickel boom of the Korean 
War (1950-1953). As production costs exceeded the market price set by INCO, the SLN was in a poor 
bargaining position. 
203 Laurent Elisée Péchoux, Governor, 1 December 1958 to 9 January 1963. 
204 According to Lenormand, the new Governor left France saying: ‘I will have the skin of Lenormand 
within six months.’ Following the bombing of the Assemblée Territoriale, the garage of a republican 
lawyer and the UC headquarters, Lenormand was imprisoned and deprived of civil rights for seven years 
for failing to stop the bombing. See also Chappell (2004, p. 53). 
205 The French Government was against the establishment of foreign companies in the territory as this 
could strengthen the call for independence and result in a reduction of French control over lucrative 
nickel deposits, and loss of influence in the Pacific (Gendron 2009, p. 119). 
206 France was accused of sacrificing ‘New Caledonian concerns to French interests at the expense of 
stagnation in the territory’, and of the fact that the SLN ‘dominated and exploited New Caledonia’s rich 
natural resources for its own advantage and returned insufficient economic and other benefits to the 
people of New Caledonia’. (Gendron 2009, p. 118). 
207 Louis Jacquinot, Ministre de la France d’outre-mer, 11 August 1951 to 19 June 1954.  
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France d’outre-mer de l’époque avait donné au territoire les assurances 
les plus formelles. 
(JORF 11 December 1963, p. 7794). 
This law effectively dissolved the Territorial Assembly and stripped the Territory of its 
post-war political advances. Ultimate power had been returned to the Governor. It was a 
case of when France sneezes, New Caledonia catches a cold. In 1962, after eight years 
of war, Algeria gained independence. This was a bitter blow for de Gaulle, whose 
‘certain idea’ of France as a major world power depended for its grandeur upon the 
remaining ‘confetti of Empire.’ The French right-wing Government had the support of 
the European settler majority and this further disadvantaged the indépendantistes. 
Protests, forbidden by Pechoux and organised by the UC, resulted in dynamiting of the 
Territorial Assembly, the garage of the president of the Gaullist Union pour la nouvelle 
République (UNR), Georges Chatenay, and the UC offices. Ciavaldini, a member of the 
UC, gave evidence which led to the arrest and incarceration of Lenormand.208 Although 
Ciavaldini retracted his statement, Lenormand was stripped of his civil rights for seven 
years. According to Lenormand the first peaceful step towards independence had been 
foiled. By 1968, the Territorial Assembly had been disbanded and the UC had lost its 
seat in the Senate to Henri Lafleur of the Rassemblement Calédonien.209  
In this colonial milieu, promises were broken, laws were changeable, and individualism 
triumphed. The Melanesian faith in ‘la parole’ as sacrosanct, and in cooperation for the 
common good, were not European attributes. The unsavoury aspects of the Imperial 
regime were described by Aimé Césaire: ‘colonialist Europe has grafted modern abuse 
onto ancient injustice, hateful racism onto old inequality’ (Césaire 2000, p. 45). During 
these turbulent years the inconsistencies of the various French Governments were to 
engender further conflict. The anti-colonial literature of the day, the Algerian War of 
independence, and the May 68 student-worker uprising had a profound radicalising 
effect on the Caledonian students and led to what became known as the ‘Kanak 
Awakening’. Given the intransigence of the entrenched local population and the self-
                                                
208 No one claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Territorial Assembly and no one ever knew 
whether the graffiti painted on the wall—FROLICA—was an acronym for Front de libération calédonien 
or Front de libération canaque (Bergeroux 1975). 
209 The Rassemblement Calédonien emerged as a new conservative political force in 1958, led by Henri 
Lafleur a wealthy mining magnate. 
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serving interests of the French State, the situation was bound to lead to conflict. It is to 
this that we shall turn in our next chapter.  
Conclusion: Chapter 3 
World War II woke New Caledonia from its colonial lethargy. The capitulation of 
France and the possibility of a Petainist Government in the colony caused concern in the 
Anglo-Pacific, and for Australia and New Zealand in particular.210 When Japan became 
a signatory of the Tripartite Pact on 29 September 1940,211 the strategic importance of 
New Caledonia and the wartime value of its large nickel deposits became apparent, and 
by way of undercover diplomatic manoeuvring Australia ensured that de Gaulle’s Free 
French gained power. With the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the Americans were quick to 
react by establishing a military base in New Caledonia. The passage through the 
Territory of an estimated million allied troops posed a challenge to French hegemony212 
and helped to liberate the Kanak who, until 1944, had been severely restricted by the 
Indigénat. 
Post-war Kanak liberation, and a growing interest in Communism, brought a swift 
reaction from the Churches and the encouragement of the Church-sponsored Kanak 
entry into the political arena. The Kanak, with a demographic majority and a viable 
political voice, were now able to challenge the ruling oligarchy and violent conflict 
erupted. As the Churches became more enmeshed within the political agenda, the 
threads uniting the disparate strands of the Protestant Church began to unravel. The 
Church was torn by different educational, theological and political ideas that led to 
bitter conflict and its eventual schism. This in turn led to political divisions, notably for 
or against ‘autonomy’, ‘independence’ or remaining ‘loyal’ to France. With multiple 
cracks in the Church and growing political division, the opportunity for reconciliation 
quickly evaporated and the scene was set once again for a return to conflict. 
                                                
210 This vindicated the opinions aired by Australia and New Zealand almost a century earlier in the quest 
for annexation. 
211 The Tripartite Pact linked Germany, Italy and Japan. Each followed its own course of action in the 
fight against the Allied forces. This Pact was also known as the ‘Axis Alliance’. 
212 Fundamental differences between the French and Americans led to a deep misunderstanding. 
According to De Gaulle, ‘reconciliation with the Americans was not possible’ (Munholland 2005, 
p. 178). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
The Kanak Awakening, May 68 and Beyond 
World War II was a period of liberation for the native population of New Caledonia and 
the Kanak were now a force to be reckoned with. They outnumbered Europeans, had a 
political voice,213 and with improved educational opportunity were able to pursue higher 
studies in France. When the first Kanak students arrived in France in the early 1960s, 
the country had emerged by way of the Marshall Plan from post-war devastation to an 
era of strong economic reconstruction and expansion, the heady days of Les Trente 
Glorieuses.214 An explosion of industrial activity called for an increased labour force 
and this was supplied largely by the colonies. Enthusiastic recruitment campaigns and 
wars of emancipation led to a colonial diaspora, which meant that many uprooted, 
marginalised people were living in France in cultural limbo. From Algeria alone one 
million French settlers, pieds-noirs, and Muslim pro-French Algerians, harkis, moved to 
France where, after having championed the French cause in Algeria, they were treated 
as an underclass and alienated from French society (Stoppard 2006, p. 207). 
Although some Kanak may have been confronted with racial discrimination in the 
Metropole, Nidoïsh Naisseline, the son of the High chief of si-Gwahma on Maré, was 
welcomed into the Protestant milieu (Chappell 2010, p. 42). When Naisseline arrived in 
France in 1962 to attend the Lycée Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Montmorency, he was 
guided by Pastor Marc Boegner, an active resistance campaigner during German 
occupation, Head of the Protestant Church of France and an advocate of Christian unity 
                                                
213 The framework legislation which led to the Defferre law of 26 July 1957 granted the right to vote to all 
Caledonians without distinction. The Conseil Général was replaced by the Territorial Assembly of 30 
members from which were elected 6 to 8 Ministers. Of the 30 members of the first Assembly 18 were 
from the UC, 7 were Social Republicans, 4 pro-indépendantistes, and 1 from the workers’ party, 
Rassemblement Ouvrier Calédonien (Lenormand 1991, p. 141). 
214 ‘Les Trente Glorieuses’ referred to the years between 1945 and 1975 and was coined by Jean Fourastié 
in his book Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975. 
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through the œcumenical movement.215 Slowly, Kanak pride began to replace the 
complex of inferiority inculcated by a century of imperial rule.  
The 1960s were years of conflict as the forces of order confronted the forces of protest 
and liberation. The Black Power and Civil Rights movements were focusing the world’s 
attention on the American black–white divide. The black-power salute of black athletes 
at the Mexican Olympic Games in 1968 was beamed around the world. In this changing 
socio-cultural climate, the Kanak students discovered that the great men of the time, 
Martin Luther King, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, were not European. Inspired by the 
mood of the era, the Caledonian students joined the fight for equality, justice and human 
rights. It was a Kanak awakening. 
Among the early New Caledonian students to arrive in France from New Caledonia in 
the 1960s were the non-Kanak Jean-Paul Caillard, a medical student, and Max Chivot, 
an economics student who joined Naisseline in the Association des étudiants de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie et des Nouvelles-Hébrides (AENCNH). They became involved 
with the student magazine Trait d’Union (acronym TU, translation ‘hyphen’) in which 
Caillard, as editor, encouraged an emergent interest in Kanak culture. Articles were 
written which provided a Melanesian perspective of events of the past, which had 
generally been confined to oral histories. Naisseline, influenced by the anti-colonial 
writers Aimé Césaire and Franz Fanon,216 published an article titled Coutumes canaques 
et civilisation occidentale: face à face ? which reflected on racism and the clash of 
civilisations in New Caledonia. In his analysis Naisseline described the three stages of 
denaturalisation of the Kanak: first was the attempt to assimilate to escape the shame of 
cannibal ancestors; second was disillusionment with the realisation of having being 
duped; and third was the total rejection of Western civilisation (Chappell 2010, p. 46). 
Naisseline spurned Kanak imitation of Europeans and argued in favour of equality, 
mutual respect and the recognition of Kanak identity: 
                                                
215 Boegner wrote to Pétain pleading for a more humane treatment of Jews throughout the period of 
German occupation. After the war, he received a Yad Vashem award which was given to non-Jews who 
saved Jewish lives during the war. 
<http://db.yadvashem.org/righteous/family.html?language=en&itemId=4042772>. [2 January 2016]. In 
1963 he became a member of the Académie Française, the only Pastor ever to achieve this honour. 
<http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/marc-boegner?fauteuil=2&election=08-11-1962>. 
[2 January 2016]. 
216 Frantz Fanon was born in Martinique in 1925. He studied medicine in France and specialised in 
psychiatry. He practised in Algeria during the War of Independence and joined the revolutionaries. He 
died of leukaemia, aged 36, shortly before Algerian independence. 
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Nous dialoguerons avec les civilisateurs, à condition qu’ils acceptent 
d’extirper l’Homme de ce tas de ruines. Nous les aiderons avec plaisir 
s’ils nous le demandent. Pour cela, nous pourrions par exemple, avec 
eux, faire une balade du côté des tribus canaques, pour qu’ils apprennent 
à découvrir ce qu’est une société sans prison, sans orphelinat, sans 
homme seule une société où tout le monde se donne la main.  
(Naisseline cited in Banaré 2014, p. 8). 
It became apparent that values fundamental in Europe—equality, democracy and 
liberalism—did not extend to non-Europeans. Colonial Manichaeism was firmly 
embedded; the Kanak and European existed in two separate spheres. In general, 
Europeans were not interested in the world of the Kanak. In the politics of white 
assimilation it was the black colonised who had to wear ‘white masks’, to use Fanon’s 
expression.217  
Dissatisfaction in France during the sixties culminated in the crisis of May 68. 
De Gaulle had lost support because of the disastrous war with Algeria, and the war in 
Vietnam sparked student protests against American imperialism. Protests were 
organised by militant student and teacher organisations.218 The wartime sentiment of the 
Free French Movement against American Imperialism was reignited.219 Students of the 
post-World War II ‘baby boom’ generation in France were joined by students from the 
newly liberated colonies, with the effect that universities were poorly equipped and 
overcrowded. Protest meetings organised by Daniel Cohn-Bendit220 called for a broad 
gamut of reforms to perceived injustice. One theme which resonated with the Kanak 
was ‘the attempt of bureaucrats to turn men into objects […] and of mankind’s refusal 
to be treated in this way’ (Woroni 10 June 1971, p. 8). The protest spread. 
                                                
217 See Boyden (1970). Genetically, humans have remained unchanged for thousands of years. It follows, 
according to Boyden, that hunter-gatherer societies were, by natural selection, best adapted to the earth’s 
habitat. The enormous environmental and lifestyle changes that have occurred in recent years have 
resulted in stress and signs of maladjustment. As a consequence, ‘modern’ man has much to learn from 
the ‘primitive’ or less technologically advanced. 
218 The Union Nationale des Étudiants de France (UNEF) and the teacher organisation, the Syndicat 
National de l’Enseignement Supérieur (SNESUP). 
219 In New Caledonia, imperialism was running unabated, the Billotte Laws had returned control of the 
Territory to France, and this included the control of the mining industry at a time of unprecedented 
growth, the nickel boom. As well, the country was flooded with new immigrants, which ensured that the 
Kanak voice would never be heard. 
220 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Dany le Rouge, a German Jew, subsequently became a Member of the EU 
Parliament for the Greens. 
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New Caledonian students were quick to join the fray, which soon changed from passive 
protest to violent conflict. Barricades were raised, the Compagnies républicaines de 
sécurité (CRS) was brought in and revolutionary slogans abounded, highlighting 
student discontent with a repressive technocratic society that espoused liberty and 
fraternity but practised social inequality (Bureau of Public Secrets n.d.). Radical labour 
unions affronted by police brutality took industrial action and within two months France 
was at a standstill as ten million workers joined the general strike. A general election 
swept De Gaulle back into power with promises for sweeping reforms. For those New 
Caledonian students in Paris these events had a profound effect; it was an experience 
which would affect future political confrontation on the Caillou.221  
Nidoïsh Naisseline was at the centre of the action which challenged and contested 
imperial, racial, political and educational oppression. Amid this turmoil, in a country 
eighteen thousand kilometres from his homeland, Naisseline began to appreciate Kanak 
culture which he believed should be accepted with pride and not subjugated to western 
values: ‘l’on a toujours appris à Nouméa, selon la première conception, que pour 
devenir quelqu’un de bien, il suffit de se hausser au niveau de l’Européen.’ (Naisseline 
cited in Banaré 2014, p. 4). In 1969, while still living in France, Naisseline wrote an 
article for the review Canaque Homme Libre,222 which he titled Aspects noirs du 
problème blanc. In this article, he criticised the way in which Europeans had 
stereotyped the Kanak as a race of footballers and pilou dancers who lacked the ability 
to reason or recognise the difference between good and evil: ‘Si l’homme devient 
réellement homme à partir du moment où il pense, d’après certaines paroles entendues à 
Nouméa, l’indigène serait à la frontière entre l’humanité et l’animalité.’ (Banaré 2014, 
p. 6). The student rebellion in 1968 was for Naisseline a defining moment of 
self-acceptance: ‘La grande leçon que je tire de 68, c’est que le regard du métropolitain 
m’a réconcilié avec moi-même.’ (Brandeau 1998). Like Fanon, Naisseline believed that 
the only way for the native to extricate himself from the imperial clutch and to restore 
the Melanesian personality was by dialogue or revolt (Banaré 2014, p. 7). 
                                                
221 When violence erupted in the streets of Paris, New Caledonian student Gabriel Paita and medical 
student Jean-Paul Caillard were pursued and clubbed by the CRS.  
222 In December 1968, the radical students formed a new association, the Association des Jeunes 
Calédoniens à Paris (AJCP) and in February they published the journal Canaque Homme Libre 
(Chappell 2003, p. 193). 
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In 1969, Naisseline returned to New Caledonia with ideas which had radically changed 
during his student years in France. He brought together those concerned with 
reasserting Kanak identity and culture through a movement called the Foulards Rouges, 
a name which symbolised both the Paris Commune and the red commune scarf which 
Louise Michel is reputed to have given to Ataï during the 1878 insurrection. Students 
who had returned to New Caledonia after taking part in the May 68 insurrection in 
France took pride in Kanak culture and in ‘black power’ and sought, with Naisseline, a 
return to the roots of Kanakitude. The return to the ideals of Kanak traditional society; 
of being in tune with the rhythm of nature, and of working and living together for the 
benefit of the community, was seen by the French anthropologist Alban Bensa to be an 
acceptance of the ‘Fourierist’ principles of utopian socialism practised by Guillain in 
the previous century (Kajman 1985). 
Eminently political, the group made its presence felt by painting anticolonial slogans on 
‘white only’ restaurants and bars. Slogans such as ‘À bas le colonialisme’, ‘Les Blancs 
dehors’ and ‘Calédonie Libre’ which appeared around the city led to the arrest of 
Naisseline and Caillard. The imprisonment of the son of the High Chief of Maré caused 
riots in the city and publicity for the objectives of his indépendantiste party.  
To broadcast the aims of the Foulards Rouges, a monthly magazine, Réveil Canaque,223 
edited by Naisseline, published revolutionary commentaries. The publication of this 
magazine in Nengone, the language of Maré, resulted in another term of imprisonment 
for Naisseline. The use of languages other than French had been forbidden by law in 
both education and publishing since 1863 and this law still held.224 While in prison 
Naisseline wrote: ‘We are struggling for humanity and not against the White […]. The 
condition for racial harmony in New Caledonia [is that] each ethnic group should 
                                                
223 According to Angleviel (2002, pp. 191-196) the name given to the indigenous population of New 
Caledonia has metamorphosed with time. Originally ‘kanaka’, which is the Polynesian for ‘man’, was 
used generically for all Oceanians. This became Kanak (Garnier 1991 [1871]). Trentinian in his report in 
1879) ‘frenchified’ the name into ‘canaque’, but as the French-Indigène relationship deteriorated, this 
name was considered to be pejorative. Others, including Fr Lambert (1855-1903), used the name 
Néo-Calédonien. Between the wars canaque signified the indigenous people and calédonien the 
‘Europeans’. After the Brazzaville conference ‘mélanésien’ became the lingua franca of the 
Administration. In the press, the spelling varies: Le Monde: canaque, Le Nouvel Observateur: kanak, 
Paris Match: kanak. During the events of the 1980s the kanak form was adopted as a symbol of 
independence. This spelling was retained in the Noumea Accord and seems to have gained traction. I 
have generally used ‘Kanak’ irrespective of the epoch. 
224 Hamid Mokaddem speaks of schizes, scissions, ruptures that have had a destabilising effect on Kanak 
culture and the first of these ruptures is the outlawing of the use of the maternal tongue in favour of 
French, the language of prestige and social and educational success (cited in Jouve 2014). 
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develop its personality’ (Naisseline cited in Chappell 2010, p. 50). It was a battle for 
acceptance as intellectual equals. The popular belief was that intelligence was the 
domain of the coloniser and not the colonised, and according to Naisseline, if a Kanak 
challenged this order he was suspected of plotting murder. In reality, Naisseline 
admitted, he would like to commit two murders, ‘that of the myth of White superiority, 
and that of the myth of Kanak savagery’ (Chappell 2010, p. 51). News of the arrest of 
some of her former classmates, members of the Foulards Rouges, aroused Déwé 
Gorodé’s awareness of the Kanak struggle for independence, and she with other 
educated women such as Susanna Ounei joined the group. 
Conflict continued throughout the 1970s. Naisseline was arrested and imprisoned again 
when he intervened in a dispute between a French official and Kanak shopkeeper 
(Le Monde 24 March 1972). His incarceration was likened to that of other freedom 
fighters, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, who had also paid the price and 
even died for racial liberty, humanity and dignity. The slogans of the French 
Revolution—liberty, equality and fraternity—had little meaning in New Caledonia, 
where the Kanak continued to be considered as a lower species on the evolutionary 
ladder. This was despite Guiart’s suggestion that ‘there is being created a young, 
vigorous people, who have already happily joined the humanism of the French to the 
solid virtues of the Melanesians’ (Aldrich 1993, pp. 46-47). 
The Kanak optimism of the 1960s began to fade in the 1970s. The pluriethnic UC lost 
seats in the Territorial Assembly. Melanesians became a minority as French nationals, 
lured by a healthy remuneration of up to five times that offered in the homeland, 
flooded the country. The Mayor of Noumea, Roger Laroque, who favoured closer 
integration with France, told L’Express: ‘We must make whites, make metropolitans 
come here. That way there will be no Canaque problem.’ (Chappell 2010, p. 55). This 
sentiment was reinforced by the Prime Minister Pierre Messmer who in a letter 
addressed to Xavier Deniaux, Minister for the DOM-TOM:  
La présence française en Calédonie ne peut être menacée sauf guerre 
mondiale, que par une revendication nationaliste des populations 
autochtones appuyées par quelques alliés éventuels dans d’autres 
communautés ethniques venant du Pacifique. À court et à moyen terme, 
l’immigration massive de citoyens français métropolitains ou originaires 
des départements d’Outre-mer (Réunion), devrait permettre d’éviter ce 
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danger, en maintenant et en améliorant le rapport numérique des 
communautés. 
(LDH-Toulon 2008). 
For the Kanak, the battle for equality, respect and recognition continued. To gain 
respect, the pejorative name canaque was changed to Kanak (Angleviel 2002, 
pp. 194-195; Douglas 1998, p. 70; Henningham 1992, p. 67)225 and to gain recognition, 
the annual celebration of French annexation on 24 September became, for the Kanak, a 
day of national mourning, rebellion and confrontation (Waddell 2008, p. 122). Faced 
with an intransigent Government which was slow to act on issues of Kanak inequality, a 
group of young radicals led by Déwé Gorodé and Elie Poigoune broke away from the 
conciliatory Foulards Rouges in 1974 to form a new, more militant party, Groupe 1878, 
which took its name from the Kanak insurgence of 1878. The claim was now for 
independence not autonomy.226  
The Groupe 1878 supported issues that were of concern on Grande Terre, in particular 
land rights and the restoration of ancestral land. As land was expropriated, the Kanak 
were ignored in a distribution which favoured the few: 95 people, or 5% of landholders, 
who owned 70% of the confiscated land, and of this, three people, the ‘Caledonian 
plutocracy,’ held one third of the total holdings (Ward 1982, pp. 33-34). Disenchanted, 
the small landholders, petits blancs, joined the Kanak in their fight against the injustice 
of land distribution. On the Loyalty Islands, land was not an issue as the islands in their 
entirety were tribal reserves. In addition, the overriding objective of the young Loyalty 
Island activists was to achieve cultural recognition and political, economic and social 
equality within a pluricultural framework. Naisseline, who was at the forefront of 
Melanesian political activity, sought to unite all those who had been exploited in the 
quest for equality: ‘under the domination of a common enemy […] all the exploited 
people are for me legitimate allies that we must not ignore.’ (Chappell 2010, p. 57). In 
February 1976, in a reshuffling of political parties and action groups, the Foulards 
Rouges and Groupe 1878 combined to form the political party Parti de libération 
kanak, PALIKA (Henningham 1992, p. 68).  
                                                
225 The upper-case Kanak has a strong attachment to the independence movement and remains a powerful 
symbol of identity 
226 The Foulards Rouges was predominantly Loyalty Island based; it was divided into three subgroups to 
represent each island. Groupe 1878 pursued mainland issues including land rights. The Loyalty Islands in 
their entirety were ‘native reserves.’ 
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More laws, statutes and plans: Billotte, Stirn, Dijoud and Lemoine 
Throughout the 1960s, pressure was brought to bear on the French Government to end 
the monopoly of the SLN, which was seen to advantage France and French companies 
while returning little economic benefit to the local inhabitants. A memorandum 
submitted to the Territorial Assembly by four of its members outlined widespread 
discontent with the company (Gendron 2009, p. 119). The memorandum was ignored, 
and in 1969 the draconian Billote laws,227 known locally as lois scélérates, were 
introduced. These three laws stripped the country of the last remnants of autonomy; 
they placed all mining activities, including exploration, under State control, and 
transferred the administration of the 31 communes from the Territory to State-appointed 
chefs de subdivision. The management of all major investment in the Territory was 
relocated to France. The approval of these laws was contested by Caledonians on the 
premise that as the decision had been made without consultation, it contravened Article 
74 of the French Constitution (Decraene 1968a)228 and gave rise to excessive 
centralisation:  
Véritables lois d’exception qui donnent non pas les pleins pouvoirs, mais 
la tyrannie, à un seul homme, le ministre d’État. En conséquence, [des 
élus de l’Union calédonienne] s’opposent catégoriquement à l’adoption 
de ces textes qui concernent le régime fiscal, le régime minier et les 
communes de moyen exercice de Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
(Decraene 1968b). 
Conflict and a jail term for Naisseline resulted in widespread media coverage. 
Naisseline had disputed the authority of the chef de subdivision and accused the young 
administrator of interfering in tribal affairs on native reserve land. Naisseline was 
charged with ‘flagrant offences’ and arrested. Hundreds flocked to the courtroom for his 
trial and Max Chivot published front page anti-colonial cartoons. This resulted in the 
cartoonist being incarcerated with his soixante-huitard friend (Chappell 2014, p. 110). 
Naisseline admitted to offending the chef de subdivision but was non-repentant: ‘I do 
                                                
227 Pierre Billotte was a General in the army during the Second World War, and Minister for Overseas 
Territories in the Pompidou Government from 8 January 1966 to 30 May 1968 (New York Times 3 July 
1992). 
228 ‘Les territoires d’outre-mer de la République ont une organisation particulière tenant compte de leurs 
intérêts propres dans l’ensemble des intérêts de la République. Cette organisation est définie et modifiée 
par la loi après consultation de l’assemblée territoriale.’ 
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not respect the uniform of a man who agrees to wear it and then commits a crime 
against humanity’ (Chappell 2010, p. 54). Calls for the abolition of the Billotte laws 
reached fever pitch when 75 hectares of reserve land on Maré were appropriated 
without consulting the native landowners (Chappell 2014, pp. 113-114). 
Anti-colonial sentiment had again been aroused, but according to Naisseline, the major 
cause of conflict was due to Caledonian politicians: ‘It is not France who is colonising 
[…] but a bunch of conniving politicians in the service of big money’ (Chappell 2010, 
p. 55). During these events, the Human Rights League came out in support of 
Naisseline who was not anti-white, but against repressive colonialism (Chappell 2014, 
p. 121). 
Frustration surfaced again for the Kanak when, with the mass migration of the nickel 
boom years, 1969-1972, they became a minority in their own country. In the seven year 
period from 1969, the New Caledonian population increased from 100,836 to 133,233. 
The new immigrants were mainly from the métropole, but 7426 arrived from the French 
Pacific possessions and they, as French citizens, were eligible to vote in local elections 
(Aldrich 1993, p. 120). Such an increase had been welcomed by the Mayor of Noumea, 
Roger Laroque, and the French Prime Minister, Pierre Messmer, who were both anxious 
to increase the loyalist vote, to make New Caledonia white and to eliminate the Kanak 
problem (Chappell 2014, p. 115). This was a flagrant breach of the rules of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, which prohibited an influx of immigrants that could 
upset the population balance of nations awaiting decolonisation. The new arrivals 
caused further conflict and resentment (Lenormand 1992, p. 144).  
Indigenous disadvantage was both political and economic.229 The profits of the nickel 
boom were not evenly distributed and the gap widened between Melanesian and 
European: ‘un déséquilibre humain et social, faisant craquer les cadres de la société 
autochtone’ (Lacouture 1964). The situation became worse when the French franc and 
then the French Pacific Franc (CFP) were devalued during the monetary crisis of 1969 
(Le Monde 7 November 1969). The increased cost of imports was compounded by the 
spiralling inflation of the boom years. Salaries skyrocketed and this attracted workers 
from outside the Territory. The housing market boomed and in this atmosphere of 
                                                
229 According to Chappell (2014, p. 51), ‘France subsidised New Caledonia partly for national prestige, 
yet the value of nickel exports was five times the financial aid that Paris provided.’ 
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unprecedented economic growth it was feared that the Caledonians were in the process 
of killing the ‘hen which laid the golden egg.’ As wages increased, so did the cost of 
nickel production, to such an extent that New Caledonia was no longer competitive on 
the global market. During this time the UC was anxious to lure the Canadian nickel 
giant INCO into the New Caledonian marketplace to break the monopoly of the SLN. 
Pitted against powerful stakes, this bid was doomed to failure. The Prime Minister, 
Georges Pompidou, had been an employee of the owners of the SLN, the French 
Rothschild family, and when he ratified the Billotte Laws it was suggested that it was to 
protect the interests of the Rothschilds. This conjecture resurfaced in 1973 when, during 
the global oil crisis, the State made good the financial losses of the SLN, and 
subsequently took over the company (Gosse 1984). 
The Billotte laws, by means of generous tax concessions, had hoped to entice external 
investors, to be vetted by the French Government. When development failed to 
eventuate, Rock Pidjot travelled to France to have the laws abolished. Paradoxically, 
despite the lack of foreign investment, the Territorial Administration, remote-controlled 
from France, acted in anticipation of the new development. Each year the budgetary 
forecast and the number of imported public servants increased. In a period when the 
population barely doubled, public servant numbers rose nearly six-fold, from 700 to 
4000. Budgetary expenditure during the seven ‘Billotte years’ skyrocketed from 3 
million francs to 11 million (Pidjot 1976). At the same time, the Doniambo smelter was 
struggling with outdated technology, was unable to meet Japanese demand, and with 
new global players in the marketplace, market share was lost. A loss of faith in the local 
economy, a lack of external investment, and mass immigration had a Malthusian effect 
and New Caledonia was left to fend for itself.  
Frustrated in its appeal for greater internal autonomy and with the gap between 
Melanesians and colonists widening, the Union Calédonienne moved progressively 
from a claim for total internal autonomy to one for independence. Yann Céléné Uregeï, 
Acting President of the Assembly, stated: 
Si M. Billotte n’avait pas voulu, lui le premier, modifier notre statut, 
notamment en amputant l’Assemblée territoriale d’un certain nombre de 
ses prérogatives, nous sommes à peu près certains qu’il n’y aurait jamais 
eu de motion sur l’autonomie interne. 
(Le Monde 9 March 1968) 
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Billotte and de Gaulle refused to meet with future delegations from New Caledonia and 
this led to a plea by Armand Ohlen, President of the Assembly, for the Billotte Laws to 
be abandoned (Le Monde 4 June 1968). Michel Inchauspé, Secretary of State for 
Overseas Territories, declared on a visit to New Caledonia that France did not intend to 
modify the statute as it applied to New Caledonia (Le Monde 2 October 1968). 
With the numbers stacked against them and the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, 
categorically refusing total autonomy, there was little room left to manoeuvre for those 
seeking independence. Olivier Stirn, the Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM,230 
favoured the departmentalisation of France’s overseas territories,231 and was 
categorically opposed to those who had voted against independence, enjoying both the 
benefits of association with France and total autonomy (Decraene 1976). In December 
1976 a new statute, the Statut Stirn created regional councils with little real power 
(JORF 21 December 1976, pp. 9776-9778). In Stirn’s ‘neo-conquistadorian’ plan, the 
State was omnipotent in what Le Monde reported as being a barely masked and shoddy 
optical illusion: 
Le Stirnisme, c’est d’abord un fanatisme, celui de la 
départementalisation. Pour vous c’est la panacée universelle. 
Malheureusement ce n’est ni une idée neuve ni une idée juste, car qui dit 
centralisation dit engourdissement et étiolement. 
(Le Monde 15 November 1975). 
Rock Pidjot described the Stirn laws as a retrograde step that withdrew the autonomy 
conferred in 1958 by the Defferre laws, in favour of departmentalisation and the dirigist 
policies of France which offered limited personal freedom or economic opportunity 
(Le Monde 29 May 1976). These laws, like apartheid, favoured the dominant class, and 
were racially divisive (Colombani 1977). To prevent the Balkanisation of the country, a 
new electoral system was proposed. This also met with disapproval and was rejected. 
                                                
230 Olivier Stirn, Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, 6 June 1974 to 31 March 1978 and 12 May 1988 
to 23 June 1988. 
231 Césaire was critical of Stirnisme and its aim to remove all traces of the colonial époque: ‘J’ai peur que 
ne subsiste la trace du collier.’ (Jullien 1975, p. 36). The question of Stirnisme also met the acerbic wit of 
Césaire: ‘Monsieur le secrétaire d’État, je dirai, parodiant Molière, que vous êtes un « départementaliseur 
à toutes mains »’.(Hénane 2010). 
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Discontent was widespread in the territory when Paul Dijoud replaced Stirn as Minister 
of Overseas Departments and Territories in 1978.232 Dijoud confronted the unacceptable 
socio-economic environment of high unemployment, high cost of living and reduced 
purchasing power by proposing a five-year rescue plan. Almost 600 million francs were 
to be made available for agricultural, mining and tourism reforms. The ambitious plan 
envisaged Kanak social and cultural evolution within a pluricultural framework (Féraud 
1978). Land redistribution (Ward 1980, p. 193),233 Kanak education, a Melanesian 
Cultural Centre and a second nickel smelter were all on the drawing board. However, 
the large subsidy and increased dependence on the State could only be at the expense of 
independence. France was still at the helm—‘it is the Government of France who will 
command’ (Ward 1982, p. 37)—and the devil of the plan was in the detail. This was 
revealed at the last minute when it was discovered that the proposal included a ten-year 
moratorium on independence. The support of the UC for the plan evaporated and 
another opportunity for a kind of reconciliation was lost. 
With the indépendantiste group offside, Dijoud attempted to shore up the loyalist vote 
and unsettle the indépendantiste movement by the elimination of the plethora of small 
indépendantiste political parties. A change in the rules made it necessary to obtain a 
minimum of 7.5% of the vote to hold a seat in the Assembly (Spencer, Ward & Connell 
1988, p. 107).234 It was expected that many of the indépendantiste parties would fall by 
the wayside. Against all odds, these parties responded by uniting under the banner of 
the Front indépendantiste (FI) (Ward 1980, p. 196). Even so, mass migration had been 
sufficient to give the Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) a 
parliamentary majority in the 1979 territorial elections. By a strange quirk of fate, 
dissension in the loyalist camp led to the resignation of RPCR members. Accusations of 
‘irresponsibility […] summary Machiavellianism and derisive ambitions’ (Chappell 
                                                
232 Paul Dijoud, Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, 6 April 1978 to 13 May 1981. 
233 Although land on the Loyalty Islands and Isle of Pines is held entirely by the Kanak, on the Grande 
Terre the situation is very different; in 1980, 950,000 hectares were held by the Territory, 380,000 
hectares by private citizens and 165,000 inhabited by 24,000 Kanak. This imbalance was a source of 
tension. 
234 In September 1977, 17 parties contested 35 seats. 
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2014, p. 169) were directed towards the centrist Fédération pour une nouvelle société 
calédonienne (FNSC),235 and the UC gained control of the Governing Council.  
The situation in New Caledonia became increasingly critical. Nickel prices had almost 
halved, unemployment soared to 30%, agricultural returns plummeted from 16.8% to 
4% of GDP (Ounei 1978), and within 14 years, 1969-1983, the population had 
mushroomed from 100,000 to almost 150,000.236 Imports rose to meet increased 
demand and the cost of living escalated, to the great economic disadvantage of poorly 
paid Melanesian workers. Wary of the intentions of the French, Rock Pidjot brought to 
the attention of the National Assembly the reasons for Kanak discontent: the 23 million 
CFP promised by Chirac as Prime Minister had not been paid and there was concern 
that the current plan would be a return to colonialism: 
Les Calédoniens, principalement les Mélanésiens, n’acceptèrent pas la 
départementalisation. Une telle solution équivaudrait à régresser. Ce 
serait un retour à la colonisation, que désirent d’ailleurs certains 
monopoles, mais qui risquerait de provoquer des troubles aux 
conséquences fâcheuses.237 
(JORF 16 November 1978, p. 7700). 
By denying the country political autonomy and the ability to chart its own development 
strategies, the Dijoud plan paved the way to the pernicious consequences of aid 
dependency. It did nothing to ease the crisis,238 and was doomed to the same fate as the 
statutes proposed by previous governments of the 5th Republic (Ounei 1978). In the 
midst of these grandiloquent plans, a suggestion made by Rock Pidjot, had a certain 
visionary appeal as a proposal for reconciliation: 
L’entité calédonienne doit être considérée sui generis. L’autonomie 
conférée par le statut de territoire, permet, en particulier, une autonomie 
de la vie politique. Nous devons la respecter. A la crise économique et à 
                                                
235 The NSC subsequently reorganised to become La Fédération pour une Nouvelle Société Calédonienne 
(FNSC). 
236 Figures from INSEE, <www.insee.fr>. [14 January 2015]. 
237 At the same time, Pidjot demanded that the National Assembly respect Article 74 of the French 
Constitution: ‘Les territoires d’outre-mer de la République ont une organisation particulière tenant 
compte des intérêts propres dans l’ensemble des intérêts de la République.’ 
238 French President Giscard d’Estaing reinforced the French paternalism in a speech delivered in 
Noumea: ‘Votre territoire serait définitivement ruiné s’il n’était protégé par son appartenance à la 
France’, but then the contradiction, ‘vous êtes responsables de votre avenir’. (Bergeroux 1979). 
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la crise politique vient s’ajouter une crise d’identité culturelle. 
Mélanésiens et Européens s’interrogent sur leur mode de vie commun, 
sur le respect des différences. 
(JORF 16 November 1978, p. 7701). 
Land was a major source of conflict, and the Dijoud vision for its redistribution was 
contentious. Throughout the years of incarceration, tribes (by way of oral histories), 
preserved memories of the location of ancestral land and it was on this basis that claims 
were made. The process of redistribution was slow and did little to remedy inequalities. 
The average European rural property was 364 hectares and that of the Kanak, 32 
hectares (Le Monde 13 October 1978).239 Discrimination led to demonstration and 
counter-demonstration. According to Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the future leader of the 
FLNKS, it was the reclaiming of tribal land in the Hienghène area which led to a 
souring of the relationship between his tribe at Tiendanite and the settler families of 
Lapetite, Mitride, Garnier and Francheschini. As the situation deteriorated in the 
Tiendanite valley, settlers’ horses on Kanak land were impounded, tribal members were 
threatened, dogs were poisoned, and eventually Louis Tjibaou, the High Chief, took 
Garnier to court. From that time, communication between settler and tribe degenerated 
(Fraser and Trotter 1996, p. 246). 
The election of a Socialist Government in France in 1981240 raised the hopes of the 
indépendantistes. The newly elected Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, Henri 
Emmanuelli,241 after surveying the 36,000 hectare property of Jacques Lafleur, declared 
that ‘il y a des choses inacceptables surtout pour un socialiste’ (Lenormand 1991, 
p. 146). It was decided, after months of ministerial deliberation led by President 
Mitterrand, that desperate measures were needed to stop the cycle of violence and to 
provide all New Caledonians with a more equitable share of political, economic, social 
and cultural responsibilities when ‘le terme colonial n’a pas été tout à fait évacué’ (cited 
in McCallum 1993, p. 40). To avoid opposition from the RPCR and the FNSC242 in the 
                                                
239 Ovington, in Spencer, Ward and Connell (1988, p. 116) says that ‘less than 900 Europeans were 
actively involved in cultivating 432,000 hectares’, while 39,000 Melanesians lived on 165,000 hectares. 
240 François Mitterrand was elected President of the French Republic on 10 May 1981. He was the first 
Socialist President of the Fifth Republic. 
241 Henri Emmanuelli, Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, 22 May 1981 to 22 March 1983. 
242 The FNSC was a centrist party in favour of autonomy but not independence, founded in 1979 by 
Jean-Pierre Aïfa. It had aligned with the RPCR but in 1982 joined with the FI. 
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Territorial Assembly and to avoid lengthy Parliamentary delays, Emmanuelli decided to 
resort to the ordinances provided by Article 38 of the French Constitution.243 In this 
way, administrative control could be returned to France and changes made. With the 
necessary statutory and administrative modifications in place, the Government was able 
to put into action its six-point plan. Tribal land claims were to be administered by a 
‘Territorial Lands Office’ staffed by equal numbers of Kanak, Europeans, and 
representatives of the State. Reform of the mining industry would ensure that the 
country’s natural resources would be utilised for the common benefit. Offices to 
recognise Kanak identity—the Office for Kanak Cultural, Scientific and Technological 
Advancement, and the Office for the Development of the Interior and the Islands—were 
planned. Provision was also made for Melanesian advisors to give advice on customary 
law in civil cases which involved Melanesians (Henningham 1992, p. 72). These 
measures were to be reinforced by judicial, administrative and financial organisations to 
ensure greater equality in the economic and social development of the communities in 
the various regions. To conform with Article 74 of the French Constitution, the 
Government had to consult with the Territorial Assembly but it was not obliged to heed 
its advice. The potential of conflict was evident.244 Emmanuelli realised that these 
reforms were merely piecemeal and that the possibility of lasting peace was unlikely 
while the future of the territory remained undetermined (Le Monde 11 December 1981). 
As a probationary step on the way to self-determination, the Emmanuelli reforms failed 
to ease the tension. 
On 19 September 1981 the Secretary-General of the UC and President of the FI group 
in the Territorial Assembly, Pierre Declercq, was assassinated at his home in 
Mont-Dore.245 The assassin, who was believed to be an anti-independence extremist, 
was never found. In response to this assassination Maurice Lenormand declared: 
La question de l’indépendance est maintenant posée dans le sang, Pierre 
Declercq est mort à cause de cette question, mais également pour que 
celle-ci reçoive une réponse sans plus de retard. Le gouvernement 
                                                
243 Article 38 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic provides the Government with the possibility, after 
authorisation by the Parliament, to intervene in domains of legislative power normally held by the French 
Parliament. 
244 For explanation of Article 74, see footnote 228. 
245 Pierre Declercq was a teacher who had been a long-term member of the UC, a ‘white Kanak […] 
despised by the opponents of independence’ (Aldrich 1993, p. 241). 
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français doit, lui aussi, procéder à son auto-détermination sur la question 
calédonienne et canaque. C’est ainsi seulement que la Calédonie sera 
sauvée et que ses habitants sauront où ils vont. 
(Féraud 1981). 
The assassination, which was intended to weaken the Front indépendantiste, could only 
strengthen the Kanak commitment to liberation. The cycle of violence was reignited. 
Declercq’s murder was a decisive moment in Kanak political history. Six thousand 
attended his funeral, shocked at the indifference of the country to this crime. The 
assassination inspired a new unity among the Kanak for whom ‘on a cultural level, 
everything is founded on blood. If blood flows somewhere, we are touched to the core 
of our being’ (Elie Poigoune, cited in Chappell 2014, p. 181). This led to the 
amalgamation of the FNSC and the FI which provided the indépendantistes with a 
majority in the Territorial Assembly and Jean-Marie Tjibaou, as head of the FI, became 
Vice-President.246 The indépendantistes were now in a strong position to negotiate with 
the Socialist French Government.247 Violent outbreaks, however, continued to erupt in 
la France Australe, distanced as it was physically from the métropole, and 
psychologically from its anglophone neighbours in the South Pacific where customary 
law and French law were often in opposition (Le Monde 12 January 1983).  
The conflict continued. At Sarraméa, two mobile police were killed while attempting to 
clear barricades from the road to a sawmill. Roadblocks had been put in place by the 
Kanak to stop the mill from pumping its effluent into the tribal water supply and killing 
freshwater fish. The Kanak ascribed these deaths to the authorities who had failed to 
observe local custom: ‘Si des gendarmes sont morts, c’est la faute des autorités. Ici, la 
loi ne remplace pas la coutume.’ (Bole-Richard 1983a). The gap between European and 
Melanesian increased: ‘Il y a des lois pour protéger des forestiers, il n’y a pas de texte 
pour protéger les Canaques de la pollution. Cette légalité-là n’est-elle pas coloniale ?’ 
(Bole-Richard 1983a). By now the battle lines had been drawn. Roger Laroque, retired 
CEO of the House of Ballade and Mayor of Noumea, declared his readiness to take up 
arms against the Kanak should independence be declared: ‘Si la France décide de 
                                                
246 The French High Commissioner, Jacques Roynette (9 October 1982 to December 1984), was ex officio 
President of the Assembly. 
247 Composition of the Tjibaou Government: FI: J-M. Tjibaou, A. Gopéa, H. Bailly, Y. Hnada; FNSC: 
G. Morlet, S. Camerlynck; RPCR: H. Wetta. <http://nouvellecaledonie.la1ere.fr/emissions/les-conf-du-
centre-culturel-tjibaou/actu/il-y-25-ans-le-gouvernement-tjibaou.html>. [2 January 2016]. 
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l’indépendance nous sommes prêts à aller à la bataille en souhaitant que cela n’arrive 
jamais. Nous sommes plus forts que les Mélanésiens.’ (Bole-Richard 1983b). 
Throughout the country, militancy was mounting and violent conflict was looming.  
For those with their sights set on independence, voting rights continued to be contested. 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou in 1982 stated: ‘Seul le peuple indigène, à l’exclusion donc des 
Français établis sur place, devra être consulté sur une éventuelle possibilité d’accéder à 
l’indépendance.’248 Outnumbered, the Melanesians realised the futility of a vote for 
independence: in 1981, the local population was 60,000 Melanesians, 50,000 Europeans 
and 30,000 ‘others’ who included Wallisians who favoured the status quo (Canberra 
Times 16 November 1981, p. 5). The restriction of the electoral roll was unacceptable to 
the RPCR, the High Commissioner, M. Roynette, and President Mitterrand who 
acknowledged the Kanak right to independence provided that it was achieved by a 
majority vote. They also recognised the rights of later arrivals, who were now 
established in the country. There was no common ground, frequently the extended hand 
met a vacuum (Kajman 1985), and reconciliation was a Caledonian chimera.  
Not all European New Caledonians were against independence. Although numbers were 
unknown, it is suggested that as many as two thousand whites were UC members and 
denounced the unjust treatment of the Kanak. Many were critical of the Ballandes and 
Lafleurs who, by exploitation of the Kanak, had amassed great personal wealth 
(Le Monde 31 January 1983).  
In March 1983 in a reshuffling of the Mitterrand Ministry, Emmanuelli was installed as 
Secretary of State for Budget and Georges Lemoine became Secretary of State for the 
DOM-TOM.249 The question of self-determination remained unresolved and 
antagonism between the indépendantiste and anti-independence camps was becoming 
more violent. In an attempt to initiate dialogue and effect a reconciliation, the French 
Government, under the auspices of Lemoine, arranged a round table conference at 
Nainville-les-Roches in July 1983. The communiqué resulting from this conference 
provided in three paragraphs a focus for development: firstly, the abolition of the 
colonial state and Kanak equality, secondly the recognition of the Kanak as the first 
                                                
248 This was later revised to include Caldoches who had been living in the Territory for more than 20 
years (De Beer 1983). 
249 Georges Lemoine, Secretary of State for DOM-TOM, 24 March 1983 to 20 March 1986. 
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inhabitants and of their innate and active right to independence, and finally the granting 
of internal autonomy as the country moved toward independence (Godard 2001, 
p. 178). 
At the end of the conference Lemoine expressed his satisfaction with these ‘exploratory 
negotiations’ even though the outcome remained uncertain. In a climate of liberté et 
fraternité the hostile parties had discovered that dialogue, mutual recognition and the 
right to difference had a place in New Caledonian society. Unable to accept either 
increased autonomy or the separation of Territory and State, or the right of Melanesians 
to independence, the RPCR members refused to sign the agreement (Aldrich 1993, 
p. 242). However, fifteen years later this document of reconciliation resurfaced, barely 
disguised, as the Noumea Accord.  
The recognition of the innate and active right of the Kanak to independence provided 
the indépendantistes with a symbolic victory although its significance was not always 
clear. In a Senate debate, M. Etienne Dailly questioned the meaning of ‘innate and 
active’, and concluded: ‘peu importe, nous demeurons dans le royaume des 
ambigüités !’ (JORF 24 July 1985, p. 1952). A major concern for the indépendantistes 
was the vulnerability of the electoral roll to mass migration from francophone countries, 
and a request was made to limit the vote in the 1989 referendum to second generation 
islanders (Canberra Times 17 November 1984, p. 6). The request was refused. 
Despite dissension, the Lemoine ‘round table’ was a step towards reconciliation, 
agreement was achieved by negotiation between State, indépendantistes and loyalists. 
In conception, this was a departure from earlier statutes, which had been unilaterally 
decided in France. The statute, a ‘declaration of intention’, was generally treated with 
suspicion.250 Most of the powers which were held by the State in 1976 had been 
retained, and in 1984 others were added. The Stirn Statute in 1976 had attributed the 
réglementation minière to France (JORF 21 December 1976, pp. 9776-9778); this was 
expanded by Lemoine in 1984: ‘Article 5.4: exploration, exploitation, conservation et 
gestion des ressources naturelles, biologiques et non-biologiques de la zone économique 
exclusive de la République.’ (JORF 7 September 1984, p. 2841). France clearly did not 
                                                
250 Dick Ukeiwé ‘thundered’ against the proposed transition to self-determination: ‘l’anarchie politique 
[…] L’effondrement économique et social […] La guerre civile […] La domination assurée des 
anglo-saxons ou pire des pays de l’Est, de Cuba’. (McCallum 1994, pp. 46-47). Pidjot’s discontent was 
such that he withdrew from the Socialist group of the National Assembly (Le Monde 13 June 1984). 
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intend to relinquish control of the Territory. Other changes signalled by the statute 
included the creation of six customary aires, each with a consultative council appointed 
by the chefferies: ‘gardiennes du droit ancestral non-écrit et de la vie traditionnelle dans 
les tribus’. A Government elected by universal suffrage replaced the Territorial Council, 
and an executive council and President were chosen by Council members, thus reducing 
the power of the High Commissioner. The statute had a dual function: it provided the 
Kanak with a genuine political role without sacrificing the rights of the European 
community.  
The decision regarding independence remained distant and a thorn in the side of the 
indépendantistes who believed that ‘the French position is a sham Parisian 
window-dressing designed to convince the rest of the world that France should retain 
power in this corner of the Pacific’ (Coomber 1984). In protest, Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, the 
leader of the FI, led a walkout from the Territorial Assembly during a visit by the 
Minister for Overseas Territories. Disgruntled indépendantistes of the FI travelled to 
France to submit a counter-proposal to the President of the Republic but the envoy 
returned without securing an audience with Mitterrand. 
In April 1984, Lemoine visited New Caledonia and travelled to various localities in the 
Kanak-dominated provinces where he was generally poorly received. Empty villages 
and placards left little doubt about local dissatisfaction: ‘Statut Lemoine=fumisterie’, 
‘Peuple kanak=9000 chômeurs’, ‘[que] la Calédonie ne devienne pas un pays de misère 
comme le Biafra’, and in Hienghène where Tjibaou was Mayor, ‘Non à l’autonomie, 
l’indépendance au bout du fusil’, and ‘Nos terres aujourd’hui ou le fusil demain’. The 
only welcome was from the loyalist Nawetta tribe whose chief Gilbert Wetta 
disapproved of the attitude of the militant indépendantistes: 
Dans la situation troublée où nous vivons, seuls des femmes et des 
hommes ouverts au dialogue pourront peut-être proposer des solutions et 
faire exception en réussissant là où d’autres ont échoué. 
(Rollat 1984a). 
This statute—arrêté à l’Élysée—was also unpopular with the Europeans (Frappat 
1984). Anti-Lemoine placards of disgruntled Caldoches indicated a growing resentment 
of what was perceived to be the Government’s indépendantiste bias: ‘On est nés ici, on 
veut rester ici, les terres à ceux qui les travaillent, Lemoine, y en a ras-le-bol’. (Frappat 
1984). Lemoine had underestimated the depth of feeling of the opposing groups as he 
 148 
struggled to bring the warring communities together to focus on consensus, coexistence 
and reconciliation. 
In an impassioned speech, Rock Pidjot, as an indépendantiste Member of Parliament in 
the National Assembly, criticised the statute which failed to recognise the 130 years of 
subjugation of the Kanak and a situation which he said: 
[…] nie de fait l’existence d’un peuple colonisé. Le peuple kanak y est 
folklorisé, caricaturé, présenté d’une façon réductrice et passéiste. Il 
semble qu’il suffirait de lui concéder une chambre coutumière, même 
consultative, pour lui donner satisfaction.  
(JORF 29 May 1984, p. 2728). 
The suggestion that certain aspects of Kanak custom might be introduced in European 
institutions met with European derision. Instead, it was recommended that all should 
respect the laws of the French Republic (Rollat 1984c). The vote in the Territorial 
Assembly unanimously rejected the statute which was judged to be ‘monstrous’ and at 
odds with the politics of assimilation favoured by the State. The Territorial Assembly 
had no powers of government reform and its no vote was overridden in the National 
Assembly. The Lemoine Statute was short-lived due to the extent of Territorial 
opposition from both sides of the political divide. Existing conflict, as well as the 
intransigence of the antagonists, was brought into focus. Before joining the scrapheap of 
failed statutes, the Lemoine Statute provided a topic for lively discussion in the National 
Assembly, and an object of severe criticism by the opposition. 
The initial optimism of the independence movement following the election of the 
Mitterrand Government had turned to disenchantment by November 1984 at the time of 
the Territorial Elections. Mitterrand had not kept his promises, the objectives of 
Nainville had not been put into action, and the French position in relation to 
independence was considered a sham. Internal tension led to a split in the FI and the 
creation of a new, more moderate independence party, the Libération Kanak Socialiste 
(LKS), which was composed mainly of Loyalty Islanders under the leadership of 
Naisseline. On 24 September 1984 the FI metamorphosed and became the Front de 
libération national Kanak et socialiste (FLNKS) by uniting the UC and diverse 
indépendantiste parties. Its leader was Jean-Marie Tjibaou. 
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In the view of the FLNKS, participation in the Lemoine plan would be to sign the death 
warrant of the Kanak people. The decision was made to boycott the election on 
18 November 1984 with a strategy of ‘symbolic violence’ masterminded by Eloi 
Machoro.251 It was expected that this would force France to capitulate and negotiate 
with the Kanak. In the lead-up to Election Day, the number of strikes and roadblocks 
increased. On Ouvéa 100 unarmed FLNKS organised a peaceful protest in the courtyard 
of the gendarmerie.252 As the protest gained momentum police numbers doubled to 700 
and an additional 280 riot squad police arrived from France. Barricades were erected, 
electoral booths were burnt and photos of Eloi Machoro axing a ballot box in Canala 
received worldwide media coverage. On the day of the election, journalist Helen Fraser, 
a journalist for The Age newspaper, was witness to resistance around the east coast 
township of Ponérihouen where, during a day of violent confrontation, 12 were injured 
and only 73 votes were registered (Fraser 1985). In the absence of a Kanak vote, the 
result was a landslide victory for the RPCR, which won 34 of the 42 seats. After some 
creative accounting, the French High Commissioner, Jacques Roynette, managed to 
provide a participation rate in excess of 50%, and the voter turnout recorded was 
50.12% (Canberra Times 20 November 1984, p. 4). Following the election Roynette 
was recalled to France in disgrace and Georges Lemoine was stripped of the New 
Caledonian portfolio (Fraser 1985).253 Naisseline’s moderate LKS party, which had 
refused to join the boycott, gained six seats.254  
In the wake of the election, the cycle of conflict returned and indeed gained momentum. 
Four FLNKS leaders and twenty supporters were jailed and an arrest warrant was 
posted for Eloi Machoro (Canberra Times 20 November 1984, p. 4), while Dick 
Ukeiwé, the RPCR candidate from Lifou, became President of the Territorial Assembly. 
                                                
251 Machoro was from a tribe from Canala, the region that had aided the colonial army in the capture and 
beheading of Ataï in 1878. In a ceremony of reconciliation in 1983, the east coast tribes of Thio-Canala 
requested a pardon from their west coast brothers for the part they had played in the death of Ataï during 
the insurrection of 1878 (Kajman 1985). 
252 Le Monde journalist Daniel Schneidermann describes the peace-loving Kanak: ‘Profondément 
imprégnés d’esprit religieux, les Mélanésiens, au fond d’eux-mêmes, sont rebelles à toute idée de 
violence’ (Le Monde 12 November 1984). 
253 The two were held co-responsible for not having foreseen and not preventing the violence during the 
Territorial elections. In the electoral disaster, 80.88% had abstained from voting on the East Coast and 
78.8% in the Loyalty Islands had believed that it was impossible to prevent an election (Le Monde 
4 December 1984). 
254 According to Naisseline, he no longer spoke the same language as the FLNKS and asked himself 
whether they still shared the same values. It was, however, only two days later that he decided not to sit in 
the Assembly (Le Monde 22 November 1984). 
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In his opening address to the Assembly Ukeiwé stated his desire to ‘promote a 
renaissance of traditional Melanesian values while keeping the country within a French 
institutional framework’ (Canberra Times 24 November 1984, p. 6). The hostility 
continued. In Pouebo militants occupied the police station; on Lifou, the island’s 
Administrator was taken hostage; and the township of Thio was under siege. The Thio 
gendarmerie was held for seventeen hours in an act of non-violent ‘symbolic 
occupation’ (Filloux 1984). For over a week roads throughout the Territory were cut so 
that commodities became scarce in outlying areas. In a move of solidarity, PALIKA, a 
more militant indépendantiste group, formally joined the FLNKS for the Territorial 
elections and, on 1 December 1984, Jean-Marie Tjibaou was elected President of the 
Provisional Government of the socialist, decentralised republic of Kanaky.255  
The plight of the Kanak hit page one when a group of FLNKS members was sent to 
Libya to train as bodyguards for the new Provisional Government of Kanaky.256 In a 
conflictual and deteriorating environment, the Kanak were obliged to accept any 
support offered. Jean-Marie Tjibaou likened the Kanak situation to that of a drowning 
man who is not concerned with the colour of the life support, but with the priority of 
being rescued (Canberra Times 15 May 1987, p. 5). In the same way the Kanak were 
forced to ‘enlist the support of any country—provided it is neither racist nor fascist in 
its struggle for liberation’ (Canberra Times 17 November 1984, p. 6). The 17 Kanak in 
Libya brought New Caledonia onto the world stage. In Australia, the Foreign Minister, 
Bill Hayden, was critical of the Kanak action and concerned about the effect that this 
action might have on Australia’s bilateral relationship with France (Canberra Times 12 
May 1986, p. 3). The prospect of Khadafy in the Pacific ruffled Antipodean feathers. 
Edgard Pisani: A new negotiator 
The new Socialist Prime Minister, Laurent Fabius, saw as a matter of urgency the need 
to reduce violence and to establish order and dialogue. He also realised that unless the 
vote on self-determination was brought forward, there could be no dialogue between the 
                                                
255 The Tjibaou Government was baptised ‘le gouvernement de la planète des singes’ by 
anti-indépendantistes of the Rassemblement pour une Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) 
(Lenormand 1991, p. 148). 
256 On the same day as the self-proclaimed Provisional Kanak Government came into being, Edgard 
Pisani was named special delegate of the French Government in New Caledonia, and members of the 
GIGN were sent to New Caledonia to protect the new delegate. 
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antagonistic parties. It was decided that the vote should be advanced by four years and 
held in 1985. A special Government negotiator, Edgard Pisani, was sent to New 
Caledonia to establish dialogue and oversee institutional change and economic, social 
and cultural development.257 The situation was such that Lionel Jospin, First Secretary 
of the Socialist Party, caused a stir in the National Assembly when he suggested that the 
two communities should vote separately in a federal system of pluriethnic 
independence. This would provide equal rights and participation in Government for 
both loyalists and indépendantistes (Canberra Times 6 December 1984, p. 4). The 
suggestion was criticised by Jacques Toubon of the Rassemblement de la République 
party (RPR) as being ‘a sort of apartheid.’  
Fabius was a voice in the wilderness and the time for compromise had for the FLNKS 
passed. In the words of Rock Pidjot, ‘your ancestors have sown the wind, now you are 
reaping the storm’ (Canberra Times 6 December 1984, p. 4). It was now too late to 
repair 25 years of errors and it was only the Kanak vote that could determine the future 
direction of the country (Le Monde 5 December 1984). The Kanak, imbued with a spirit 
of Christianity, had for years avoided violence, preferring psychological harassment to 
physical confrontation.258 With a poorly equipped armoury and no financial backing, 
the Kanak posed no real threat to French sovereignty. On 4 December Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou met with Edgard Pisani and agreed to remove the barricades. Despite the way 
in which events unfolded, Tjibaou honoured his promise and the barricades were 
removed on 6 December 1984. This suggested that reconciliation between opposing 
groups could be possible, but these hopes were soon dashed as tragic events unfolded, 
revealing deep-seated multiple conflicts in rural New Caledonia that were brought to the 
fore by ongoing political tensions. 
The Hienghène massacre: Settler vs Kanak 
In Hienghène, and along the road through the valley to Tjibaou’s tribe at Tiendanite, the 
situation was tense. Houses had been burnt, rocks thrown and 294 people had left the 
                                                
257 According to Alain Rollat in Le Monde, ‘le titre de « grand exorciste » serait plus approprié que celui 
de délégué général du gouvernement pour qualifier la mission impossible.’ (Rollat 1984b). 
258 Although the horizons had broadened, the Kanak strategy of warfare had changed little since 
pre-annexation times (see Chapter 1). This was now, however, not for intra-Kanak conflict, but for 
‘national liberation’ against a European coloniser. 
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area as the sense of survival overtook the fear of losing property (Duroy 1988, 
pp. 18-19). After a FLNKS meeting in Hienghène, on 5 December 1984, two trucks 
carrying seventeen Kanak from Tiendanite tribes were ambushed. Ten men, including 
two of Tjibaou’s brothers, Louis and Tarcissus, were killed in the attack. The vehicles 
were incinerated and the assailants, poor whites and mixed-race settlers who had lived 
in the valley since the earliest years of French settlement, fled after setting fire to 
Jean-Marie’s house (Waddell 2008, p. 136). It was suggested that the target of the 
ambush had been Jean-Marie Tjibaou himself, but this was disputed by Guiart who 
believed that the assassins had found their mark, Louis Ty, the chief of the valley. Ty 
had begun the Kanak land claims in the Hienghène valley and the claim included the 
Pukepaek valley which had been the domain of the Lapetite family for a century (Guiart 
1997, p. 98).  
The self-confessed assassins259 gained hero status among the loyalists and gendarmes 
who had become exasperated with FLNKS threats (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 62). Florent 
Lapetite, a nephew of Raoul Lapetite, stressed that the attack was not racist, the victims 
were ‘terrorists’. The Lapetite and Mitride families were on friendly terms with the 
Melanesians, they played football together and engaged in conversation with them 
daily: 
Nombres de familles avaient des liens coutumiers très forts avec la tribu 
des Tiendanite. Ma grand-mère était une fille de chef mélanésien. Les 
métis sont les plus tolérants au niveau racial, c’est le FLNKS qui a tout 
politisé.260 
(Schneidermann 1984b). 
The depth of the tragedy was all the more dismaying as at least some of the protagonists 
thought that the substance of reconciliation and tolerance had previously prevailed. 
Jacques Lafleur, the leader of the anti-independence political party RPCR, in an 
interview with Le Monde journalists, denied that the ambush was politically motivated 
as Raoul Lapetite had been a longstanding member of the UC who had recently joined 
the less militant EPA party (l’Entente pour l’autonomie), and his son Jean-Claude was 
                                                
259 Maurice Mitride, Raoul Lapetite and his sons Jess, José, Jacques and Jean-Claude and his adopted 
Melanesian son Robert Sineimene. 
260 In addition, according to José Lapetite, ‘le racisme lui est étranger comme il semblait étranger […] à la 
population essentiellement pluri-ethnique de Hienghiène’ (Duroy 1988, p. 302). 
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number six on the PALIKA party list (Le Monde 8 January 1985). According to Lafleur 
the perpetrators of the ambush were unreservedly indépendantistes: 
Ils assistaient tous les jours aux réunions du FLNKS où l’on décidait de 
brûler les maisons une par une. Un des inculpés, Lapetite, assistait à ces 
réunions, et comme il y avait une logique de la terreur pour faire partir 
les gens de la brousse, il savait bien que la prochaine maison brûlée 
serait la sienne […] C’était une fusillade entre indépendantistes !  
(Passeron & Rollat 1985). 
Pisani had been sent as the French High Commissioner into this maelstrom to mediate 
and to resolve the deadlock between the Territorial Assembly and the newly elected 
Provisional Government of Kanaky. His objectives were to establish dialogue between 
the warring parties, to put in place a contract to safeguard the geopolitical interests of 
France in the South Pacific, to preserve the rights of the Caldoche community, and to 
satisfy the Kanak claim for independence. To achieve these aims the Prime Minister, 
Laurent Fabius, considered it important to find common ground from which 
negotiations could begin:  
Il ne peut pas y avoir de solution durable si l’on ne respecte pas les droits 
légitimes de chaque communauté. Le dialogue devra se faire avec tous 
les interlocuteurs, tous les partis, les autorités coutumières, les églises, 
etc. 
(Le Monde 5 December 1984). 
The Hienghène massacre caused further polarisation. In order to reach a better 
understanding of the two fiercely antagonistic groups and to reconcile their conflicting 
interests, Pisani produced two questionnaires, one for those who wanted New Caledonia 
to remain in the Republic, and the other for those who wanted independence. The 
loyalists were asked what measures would be taken to ensure equality and the 
harmonious co-existence of customary and common law;261 and the indépendantistes 
about the future of non-Kanak citizens and mineral exploitation (Schneidermann 
1984a). 
                                                
261 This would be in reference to Article 75 of the French Constitution which states: ‘Les citoyens de la 
République qui n’ont pas le statut civil de droit commun, seul visé à article 34, conservent leur statut 
personnel tant qu’ils n’y ont pas renoncé.’ 
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From the survey, Pisani developed a plan for independence in association with France. 
The plan was rejected by Lafleur, the RPR member for New Caledonia, who in a thinly-
veiled reference to Pisani was critical of those who, within 48 hours of arriving in 
Noumea, believed that they understood Kanak culture and were able to solve the 
country’s problems (Passeron & Rollat 1985). In Lafleur’s opinion, these fly-by-night 
bureaucrats had destroyed Kanak culture and tribal order (Canberra Times 
17 December 1984, p. 5). Dick Ukeiwé, the Kanak President of the Territorial 
Government, echoed these sentiments and sought the removal of Pisani as well as the 
annulment of the referendum on self-determination that had been scheduled to be held 
in July 1985. The Pisani plan was destined to become yet another to join the scrapheap 
of failed statutes.262  
The Pisani plan for New Caledonia aimed to bridge the gap between the State, loyalists, 
and indépendantistes. The compromise proved to be more antagonistic than 
conciliatory: it was a step towards neo-colonialism for the Kanak indépendantistes, and 
a move in the direction of independence for the RPCR loyalists. Hostility mounted and 
the agreement between Tjibaou and Pisani to lift the barricades was not universally 
accepted. Marc Fifita-Ne, chief of the Nakéty tribe, and Eloi Machoro, Minister for 
Security in the Provisional Government of Kanaky,263 decided to continue the fight. 
With twenty teams of twelve supporters, Machoro traversed the Chaîne centrale to La 
Foa to dynamite a bridge and disrupt communication between the north and south of the 
island (Bolis 2014). On the outskirts of La Foa, Yves Tual, a young Caldoche, was 
killed by a Kanak militant and this triggered violent reprisals. Several thousand settlers 
rioted in Noumea setting fire to houses, cars, businesses and offices of indépendantiste 
sympathisers. In a vigorous attempt to avoid further incitement, Pisani declared a state 
                                                
262 According to Rollat (1985b), every time a Government appointee attempted to advance a solution to 
the Caledonian problem it would be scotched by those in favour of retaining the status quo: Paul Dijoud 
was judged too progressive with his land reform package and endured contempt and obloquy during the 
d’Estaing regime; Henri Emmanuelli was accused of sectarianism for denouncing patently obvious social 
and economic inequalities; Christian Nucci was maligned for favouring Tjibaou in his rise to the 
Presidency; and Georges Lemoine was considered to be too conciliatory with his proposed statute for 
internal autonomy. 
263 Alban Bensa in an interview with Le Monde journalist Michel Kajman, 21 January 1985, described 
Machoro as being ‘éminemment politique ; indépendantiste, avec passion ; actions ayant une forte portée 
symbolique’. He was also described as being characteristic of the Thio-Canala natives who, armed by the 
colonial army, had killed Ataï in 1878. Thio had become a stronghold for the independence movement 
which relied on passive protest without bloodshed. The loss of Machoro was felt by both Melanesians and 
whites, and his death was the final chapter in the history of symbolic violence. Machoro was no enfant de 
chœur, he played to the media, in a country where fantastic rumours gained long-term credence. 
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of emergency.264 Firearms, demonstrations and gatherings of more than five people in 
public places were banned, and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was declared (Le Monde 28 
January 1985b). Gendarmes, the GIGN and helicopters began the search for Machoro. 
When the farmhouse in which he was sheltering was discovered, it was surrounded by 
sixty armed police and Machoro and his companion Marcel Nonnaro, who made no 
attempt to return fire, were shot down in cold blood (Bolis 2014). It was death by 
assassination (Canberra Times 14 January 1984, p. 1), and the order to shoot had come 
from Noumea: ‘Tir de neutralisation sur la personne d’Eloi Machoro et de Marcel 
Nonnaro’ (Guiart 1991, p. 137).265  
As the FLNKS death toll rose, it appeared that the French were effectively creating the 
hotbed of discontent that they were trying to suppress. A new cycle of violence was 
underway as the FLNKS increased their demands: 
The FLNKS now demanded the restoration pure and simple of the Kanak 
people’s sovereignty over their country […] 14 FLNKS militants have 
now been killed. The death of Mr Machoro showed the violence of 
colonialism, which does not hesitate to fire on Kanak. 
(Canberra Times 13 January 1985, p. 5). 
In anticipation of Kanak retaliation, France sent another 1000 gendarmes, riot police, 
soldiers and paratroopers to New Caledonia where the forces of order now numbered 
3200 (Canberra Times 15 January 1985, p. 5). Tension was high when, a few days later, 
President Mitterrand made a lightning visit to the Territory to establish peace, dialogue 
and order. Conspicuous signs of pro-French sentiment filled the streets of Noumea—
even the pedestrian crossings were painted in the national colours of France. The 
pro-France sentiment did not extend to the President, who was greeted by 20,000 angry 
settlers opposed to the Pisani propositions. According to the Canberra Times, the seeds 
of settler discontent had been sown long ago: ‘the essential defence has been built 
around well-honed stratagems dating back to the mid-19th century colonial times of 
                                                
264 The right of Pisani to call a ‘state of emergency’ on 12 January 1985 was challenged in the courts 
(Le Monde 15 January 1985c). ‘The state of emergency in New Caledonia and in the dependencies was 
extended by law until June 1985 (Le Monde 28 January 1985a). 
265 Pisani claimed that the order had been to wound and not to kill. He added that the crack marksmen of 
the GIGN had aimed at the shoulders of the Kanak and missed (Le Monde 6 February 1985a). In the 
official version of events ‘l’autorisation d’ouvrir le feu est donnée par le général Deiber conformément 
aux instructions qui lui ont été données par le délégué du gouvernement’ (Le Monde 15 January 1985a). 
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non-cooperation with, and personal abuse against the French pro-consul’ (Shineberg 
1985). 
Mitterrand’s meetings with political leaders failed to ease the situation, which was 
believed to favour the FLNKS. In an effort to assure the RPCR of continued French 
support in the Territory and secure a French geostrategic presence in the region, 
Mitterrand announced plans for major investment by France in naval and air facilities. 
This did little to appease the FLNKS (Rollat 1985c). As the situation became more 
explosive, additional troops arrived from France. The Territory was now patrolled by 
6000 law enforcement personnel, one for every 24 inhabitants including men, women 
and children (Canberra Times 29 January 1984, p. 1). 
It was an inauspicious start for Pisani. He had underestimated the depth of the divide 
that separated France, the loyalists and the indépendantistes, and he had a misplaced 
confidence in his ability to bridge the gap. The plan to return all land, including the 
mineral rich sub-soil, to the Kanak and the suggestion of independence could only raise 
the hackles of the Caldoches (Canberra Times 12 April 1985),266 whilst retention of 
sovereign powers by France unsettled the Kanak who suspected a move towards 
neo-colonialism. Nevertheless, Pisani, with the naivety of the French administration 
with regard to reconciliation, and a poor understanding of the historical situation, was 
convinced that the wisdom of his plan would be realised and eventually accepted.267 
In theory, the Pisani Plan could have relieved the New Caledonia headache and 
provided the possibility of a less turbulent future (Rollat 1985a) but in practice, both the 
FLNKS and the RPCR were intransigent and there was no room for compromise. The 
RPCR unreservedly rejected the plan and demanded the return of Pisani to France. With 
politico-economic dominance under threat and no guarantees of a continued association 
with France should the country become independent, the loyalists refused to engage in 
dialogue. On the other hand, the indépendantistes were single-minded in their quest for 
independence which, without a restricted electoral roll, was unachievable. This was 
considered to be unconstitutional and denied.  
                                                
266 According to Article 53 of the French Constitution, ‘no cession […] of territory is valid without the 
consent of the people concerned’. 
267 ‘Je suis personnellement convaincu, maintenant que je suis en contact avec les populations, que le plan 
[d’indépendance-association] tel qu’il a été esquissé, le 7 janvier, et tel qu’il est en train de se préciser, 
fera la majorité en Nouvelle-Calédonie.’ (Le Monde 6 February 1985b). 
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Dick Ukeiwé, RPR President of the Territorial Government, was critical of the 
Government’s failure to re-establish order in the Territory, and of the FLNKS which, 
refusing to accept universal suffrage, had decided to impose their own reign of terror by 
the forcible occupation of public buildings and gendarmeries. To re-establish dialogue, 
Ukeiwé suggested a three-point rescue plan of New Caledonia which foreshadowed the 
Noumea accord: New Caledonia would remain in association with France, with France 
responsible for the sovereign powers; a Territorial Government and President would be 
elected by universal suffrage; and the Territory would be divided into three or four 
regions each with an elected regional Government and President. Also envisaged was a 
Customary Senate which would have consultative power over customary matters 
(Le Monde 26 January 1985). His belief was that this plan would unite the mosaic of 
New Caledonian inhabitants in Christian communion (Ukeiwé 1985). The Ukeiwé plan 
for reconciliation was also quashed. 
As the country teetered on the brink of civil war, Nidoïsh Naisseline travelled to France 
to discuss the need for dialogue and decolonisation. He suggested that the regional 
assemblies should be abolished as they divided rather than united the Kanak and white 
worlds. He was also critical of the inequality existing between the city and the bush. 
Power and money were concentrated in the hands of a few, and an increasing level of 
financial reliance upon the métropole did nothing to aid the future development of the 
country.268 
Conflict became increasingly violent. Lafleur engaged 50 Wallisian ‘strongmen’ for 
RPCR manoeuvres. Wallisians were physically strong, they disliked the Kanak, and as 
many were on social security they were readily available for recruitment. On 8 May 
1985, following the Victory Day celebrations, the Wallisian protective service was 
transformed into a task force to attack a peaceful PALIKA rally. In the battle that 
ensued, a thousand Europeans descended on the Place des Cocotiers, leaving one young 
Melanesian, Celestin Zongo (Rougier 1985), dead and fifty injured (Filloux 1985c). 
Despite the bloodbath, Jacques Lafleur remained resolute and reaffirmed his 
                                                
268 The need for dialogue and self-determination was not lost on a young Caldoche who wrote in the local 
newspaper: ‘Au lieu d’appeler les gens à descendre dans la rue et d’organiser des liturgies tricolores pour 
fanatiser les foules, nos leaders feraient mieux de dépenser leur énergie à susciter la réflexion calme, 
l’échange, la discussion au sein de leurs adhérents, comme avec l’opposition locale.’ (Schneidermann 
1985b).  
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determination to oppose any independence rally on Noumea soil, including that planned 
by the FLNKS to prevent the installation of the military base (Filloux 1985a).  
In May 1985, in what appeared to be a promotion of convenience, Pisani was recalled to 
France as special Minister for New Caledonia. In a skilful Fabius–Mitterrandien 
political move, Pisani’s lack of success in calming the situation in New Caledonia was 
glossed over: ‘En décembre, il arrivait à Nouméa en libérateur. Il s’y est vite retrouvé 
prisonnier […] surtout de ses préjugés idéologiques’. (Peyrefitte cited in Le Monde 
23 May 1985). Faced with almost unanimous rejection of his statute, Pisani with 
socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius prepared a new, more cautious plan, the 
Fabius–Pisani plan. This plan, by the innovative interpretation of Article 88 of the 
French Constitution, introduced independence in association.269 It provided Melanesian 
rural areas with greater territorial representation by creating four self-administering 
regions—North, South, Central and Loyalty Islands—each with their own council.270 
The Territorial Assembly was renamed the Territorial Congress, and the High 
Commissioner became the Chief Executive of the country. In this way the stronghold of 
the RPCR was reduced (JORF 24 August 1985, pp. 9775-9778).271  
Fernand Wibaux, a diplomat who had worked in conflict zones,272 was appointed High 
Commissioner with the instruction to prepare the country for a smooth transition to 
independence (Le Monde 6 June 1985):  
                                                
269 Article 88 of the French Constitution states: ‘The Republic may enter into agreements with States 
which wish to associate with it in order to develop their civilizations.’ <http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly>. [2 January 2016]. 
270 The Territorial election in September 1985 had a participation rate of 80.62%.and provided a clear 
indication of the polarisation in existence between the two groups. Jacques Lafleur and his RPR party 
won 51.99% of the vote and the FLNKS 28.75%. Predictably the vote on the Loyalty Islands and the east 
coast was overwhelmingly in favour of the FLNKS: Pouebo: 93.7%; Hienghène: 80.7%; Ponérihouen: 
68.1%. The moderates, the troisième voie of the central region, polled poorly with Jean-Pierre Aïfa, the 
mayor of Bourail and leader of the OPAO [Organisation politique d'alliances d’Opao], losing his seat. 
The moderate indépendantiste party of Nidoïsh Naisseline, the LKS, which had won six seats in the 
election in November 1984, retained only one seat. Although the FLNKS held three of the four regions, a 
polling of 10.74% in the populous south was a cause for grave concern. The possibility of the FLNKS 
obtaining a majority in the forthcoming referendum on self-determination was virtually impossible. 
271 Article 4 determines the number of Councillors per region: North: 9, Centre: 9, South: 21, Loyalty 
Islands: 7. This met with the disapproval of the RPCR. Article 25: ‘Le haut-commissaire est l’exécutif du 
Territoire. Il prépare et exécute des délibérations du congrès. Les services du Territoire sont placés sous 
son autorité.’ 
272 Fernand Wibaux was the French Ambassador in Lebanon: ‘Au Liban, j’ai eu la chance de rester en 
contact avec les sunnites, les chiites, les chrétiens et les druzes. Sans tromper mes partenaires, je ne tenais 
pas le même langage à chacun. Ici, c’est la même chose. Au lieu de dire, c’est tout blanc ou tout noir, je 
sais, comme chacun, qu’en général c’est plutôt gris.’ (Le Monde 15 January 1986). 
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Mon objectif est de préparer la Nouvelle-Calédonie à l’accession à 
l’indépendance. Si le plan a changé, même si le plan Fabius a remplacé 
le plan Pisani et le plan Pisani le plan Lemoine, la finalité reste toujours 
la même.  
(JORF 24 July 1985, p. 1952). 
Wibaux believed that conflict was not caused by religious or political difference but by 
a lack of communication between the warring parties, and for reconciliation to occur the 
antagonists needed to engage in dialogue. With a look-and-listen approach, Wibaux was 
no more successful than his predecessor Edgard Pisani (Filloux 1985e),273 whose modus 
operandi, according to Tjibaou, had been electric shock therapy: ‘Les deux hommes 
sont différents […] mais, globalement, je n’ai pas noté de changement dans le projet.’ 
(Filloux 1985f). 
To establish dialogue was no easy task; the gulf separating the pro- and 
anti-independence camps proved to be unassailable and conflict became more intense. 
The Thio region was a battle zone. Mobile gendarmes camped near the 
Saint-Philippo-II tribe274 were the cause of native malaise. The Kanak countered this by 
blocking the entry to the wharf and Wibaux, despite his ‘allergy’ to exceptional 
measures (Canberra Times 15 June 1985, p. 4) sent more than 400 special gendarmes, 
parachutists, helicopters, and VBRG (véhicules blindés de reconnaissance de 
gendarmerie), to reinforce the existing forces of order (Filloux 1985g). Long on rhetoric 
and short on action, Wibaux appeared to be a ‘brake rather than a motor’ in the 
application of promised reform and the Kanak were soon asking France to recall their 
delegate (Canberra Times 24 January 1986, p. 1). 
This new statute caused general disgruntlement. It did nothing to improve the overall 
position of the FLNKS, and reduced the power of the RPCR. For many the ‘waltz of the 
statutes’ provided a field day of amusement for journalists (Rollat 1986c)275 and within 
the National Assembly (JORF 24 July 1985, p. 1957). Clearly Fabius and Pisani 
realised the need for a more inclusive approach to reconciliation but they had not 
                                                
273 The inconsistency is apparent: within two weeks, the stated aim of Wibaux changes from 
independence to independence–association. 
274 Sainte-Philippo II was the tribe of Maurice Moindou, a suspect in the killing of Yves Tual. 
275 The troublemaker was the right-wing parliamentarian Jean-Pierre Soisson whose comment ‘three 
reforms in three years to prepare a fourth statute’, had the effect of itching powder on the parliament. The 
neophyte canaque is Maurice Nenou, the new RPR member. 
 160 
counted on the strength of the settler population and their powerful right wing allies in 
France. Decisions were made in France, and hegemonic laws and statutes were firmly 
embedded in a Western conceptual framework, entangled in colonialism and its legacy. 
There was little understanding of Kanak custom in terms of time, la parole and even the 
restorative power and importance of Kanak silence in mediation. With no common 
ground, reconciliation was impossible. 
Bernard Pons, Minister for the DOM-TOM in the Chirac Government 
20 March 1986-8 May 1988 
In 1986, with the change of Government in France, the Socialist President, François 
Mitterrand, was forced to cohabit with a conservative Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac. 
Chirac abolished the position of special Minister for New Caledonia, and the Minister 
for the DOM-TOM, Bernard Pons, became responsible for the Territory. Pons began a 
program of reform to end any illusion of New Caledonian independence (Le Monde 
20 February 1987). Tjibaou described the autocratic management style of Pons: ‘J’ai 
compris pour vous, et je décide pour vous que la situation ne doit pas changer, que la 
France décide de votre avenir et de votre destin et estimez-vous heureux.’ (Rollat 
1986b). According to Waddell, the appointment of Pons led to ‘a spiral of increasing 
prejudice, sectarian violence and injustice’ that gave rise to the Kanak loss of faith in 
the French institutions of democracy and integrity (Waddell 2008, p. 165). To fulfil his 
program of reforms, the Pons Law was announced in July 1986, reducing the power of 
the regional governments in relation to rural policy and financial management. The 
Office for Regional Development and Lands was replaced by a State agency,276 the 
power of the High Commissioner was increased, and the Fabius–Pisani statute became 
peau de chagrin. The President disavowed the changes to land distribution: ‘Le système 
foncier actuel représente une offense grave à la dignité du peuple canaque.’ (Le Monde 
29 March 1988). Tjibaou suggested that Pons was not acting as a free agent (Fraser & 
Trotter 2005, p. 197) and that rather than calming an already strained situation he was 
                                                
276 The new statute replaced the Lands Office with Agence de développement rural et d’aménagement 
foncier (ADRAF), an agency that favoured the colonial barons as land was shuffled between members of 
the RCPR and Kanak with loyalist sympathies. This was met with reports of copinage and favoritisme. 
Claims by clans were treated with indifference by the head of the agency, Denis Milliard, former RPR 
Minister in the Ukeiwé Government: ‘La revendication clanique, c’est de la poudre à perlimpinpin 
juridique’. The sale of a Lafleur property absorbed 40% of the agency’s budget in the first year (Le 
Monde 12 September 1987b). 
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igniting a powder keg. Property was burnt, people were killed, street demonstrations 
were held and more gendarmes arrived.  
At the request of neighbouring Pacific Forum countries, New Caledonia was added to 
the United Nations list of countries to be decolonised. The UN in a damning report 
stated: ‘Bien sûr, il y eut des affrontements entre communautés mais c’est la situation 
d’apartheid que met le système français qui était dénoncé et rejeté par le peuple Kanak.’ 
(Nations Unies 2010). In the ensuing cycle of conflict, the Australian Consul-General in 
New Caledonia, John Dauth, was expelled for the alleged role which he had played in 
determining the UN decision (Canberra Times 11 January 1987, p. 1). Pons, however, 
continued his ‘slash and burn’ mission to clean up the ‘Caledonian mess’ before the 
1988 Presidential election. The attack by the CRS on a peaceful sit-in in the Place des 
Cocotiers in Noumea on 22 August 1987 was televised in France and Australia to 
outcries of indignation. In response, more ‘law and order’ reinforcements were sent to 
the Territory, swelling the number to 6500, and the level of nomadisation among the 
tribes was increased.277  
The decision made by the National Assembly in April 1987 to hold a referendum on 
self-determination met with the disapproval of the South Pacific Forum, the LKS, and 
the FLNKS and reopened the question of voting eligibility. At a demographic 
disadvantage, the FLNKS sought to restrict the vote to second generation inhabitants 
using a post-World War II precedent to support their claim. The return of Tende and la 
Brigue to France by the reconciliatory Paris Peace Treaty in 1947 secured for the 
French the strategic hydro-electricity plants and made future invasion by fascist Italy 
more difficult.278 This required the approval of those residents concerned.279 To ensure 
success, a hastily implemented law was introduced—‘sans discussions et voté en cinq 
minutes’ (Kajman 1987)—which restricted the vote to those born in the region and who 
were still living there,280 those not living in the Territory but with parents who were 
born there, and those who were able to prove that they had been living there before 28 
                                                
277 Nomadisation is defined as the circulation of small military units in areas where enemy are expected. 
278 This territory had previously been annexed to Italy by Napoleon III in 1860. 
279 According to Article 27 of the Constitution of 27 October 1946, ‘nulle cession, nul échange, nulle 
adjonction de territoire n’est valable sans le consentement des population intéressées’. 
280 This prevented those who had moved to Italy from voting against the terms of the ‘Peace Treaty’ and 
created organisations of profughi of the alpine regions ceded to France (Rainero 2001). 
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October 1922, the date when Mussolini came to power (Couttenier & Gastaud 2007, 
pp. 94-95). The result was a resounding success for the French.281 It was found that due 
to historic, political and constitutional differences between Liguria and New Caledonia, 
the French were unable to consent to a similar modification of the law for the Kanak. It 
was decided that the referendum on self-determination must be based on universal 
suffrage, equal for all and voluntary (Le Monde 4 December 1984). This only served to 
unleash further antagonism. 
The date of the referendum was finally announced without consulting the independence 
parties. This did not surprise Tjibaou who believed that the High Commissioner, Jean 
Montpezat, was being paid by the RPCR. Tjibaou refused to enter into discussion with 
Pons, ‘un ministre qui est le porte-parole de la droite locale’ (Le Monde 7 October 
1987). Among the loyalists, politics, customary divide and religion united to produce 
formidable foes, and these scissions were expected to advantage the loyalists. Against 
all odds the ‘falcons and doves,’ the old enemies of the independence family (Le Monde 
30 January 1987) became reconciled, and Naisseline gave his support to the FLNKS 
and agreed to boycott the next referendum. For Pons, there were to be no half 
measures—it was independence or nothing: ‘Il n’y a pas de moitié de l’indépendance, je 
ne vais pas reprendre à mon compte les manipulations intellectuelles de M. Pisani.’ (Le 
Monde 11 January 1987). Dialogue with the patently anti-independence Pons became 
impossible and the message which had been delivered by Chirac in Noumea on 29 
August 1986 for hope, tolerance and solidarity a chimera. 
Under the new administration, the indépendantistes were progressively stripped of the 
powers they had gained during the Pisani era. The Presidents of the Kanak-dominated 
aires, unable to obtain finance for basic public works, were forced to complain of 
misappropriated funds to the Prime Minister. In response, those aires were placed under 
permanent military surveillance. The application of such drastic psychological pressure 
belied Pons’ belief that the FLNKS were non-existent (JORF 5 June 1986, p. 1347). 
When a Le Monde journalist asked Pons whether this desire had become a reality in his 
mind, Pons replied: 
                                                
281 In the vote which took place on 12 October 1947, 91% voted for the disputed territories to become 
French (Le Monde 11 April 1987). 
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Je ne nie pas qu’il y ait un mouvement indépendantiste, je dis que sa 
représentativité me parait en baisse parce que j’ai rencontré des gens qui 
m’ont dit avoir voté jusqu’à présent pour le FLNKS et qu’ils ne le 
feraient plus maintenant. 
(Le Monde 20 February 1987). 
In an election a few months earlier the FLNKS had polled 35% of the vote.  
Pons was determined to establish order, but his strategy of applying a military solution 
to a complex problem led to further conflict.282 In the months before the referendum, 
antagonism increased between the indépendantiste movement, which had the support of 
the Protestant Church and the decolonised States of the South Pacific283, and the 
loyalists who were backed by the Government and local business. In May, the FLNKS 
organised a peaceful march for independence in their ‘occupied territory.’ The march 
was outlawed by Pons and Air Calédonie flights between the mainland and the Loyalty 
Islands were cancelled to prevent an influx of indépendantiste supporters. The march 
went ahead and was violently suppressed by loyalists and Government forces. The 
brutality of the suppression was captured by photojournalists and their publication led to 
public outcry. When peaceful protest countered violent repression, the right to rebellion 
was recognised: ‘When the Government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is, 
for the people and for each group of people, the most sacred of rights and the most 
indispensable of duties’.284 
By boycotting the referendum, the FLNKS, which had an overall abstention rate of 
40.89%, provided the RPCR with an overwhelming victory of 98.30%. The rate of 
abstention in the Kanak dominated Loyalty Islands rose to 75.08% (Reno, Fortier & 
Gold-Dalg 1987, p. 134; Lenormand 1991, p. 152).  
                                                
282 This was against the advice of M. Lemoine who recommended the delaying of the referendum in view 
of the ‘fragile’ state of the country, the inequality which was still marked, and the possibility of violence. 
The objective was, in his opinion, to maintain peace. Chirac, on the other hand, applauded Republican 
power and was unprepared to engage in constructive dialogue (Le Monde 21 January 1987). 
283 By this time all of the British Empire ‘east of Suez’ had been disbanded, despite Britain’s early belief 
that many of the micro and mini island States lacked the resources to become self-governing. 
284 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1793. Article 35 : ‘La convocation se fait, 
en ce cas, par la municipalité du lieu ordinaire du rassemblement’. <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-
france/constitution-du-24-juin-1793.5084.html>. [2 January 2016]. 
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The trial of the Hienghène assassins, France vs Kanak, and the 
prospect of reconciliation thwarted by ‘judicial process’ 
Conflict was never far from the surface. On the anniversary of the Hienghène massacre, 
loyalists in a violent rampage bombed and attacked the law courts in Noumea, the 
courts’ underground parking lot, the car of the leader of the Socialist Party of Kanaky, 
the Kanak cultural centre and the Lands Office. In the rubble of the law courts 
investigators found documents, ‘for the eyes of Gauzère’ (Gauzère had lost his sight 
after being hit by a CRS bullet), calling for the release of the Hienghène assassins in the 
name of ‘a secret army organisation for the defence of French New Caledonia’ (Filloux 
1985d).  
On 29 September 1986, the case against those responsible for the Hienghène ambush 
was heard before M. François Semur,285 who found that there was no case to answer: 
the state of anxiety of the accused was sufficient for the ambush to be ‘legitimate 
defence.’ To justify his findings Semur had ‘exhumed’ Line 2 of Article 329 of the 
Penal Code of 1810, which continued as law until 1994: ‘Si le fait a eu lieu en se 
défendant contre les auteurs de vols ou de pillages exécutés avec violence’ (Code Pénal 
1810). At the time of the trial, there were no Melanesian magistrates, and the 
application of the law in the colony was not representative of the justice in France: ‘La 
justice, dans la bonne tradition des antipodes, marche ici, la tête en bas.’ (Le Monde 11 
February 1988).286 
For all except the loyalists of the extreme right, the verdict was an embarrassment. All 
the indications were that the attack had been premeditated. The road was blocked by a 
felled tree, armed men were strategically placed, and the wounded were shot at close 
range in the presence of witnesses. M. Tubiana, the secretary of the Human Rights 
                                                
285 Semur had nothing against the FLNKS or the Melanesians; he was Christian, passionate about 
customary justice and frequently travelled to the ‘bush’ to effect reconciliation between Kanak and 
Caldoche. In February 1985, by means of custom, and the brandishing of l’épée de Damoclès he brought 
about the reconciliation of the Touaourou tribe, which had been accused of theft and burning property, 
and an old Caldoche, M. Cornaille. Prison was avoided, and for the Kanak, ‘la justice ait fait un pas vers 
eux’ with a ‘bougna (repas mélanésien traditionnel) de fraternisation’, and a ‘poignée de main entre le 
vieux caldoche barbu et le grand chef Albert Ouetcheo, et l’échange symbolique d’objets entre les deux 
hommes’ (Filloux 1985b). 
286 The Kanak and the indépendantistes had always denounced the justice coloniale à deux vitesses and 
this ruling confirmed that belief (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 62). 
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League for the DOM-TOM, was astounded, and with three other lawyers in France,287 
decided to enter an appeal to have the ‘no’ case annulled and M. Semur removed from 
any file concerning the Kanak. As retaliation, additional appeals were made to the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and to the European Court of Justice to 
pardon those indépendantiste sympathisers who had been imprisoned (Le Monde 6 
October 1985). In October 1987, the trial was brought before the Court of Assize in 
Noumea where the Attorney General, M. Lucazeau, recommended a jail sentence of 
nine years for Raoul Lapetite and Maurice Mitride, and seven years for Robert 
Sineiméné and Lapetite’s four sons. He found that the attack had been premeditated, 
there was no evidence that shots had been fired by the victims, and there was little room 
for improvisation. Before M. François Semur and a jury on which no Kanak were 
included (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 68), arguments in favour of the accused included 
‘psychological disarray in a climate of extreme tension’ when the gendarmerie was 
unable to ensure the security and protection of isolated farming communities:  
Quand l’ordre ne règne pas, quand tout est insécurité, on a le droit de se 
défendre soi-même […] cet état d’abandon résultait d’une intention 
délibérée des socialistes de laisser le champ libre au FLNKS.  
(Le Monde 30 October 1987). 
Having heard the case M. Tubiana agreed that the accused should be acquitted; to 
condemn them would be to legitimise the Kanak revolt (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 64). 
On 29 October 1987, the Hienghène assassins were acquitted. 
For the Kanak this was a travesty of justice, where politics had skewed the justice 
system. Small comfort was gained from the knowledge that nothing could now stop the 
Kanak (Le Monde 30 October 1987). In France many were equally perplexed by the 
judgment. Lionel Jospin, First Secretary of the Socialist Party opined: ‘un déni de 
justice […] C’est afficher le mépris du droit et peut-être, dans le contexte difficile de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie, une espèce de provocation politique.’ (Plenel & Rollat 1988, 
p. 67). The Communist League commented on the findings that ‘la justice de Chirac 
ressemble à celle des républiques bananières’ (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 67) and for the 
Communist Party, Pierre Juquin declared that the judgement ‘bafoue les lois de la 
morale et de la République’ (Plenel & Rollat 1988, pp. 66-67).  
                                                
287 MM. Tubiana, Roux, Ottan and Felice (Le Monde 6 October 1986).  
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The pastor at Montravel, Anjapunja, described the Kanak as being confused by the 
decision which allowed Kanak to be killed with no right of defence. The subtleties of 
Article 329, Line 8 which allowed the judgement non-lieu remained a mystery (Le 
Monde 11 February 1988).  
This was a bitter blow for the Kanak, leaving them with no recourse to justice and little 
possibility of countering Western hegemony other than by resorting to violent conflict. 
In the words of Tjibaou: 
Cela veut dire qu’on peut abattre comme des chiens […] Il n’y aura pas 
de justice pour les Kanak tant qu’il n’y a à se faire qu’avec les coups de 
fusil. Il faut que le peuple Kanak, maintenant, prenne ses dispositions. 
(Plenel & Rollat 1988, pp. 62-63). 
The release of the assassins strengthened the resolve of the FLNKS to stop the planned 
Territorial elections. Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, number two of the FLNKS declared the defeat 
of their strategy of non-violence: 
La stratégie de non-violence que nous avons suivie avant le référendum 
du 13 septembre n’a pas tout à fait été compris par le peuple kanak 
qu’elle a un peu démobilisé. Elle a été interprétée comme une faiblesse. 
Maintenant nous avons décidé de ne pas laisser se dérouler les nouvelles 
élections régionales annoncées par le gouvernement. Il ne s’agit pas de 
se lancer dans le même mouvement que 1984, mais le jour de scrutin 
nous serons là pour empêcher ces élections. 
(Picard 2010, p. 32). 
The time for reconciliation in the Tiendanite valley had passed. Ancient tribal lands 
were reclaimed by the Kanak. The jubilation of the white population was short-lived. 
The broussards had lost their land but the white residents of Hienghène had lost 
everything and found themselves refugees in Noumea. The Lapetites sought refuge in 
their old hunting grounds in the mountains behind Hienghène and it was there, six 
months to the day after the decision of the Court of Assize, that José Lapetite was killed 
(Duroy 1988, pp. 319-320). The case continued in 1989 when the masterminds of the 
massacre sued Lionel Duroy for use of the word ‘assassin’ in his book Hienghène: le 
désespoir calédonien. The claim for compensation was 3,500,000 francs (Le Monde 
19 May 1989); the wives and children of the assassinated claimed nothing. 
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Conflict and a theory of conspiracy 
The ‘victims of history,’ poor whites and métis were most commonly loyalists, they had 
struggled for generations to eke out a living from the land, battling cyclones, 
grasshoppers and Kanak. They were now fighting to retain their land and for a 
legitimate place in the future of New Caledonia. The assault on the road to Tiendanite 
was believed to be part of a carefully orchestrated ambush originating, not in the 
Tiendanite valley, but in the métropole under the code name of Plan d’Araignée. The 
plan was purported to have been hatched to eliminate the charismatic leader of the 
indépendantiste movement, Jean-Marie Tjibaou. In letters written from prison, Guy 
Dijou,288 a right-wing extremist and a commando in the Organisation de l’armée 
secrète, posed the following questions relative to the attack: who put the plan into 
action, who executed it, why were phone calls made to the High Commissioner and 
Franck Wahuzue (RPCR) from the Hienghène Post Office on the night of the attack? 
Raoul Lapetite (UC) was a métis with Kanak blood of the Bourate lineage in his veins. 
Jean-Marie’s mother was also a Bourate (Waddell 2008, p. 41), and the two families 
were inextricably bound by native custom, while property was protected and sacrosanct. 
Central to Dijou’s enquiry was the need to discover who set fire to houses that were 
protected by custom: ‘qui a mis le feu dans une de ces maisons « couvertes » par la 
coutume acceptée, déclenchant de la part des familles […] une réaction extrêmement 
violente qui devait faire dix morts par contrecoups.’ (Le Monde 20 April 1996). It was 
this denigration of custom that led to the assault. At the last minute, the target, 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, had changed his plan to return to Tiendanite with the others. This 
overall context with multiple ‘victims of history’ highlights yet again the lost 
opportunities for reconciliation that line the history of New Caledonia. 
Conclusion: Chapter 4 
The conflict that tore France apart in 1968 was a pivotal moment for the young Kanak 
students in France as they became aware of the power of protest. In what appeared to be 
                                                
288 Guy Dijou was a proactive loyalist. His field of action was not against the Kanak or Kanak property 
but that of non-Kanak FLNKS sympathisers. Property destroyed included the Law Courts (twice) to 
liberate those responsible for the Hienghène massacre, the Lands Office (twice), an institution that 
prevented Caldoches from buying and selling land acquired legally, and the Taxation Office, which paid 
malingerers who worked only when they wished. The garage of André Dang was also targeted. 
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a David and Goliath contest of student versus government, the student voice was heard. 
On the global scene, the voice of black protest was making its mark; this was 
consolidated by the writings of Fanon and Césaire and had a profound influence on the 
Kanak students at the time. There was also an awareness, appreciation and re-evaluation 
of native custom which for over a century had been ignored or denigrated. On their 
return to New Caledonia, the claims of student-led political groups met with stiff and 
often sanguinary opposition from the ruling plutocracy. With each change of 
government in France, new statutes, which provided and withdrew Territorial 
autonomy, came into being in what became known as the valse des statuts. In general, 
the statutes were conceived to alleviate the tension in the Territory but the depth of the 
separation of the antagonists was under-estimated in France and conflict became 
increasingly violent. All attempts to find a common ground whereby the process of 
reconciliation might be achieved failed. The Hienghène massacre in 1984 was a 
particularly gruesome instance of political and social tension that set the scene for a 
more general escalation of violent conflict across New Caledonia. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Conflict, Tragedy and Reconciliation: 
the Événements and Beyond 
Confident that the question of self-determination had been settled by the 1987 
referendum,289 the Chirac Government engaged in some creative restructuring of the 
Territorial institutions, and replaced the Fabius–Pisani statute of the Socialist 
Government with a statute of the new Minister responsible for the DOM-TOM, Bernard 
Pons. This statute transferred some power to the regions and communes, but the lion’s 
share, including the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural, 
biological and non-biological resources was retained by the State. As a concession to 
the Kanak, provision was made for the establishment of a Customary Assembly,290 
which was to play a consultative role in Kanak affairs, and a Caledonian Cultural Office 
to promote cultural pluralism. The ‘sting’, however, was in the realignment of electoral 
boundaries on a longitudinal east-west axis, which disadvantaged and antagonised the 
already disgruntled indépendantistes. Just as the Fabius–Pisani north-south division had 
favoured the nationalists, the Pons redistribution provided the loyalists with an electoral 
advantage and a possible majority in two of the four divisions. 
Further exasperation was caused for the Kanak when the request to limit the electoral 
roll to long-term inhabitants was refused by Chirac who believed that such a move 
would lead to minority rule: ‘une minorité, une petite minorité dans la République, 
imposer sa loi’ (Le Monde 24 April 1988d). 
In the opinion of the indépendantistes, the new statute represented a return to the 
economic slavery of colonialism and ‘la négation du peuple Canaque’ (Le Monde 8 
April 1988). The expectation in France that the new law would suppress Kanak activism 
                                                
289 This confidence was misplaced. Lionel Jospin, First Secretary of the Socialist Party, was surprised that 
the Chirac Government ignored the abstention rate. He was also critical of a statute that was seen to be a 
return to the colonial period with all of its aggression and political pressure. On the other hand, 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou had realised that for the Kanak to vote would be to commit cultural genocide (Le 
Monde 12 September 1987a). 
290 Article 4: ‘L’assemblée coutumière regroupe les représentants de la coutume de l’ensemble des aires 
culturelles de la Nouvelle-Calédonie: Hoot Waap, Paci Camuki, Ajie Aro, Tei Araju, Dumbea Kapone, 
Nengone, Drehu, Iaai et Faga-Uvea.’ 
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and lead to peace and reconciliation was a gross miscalculation. In reality, tension 
increased and the FLNKS’ resolve was for greater militancy and conflict. Peaceful 
protest had failed, and in the lead-up to the 1988 Presidential election, the situation 
became more conflictual. As violence escalated, press reports became increasingly 
critical of the administration, and Pons reacted by bringing in more troops.291 For a 
population of 60,000 there were now up to 12,000 ‘men in arms’ on the island (Fraser & 
Trotter 2005, p. 276.) In this hostile environment, and with mounting RPCR pressure, it 
was decided that the first Territorial election under the new statute would be held on the 
same day as the first round of the French Presidential election. This defied French 
law292 and was a new source of provocation for the FLNKS.293 
Division within the community ran deep; opinion was polarised, entrenched, and 
intransigent. The indépendantiste ÉÉNCIL was concerned that the ‘national 
consciousness’ of the Kanak294 was being demolished by continual marginalisation, and 
that violence was being condoned as a final solution. This sentiment was shared by 
Catholic priests working among the Kanak who, while remaining apolitical, were 
unable to disregard race-related prejudice, the denial of justice, and increased military 
nomadisation.295 On the other hand, the anti-independence RPR Minister, Maurice 
Nenou-Pwataho, argued in the National Assembly that the root of the Caledonian 
problem was the employment by the previous socialist Government of pro-separatists, 
who needed to be replaced as a matter of urgency: ‘faites vite. Ne laissez pas 
développer et la haine, et le racisme, et l’anti-France’ (JORF 9 July 1986, p. 2968). 
Pons remained anchored in his opposition to Kanak nationalism; he believed in the 
existence of a single community in the Territory—and that was French. This belief also 
absolved him from the electoral reform required by the FLNKS. Pons refused to 
                                                
291 Tjibaou recounts the words of an Algerian FLN director: ‘Les Français n’ont pas de parole ; ils ne 
connaissent que les rapports de forces’. (Le Monde 28 April 1988). 
292In France, by law, the cantonal and Presidential elections were held separately, and by combining the 
two, Pons had effectively dissociated New Caledonia from French law (Le Monde 28 January 1988). This 
also allowed the RPCR to benefit from the new electoral boundaries that could be altered with a change 
of Government in France. 
293 The decision confounded Lemoine, who predicted a FLNKS boycott of the double election and 
resultant conflict (Le Monde 6 March 1988). 
294 ‘National consciousness, […] the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole 
people […] which in adverse circumstances may become an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of 
what it might have been.’ (Fanon 1963, p. 119). 
295 This put them at odds with the Archbishop in Noumea who, with a largely white loyalist congregation, 
kept religion and politics separated. 
 171 
recognise cultural difference. Kanak identity and ‘Kanakitude’ was, he argued, a 
post-colonial invention. In pre-colonial times, disparate warring tribes had been 
geographically and linguistically divided. This attitude exacerbated political tension and 
encouraged Kanak militancy and distrust of the integrity of the French State (Le Monde 
9 September 1987). The referendum on 13 September 1987 had failed to solve any of 
the Territory’s problems and serious political dialogue, mediation and reconciliation 
between the two communities was still impossible. The political aspirations of the 
FLNKS had not diminished, and solutions were now being sought beyond the confines 
of French institutions. Despite the warning ‘il faut cesser d’humilier les dirigeants 
canaques’ (Le Monde 6 March 1988), it appeared that the course was set and that 
violent conflict would prevail. 
On 16 March, during a twenty-four hour visit to the Territory, Bernard Pons cautioned 
against any activity that might disrupt the forthcoming elections. The High 
Commissioner, Clément Bouhin, the military, and specialists of the gendarmerie were 
all on alert: 
Tous les scénarios et toutes les hypothèses furent envisagés […]. Nous 
avons arrêté toutes les dispositions permettant de donner aux forces de 
l’ordre les moyens de rapidité d’intervention pour neutraliser 
immédiatement toutes les menaces à l’ordre public, où qu’elles puissent 
se développer. 
(Le Monde 17 March 1988). 
In April 1988, New Caledonia was a tinderbox. The Kanak had been fighting for 
independence for thirty years and the FLNKS, spurred to action by the Pons Statute, 
decided to boycott the territorial election. PALIKA and the Union progressiste 
mélanésienne (UPM), although reticent, joined forces with the UC, while the Front Uni 
de Libération Kanak (FULK), generally noted for its militancy, decided against the 
boycott. This was perhaps in retaliation for the expulsion of Yann Céléné Uregeï, the 
FULK leader, from the provisional government of Kanaky due to his Libyan connection 
(Le Monde 24 April 1988a).  
Rancour was sparked when it was announced that police and gendarme numbers would 
double for the election. Sixteen squadrons of gendarmes and twelve CRS companies 
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swelled the law enforcement numbers to almost 7000, and to this was to be added a 
garrison of 2000 backup forces (Henningham 1992, p. 103).296 Coercion and the use of 
force were the key elements used by Pons to promote his political interests, to eliminate 
any major challenge and to manage possible conflict. In this he had miscalculated 
Kanak fortitude. Systematically maligned, and discriminated against by a tarnished 
legal system, the FLNKS decided to draw attention to the situation by the non-violent 
occupation of the gendarmerie at Fayaoué on Ouvéa.297 Scheduled for the eve of the 
second round of the Presidential election, this followed similar ‘sit-ins’ in Poindimié 
and Thio. In the uneasy pre-election political climate one of the gendarmes, when 
confronted by armed and menacing Kanak, drew his pistol (Michaud 2011). In the 
mêlée, shots were fired and four gendarmes were killed. The Melanesians panicked and 
fled, taking 27 gendarmes hostage. One group headed south, the other north. The 
southern group was soon released, and Robert Kapoeri, the leader of the hostage-takers, 
was arrested and gaoled. According to one of the hostages, Jean-Paul Lacroix, the 
Kanak were untrained, unprepared and unable to use the firearms taken from the 
gendarmerie. They were simple citizens caught in an adventure that had gone horribly 
wrong. The northern group sought refuge in a sacred cave five kilometres from 
Gossanah298 in the north of the island.  
The battle for political supremacy was at its height in France and decisive action on the 
Ouvéa crisis provided an opportunity for political kudos. Jacques Chirac, who was 
attempting to oust François Mitterrand in the Presidential election, was trailing the 
incumbent after the first round. Buoyed by the successful release of French hostages in 
the Lebanon, this new drama presented a ‘page one’ opportunity for Chirac.299 To have 
                                                
296 This figure is substantially less than the 12,000 quoted by Tjibaou. 
297 As Father François-Xavier de Viviès explained in a letter dated 26 April 1988: ‘Quand le pouvoir 
utilise toutes les ficelles, toutes les arguties, tous les chantages pour fermer les portes de l’avenir au 
people colonisé, quand, à travers les projets annoncés, il n’y a plus aucune lueur d’espérance, celui-ci n’a 
plus le choix : il ne lui reste que la pression pour essayer de se faire entendre.’ (Cited in Legorjus 2011, 
p. 125). The organisers of the assault were Yeiwéné Yeiwéné and Franck Wahuzue, two FLNKS leaders 
(Legorjus 2011, p. 134). A similar operation to that planned in Ouvéa had already taken place in the 
Poindimié gendarmerie without incident. 
298 I have chosen to use the spelling Gossanah, after Hossanah as the Israelites returned to the promised 
land, but other spellings include Goosana (the original spelling), Gossanay (Françoise Ozanne-Rivierre), 
Gosanah (Jean Guiart), Gossen/Gosen (Protestant Bible), Goshen (Catholic Bible) (Mwà Véé 1999, 
p. 39). 
299 In 2005, Jean-Charles Marchiani, who had engineered the release of the Lebanon hostages with 
Jacques Chirac and Charles Pasqua, was on trial for allegedly receiving kickbacks from military 
contractors (Sydney Morning Herald 7 October 2005). 
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French gendarmes held hostage, and unable to be located on French territory (Michalski 
2004, p. 118) was intolerable for Chirac who raged at the ‘savagery and the barbarity’ 
of the FLNKS. He accused the socialist government of 1981-1986 of aiding and 
abetting the action (Le Monde 24 April 1988d) and suggested that ‘interlocuteurs 
privilégiés et uniques’ of the President were supporting the terrorists (Le Monde 24 
April 1988c). As head of Government, Chirac authorised Pons, the Minister of Overseas 
Territories, to set the course of action for the release of the hostages and the arrest of the 
assassins.300  
As the situation deteriorated, Pons isolated the island, cut communication links, and 
banned the press (Le Monde 28 April 1988). Crack troops were flown in: the GIGN, the 
Marine Fusiliers, Commando Hubert, EPIGN and the commandos of the IIe Choc301 in 
a political ploy to demonstrate the firmness and strength of action of Chirac as opposed 
to the portrayed procrastination of his adversary, Mitterrand (Le Monde 3 May 
1988a).302 Despite the possibility of dramatising an already difficult situation, General 
Vidal, Chief of Armed Forces in New Caledonia, and Clément Bouhin, the High 
Commissioner, agreed to deploy the army and the judicial police to find and free the 
hostages (Vidal 2010, p. 44). This replacement of gendarmes by Armed Forces of the 
third category303 transformed what was ostensibly a regular police exercise into 
full-blown civil war (Le Monde 24 May 1988). 
This decision, although legal,304 was controversial,305 as no state of emergency or state 
of siege had been announced. The risk of involving the army in the maintenance of 
                                                
300 Article 15 of the French constitution states that the president is the Commander in Chief of the armed 
services. Article 21 states that the Prime Minister is responsible for national defence and the regulation of 
civil and military posts.  
301 GIGN: Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale; Commando Hubert: the ‘supermen’ of 
the marines; EPIGN: Escadron parachutiste d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale; 11e Choc: the 
spearhead group of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE). 
302 The macrocephalic command of multicephalic forces led to confusion as each force had its own 
method of operation. Command and counter-command reduced the efficiency of a military operation 
which traditionally worked on the principle of ‘un chef, une mission’. 
303 Article 19-22 of the Instruction inter-ministérielle 20 July 1970 lists the three categories of armed 
forces employed to maintain order and their areas of activity: (i) departmental gendarmerie; (ii) mobile 
gendarmerie; (iii) air, sea and land army. 
304 Cedric Michalski found justification for the action by referring to Article 20 of the Constitution of 
20 June 1958, which defined the requisitions. The first enabled the army to engage the necessary troops to 
maintain public order, to liberate those illegally held, and to arrest the perpetrators of the crime. The 
second approved the use of arms (Michalski 2004, pp. 111-146).  
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public order306 was questioned by Jean-Marc Berlière, Professor of History at the 
University of Bourgogne:  
L’armée ne fait plus de maintien de l’ordre en France depuis 1914. Avec 
[…] les policiers en uniformes, les gendarmes mobiles et les compagnies 
républicaines de sécurité (CRS) créées en décembre 1944, le pouvoir 
exécutif dispose aujourd’hui d’un instrument à trois claviers en cas de 
trouble à l’ordre public. 
(Béguin 2013) 
Conflict in New Caledonia had been brought onto central stage, Chirac wanted a quick 
fix, Ouvéa was declared a war zone, and the decision was made to launch Opération 
Victor (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 126) The decision to employ the army and gendarmes 
in a single operation was an enigma: the army was trained in violent retaliation and the 
GIGN in mediation and reconciliation. This ideological incompatibility led to confusion 
and disillusionment (Legorjus 1990, p. 272). Among the forces of order there was a 
total ignorance of customary knowledge: ‘personne ne nous a expliqué le contexte 
coutumier. Ça a été une véritable erreur car la coutume est au centre de tout’. (Bérard 
2010). 
The Pons plan of action was criticised for its weakness, insensitivity (Le Monde 29 
April 1988a) and failure to find a negotiated solution (Le Monde 29 April 1988b). Pons 
was intransigent in his attitude towards the Kanak. As Minister of DOM-TOM he made 
no allowance for cultural difference and by resorting to violent repression he had 
expected that Kanak submission would result in cultural and ethnic fusion within the 
French ‘melting pot’. This approach, embedded in a Western conceptual framework, 
dictated the action taken on Ouvéa as politicians sought to fulfil political interests, the 
army fought to uphold its honour, and gendarmes battled to exact vengeance for the 
deaths of their colleagues and for the humiliation they had suffered as the result of the 
Kanak occupation of the gendarmeries at Canala, Poindimié and Thio. As Yeiwéné 
Yeiwéné, number two in the FLNKS, explained: ‘il faut comprendre que nous sommes 
                                                                                                                                          
305 The law of 14 December 1791 states: ‘Aucun corps ou détachement de troupes de ligne ne peut agir 
dans l’intérieur du royaume sans une réquisition légale.’ (Le Monde 24 May 1988). 
306 The gendarmes favoured dialogue and conciliation, while army solutions were generally more 
sanguinary. 
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humiliés par la politique de M. Pons et que nous sommes traités avec mépris’ (Le 
Monde 1 May 1988). 
In the operation to locate the prisoners, men, women and children of the Gossanah tribe 
were rounded up at gunpoint and interrogated (Plenel & Rollat 1988, pp. 96-97). 
Djubelli Wéa, a Protestant minister and charismatic chief of the tribe, despite being 
incapacitated with malaria, was handcuffed to a coconut palm, questioned and tortured. 
He was bluntly told by General Vidal: ‘La France déclare la guerre aux Canaques.’ (Le 
Monde 21 June 1988). The Mayor of Ouvéa, Hosséa Ohwane, who was in France on the 
day of the hostage taking, was also arrested (Le Monde 26 April 1988). 
In a replay of the strategies employed by the army during the 1878 rebellion, advantage 
was taken of the ancient tribal rivalries between the Gossanah tribe of High Chief 
Imwone and the Weneki tribe of High Chief Bazit. Antonin Filimoehana of the Catholic 
RPCR Weneki tribe collaborated with the French Army,307 while the Gossanah tribe 
supported the hostage takers with daily supplies of food and drink. Negotiations 
between Alphonse Dianou, the leader of the hostage takers, Patrick Destremau, an 
officer of the Régiment d'infanterie de marine du Pacifique (Marine Infantry Regiment) 
and Filimoehana failed. Filimoehana was denounced as a traitor and Destremau was 
taken prisoner. It was only by the grace of the sacred land of the grotto that 
Filimoehana’s life was saved: ‘On ne tue pas un Canaque sur la terre de ses ancêtres.’ 
(Picard 2010, p. 123).  
In an attempt to negotiate a reconciliation, Jean Bianconi, a lawyer from the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office,308 Legorjus and five GIGN members were also captured. This 
increased the possibility of violent conflict, further endangered the lives of the hostages 
and was considered an error of judgement by GIGN Captain Barril: ‘il a réussi ce que 
                                                
307 The Weneki tribe of High Chief Bazit was of Wallisian descent, Catholic, loyalist and Faga-Uvea 
speaking. The hostage takers were also Catholic, and Alphonse Dianou had studied to become a priest. 
Because of this connection to the Church, Archbishop Calvert of Noumea was solicited to make a 
goodwill mission to the cave. However, on Ouvéa, radio communication failed and the priest was able 
only to send a message to the group (Le Monde 3 May 1988b). 
308 Bianconi came from Noumea to negotiate with the hostage takers. On Grande Terre, he was known 
for his pro-Melanesian sympathies and it was expected that his reputation would be known on Ouvéa, but 
this was not the case; his standing on Ouvéa had been miscalculated. Fearing for Bianconi’s safety, 
Legorjus, chief of the GIGN, with GIGN members accompanied him to the grotto. 
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nous avions toujours su éviter: faire prendre des gendarmes en otages’.309 As members 
of the group responsible for the assassin of the Kanak hero of the independence 
movement, Eloi Machoro, the GIGN were at particular risk, especially Jean-Pierre 
Picon who had directed the operation in 1985. It had been a strange choice for the 
GIGN command to send Picon on this mission. 
According to Vidal, Legorjus decided to capitalise on the tension existing between the 
President and the Prime Minister by appealing to the President who was known to 
favour reconciliation.310 Mitterrand was sympathetic to the FLNKS claims and 
nominated a mediator.311 Notice of the appointment was sent to the Prime Minister but 
there was no response, and no contact was made with Dianou (Picard 2010, p. 188). 
Appeals to the FLNKS leaders were ignored (Picard 2010, p. 188), and the plan for a 
military attack on the cave was being pushed by Pons.312 In a climate of polarisation all 
possible sources of reconciliation had dried up.  
Dianou was anxious to find an honourable and safe way out of the crisis but not until 
after the 8 May elections. He was not the fou de Dieu trained in Libya as Pons had 
suggested, but a former seminarian, an advocate of non-violence who, after training in 
Suva, worked with Kanak youth, encouraging them in sporting activities and 
discouraging their use of drugs and alcohol (Le Monde 13 May 1988). Dianou and the 
FLNKS had not envisaged the loss of life of the hostages and warned the French 
Government: 
Le FLNKS a toujours garanti la vie des détenus tant que le 
gouvernement dispose à trouver une issue pacifique à l’affaire d’Ouvéa. 
Dans le cas contraire, tout peut arriver et le gouvernement français 
                                                
309 <http://www.tour-de-nouvelle-caledonie-2010.com/Images/commentaire-kasovitch.pdf>. [20 February 
2016]. [Originally available at <http://www.gazetteinfo.fr/2011/11/23/jean-bianconi-veut-en-finir-avec>.] 
310 It has been suggested that it was due to his relationship with Christian Prouteau, Mitterrand’s technical 
advisor, that Legorjus was able to gain the confidence of the hostage takers, gain press coverage and 
generally be considered as the chief of the ‘victor’ mission. Legorjus had also been in charge of security 
for High Commissioner Pisani (Le Monde 14 May 1988).  
311 Franck Wahuzue had changed his political affiliation from RPCR to FLNKS. 
312 Dianou sought the help of Yeiwéné Yeiwéné and Frank Wahuzue, the men who had planned the 
attack, to release the hostages, to remove the armed forces from Ouvéa, to cancel the regional elections 
on 24 April 1988, and to have the President select a mediator to discuss a referendum on 
self-determination (Le Monde 24 April 1988b). When Pons discovered that Legorjus had ignored protocol 
and made direct contact with l’Elysée he warned Legorjus against further political involvement (Picard 
2010, p. 188).  
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prendrait la lourde responsabilité de mettre directement en péril la vie 
des détenus.  
(Le Monde 5 May 1988). 
This was ignored by Pons (Le Monde 21 May 1988a) and the military, police, GIGN 
and EPIGN gathered in Noumea to flesh out the details of an attack. 
For Legorjus, Ouvéa was a maelstrom of conflict. He was at odds with Dianou for 
failing to secure a solution, with Pons for having interfered in politics, with Vidal due to 
opposed ideologies, and even with other GIGN members for having allowed his men to 
be taken hostage. Despite his considerable effort, he had been unable to influence the 
course of events (Legorjus 2011, p. 19). Physically and mentally exhausted, Legorjus 
was of the opinion that, given time, mediation was possible. The politicians, on the 
other hand, had competing interests and logics. They had a deadline and were obsessed 
with the idea of obtaining a resolution before the Presidential election. On 5 May 1988, 
Chirac, with the approval of the President, gave the green light for Operation Victor to 
go ahead. Seventy-five men were engaged in total warfare. 
The attack was two-pronged. Four hours and forty minutes separated the attacks, and 
this would have provided adequate time for the hostages to be assassinated if that had 
been the plan. The Kanak, ‘savage barbarians’ as Chirac would have the world believe, 
made no attempt on the lives of their captives, and all escaped without injury. The 
resulting death toll of 19 Melanesians and two of the 11e Choc led to a rapid 
backpedalling by the politicians, army and gendarmes. Mitterrand who, as the 
constitutional Chief of the Army, was ultimately responsible for the action taken, 
declared his preference for conciliation and mediation rather than a military solution.313 
At the outset of military intervention, when Mitterrand had sought written estimates of 
the cost in terms of human life from General Vidal, the reply had been immediate: ‘Au 
mieux 2 tués, 10 blessés, au pire 10 tués 20 blessés dont environ la moitié dans le 
commando et la moitié chez les otages’ (Vidal 2010, p. 96). Pons disputed the upper 
estimate (Le Monde 6 May 1988b). Mitterrand maintained that he had not given 
                                                
313 Mitterrand denounced the politique du bulldozer and emphasised that ‘les communautés ethniques qui 
vivent en Nouvelle-Calédonie ont le droit de vivre en paix dans le respect mutuel’. He also expressed a 
desire for France to remain in the South Pacific and considered how this could be best achieved (Le 
Monde 6 May 1988b). 
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approval for military action when he had been informed of the likely cost in terms of 
human life and he questioned the sequence of events (Le Monde 7 May 1988).  
For Chirac there were no recriminations; the operation was a success, all who had been 
involved were congratulated (Le Monde 7 May 1988), and the engagement of the 
military against those who had flouted the ‘values of our civilised country’ was 
justified. In this political wager, Naisseline held Pons and Chirac responsible: ‘Ils ont 
préféré échanger du sang kanak contre des bulletins de vote des amis de M. Le Pen.’ (Le 
Monde 10 May 1988a).314 In the opinion of the FLNKS leaders, hostage lives had never 
been in danger. The exercise was to highlight the Kanak demand for independence and 
the draconian measures of Pons’ military intervention.315 
After the release of the hostages the conflict continued. Of the nineteen Kanak killed, 
the deaths of at least three were suspicious. According to witnesses, Alphonse Dianou 
and Samuel Wamo were killed after being wounded, and another two other unarmed 
Kanak after surrendering Le Monde 10 May 1988b). The accusations of murder were 
taken up by the press, the League of Human Rights, and a quartet of lawyers, Felice, 
Ottan, Roux and Tubiana. The voices of Kanak witnesses, which had seemed 
inadequate when confronted with the power of the French State, benefited from the 
addition of these new participants. In the course of further enquiry, the veracity of the 
official version of Operation Victor was contested.316 
The deaths, claimed to be corvées de bois,317 of Alphonse Dianou, Wenceslas Lavelloi, 
Samuel Wamo, and a simple tea-bearer, Amossa Waina, when aired publicly were 
further investigated.318 It was found that Dianou, who had been shot in the knee, was 
treated on site by a medical officer of the 11e Choc (Le Monde 26 May 1988b). When 
he arrived at the airport at Ouloup his compression bandage and perfusion line had 
disappeared, his face was contused, and he was dead. The autopsy on 11 June found 
                                                
314 The ÉÉNCIL believed that ‘la politique du gouvernement français y a trouvé un intérêt électoraliste’. 
315 Pons considered that the affair implicated the honour of France. It was noted, however, that the honour 
of France would have been better served by treating the Kanak with less cynicism (Le Monde 6 May 
1988a). 
316 Photos of Paris-Match photojournalist, Charles Villeneuve, published on 27 May 1988 discredited the 
official version.  
317 Summary executions during the Algerian War were called corvées de bois by French soldiers. 
318 Four gendarmes had been killed in the gendarmerie. The suspicion that there was foul play in the 
killing of Dianou, Lavelloi, Wamo and Waino suggests an eye for an eye and the law of retaliation. 
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‘des lésions thoraciques au niveau du sternum’. This confirmed witness reports that he 
had received a barrage of blows from combat boots and rifle butts (Picard 2010, p. 231). 
The report was at odds with that of the army which found death by infarction, ‘une 
phlébite, en somme’.  
Samuel Wamo was initially wounded by a single bullet, for which he received medical 
treatment. When he was autopsied, seven bullet wounds were found (Michalski 2004, 
p. 206). Waina Amossa, an 18-year old tea-bearer from Gossanah, and Wenceslas 
Lavelloi were shot when unarmed. Lavelloi’s GIGN assassin informed his confrères: ‘le 
tour de Lavelloi est fini, au suivant’ (Le Monde 10 May 1988b).  
When the scope of the violence was realised (Le Nouvel Observateur 27 May 1988, 
pp. 46-47), two enquiries were opened: one relating to Alphonse Dianou and the ‘lack 
of assistance to a person in danger’ and the second into ‘voluntary manslaughter’ and 
‘deliberate assault’ after surrender.319 The Public Prosecutor of the Republic travelled to 
Ouvéa to interview the tea-bearers (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 172) and the judicial police 
in Paris simultaneously interviewed the thirty indépendantistes who had been 
imprisoned in France. When the accusations were verified, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Defence were drawn into the vortex of New Caledonian conflict. 
André Giraud, Minister of Defence in the Chirac government, denounced the press for 
its monstrous insinuations and for ‘defaming the army.’ The new Socialist Minister for 
Defence, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, however, ordered an enquiry into the ‘Ouvéa 
Affair.’ In his opinion, not all channels of mediation had been exhausted: a letter from 
Pons on 29 April indicated that Legorjus had been prohibited from returning to the 
grotto for further negotiations which may have led to a less sanguinary solution. The 
request by Dianou for Frank Wahuzue to mediate had also been refused (Le Monde 22 
May 1988). The Minister also ordered the exhumation of the bodies of Dianou, Lavelloi 
and Amossa for autopsy. The post-mortem findings were damning.320 The report to the 
                                                
319 According to Jean Guiart (1997, p. 87), what Dianou could have revealed in court ‘could have been 
dangerous to the leaders of both the Union Calédonienne and RPCR, so there could be no court case. The 
Government in Paris and the leaders of both the independence and anti-independence movements were 
here in full agreement. Dianou, captured, could have survived. His death was in answer to the same 
orders that cost Eloi Machoro’s life on 13 January 1985. They came from very high up and had to be 
obeyed.’ 
320 The officer of the mobile gendarmes responsible for the evacuation was suspended from duty (Le 
Monde 23 July 1988). 
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Ministry of Defence from the two generals found that ‘des actes contraires à l’honneur 
militaire’ and ‘des négligences’ had been committed (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 173). 
In the spring of 1988, torture, summary execution and lack of assistance to a person in 
danger had replaced liberty, equality, and fraternity on Ouvéa, a small French island in 
the Pacific. In the words of Bênoit Tangopi, one of the hostage takers, ‘dans cette 
affaire, on est tous victimes, eux aussi les autres… on est tous victimes des politiques’ 
(Le Nouvel Observateur 9 May 2008). Amid accusations and denials, careers were 
destroyed, honour lost, and reconciliation seemed inconceivable. 
Although Guiart (1997, p. 88) notes, ‘there has never been any co-ordination between 
Kanak acts of resistance’, in 1988 on Ouvéa decisions were made in haste and everyone 
was affected. Thirty-three Kanak were arrested and, without trial, incarcerated in France 
with nothing other than the clothes they were wearing. Medical examinations authorised 
by judge Jean-Louis Mazières found that chains had left several prisoners with deep 
wounds to the feet and hands. Other injuries resulting from tortures à la française 
included haematomas of the eye, a contused lip that needed stitching, a broken nose, 
infected wounds and internal injuries (Le Monde 8 August 1988).321 The suffering and 
horror of the conflict surpassed Kanak comprehension. Although conflict was innate in 
traditional life (see Chapter 1), violence of this extent was not. The survival of 
indigenous communities depended upon customary order in warfare and a massacre of 
this dimension would have a significant bearing on future events. 
The prisoners included Djubelli Wéa, an innocent bystander who had offered to act as a 
mediator provided that Kanak political claims were heard.322 His offer was rejected by 
Vidal; in this war there was no room for negotiation. The FLNKS lawyers filed a 
complaint of ‘violence and assault’ for those incarcerated in France, and for theft, 
intimidation and violent interrogation at the hands of the military, for those who had 
suffered in Gossanah (Le Monde 7 July 1988).323 
                                                
321 ‘See also Plenel & Rollat (1988, pp. 93-117).  
322 Djubelli Wéa had wanted to participate in the Matignon negotiations on behalf of the Ouvéa comité de 
lutte and the other prisoners; instead he returned to Gossanah where an uncle had died: ‘depuis les 
événements, expliquaient-ils, nos vieux se laissent mourir de chagrin’ (Le Monde 21 June 1988). 
323 The complaint was referred to the Minister for Defence in accordance with article 687 of Penal Code, 
‘lorsqu’un officier de police est susceptible d’être inculpé ou d’un délit’. See also Plenel & Rollat (1988, 
pp. 93-117). 
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Conflict on Ouvéa led to protest on the streets of Paris. Nearly ten thousand protesters 
rallied to claim independence for New Caledonia and to question the newly re-elected 
President’s role in the Ouvéa butchery. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, historian at the École des 
hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), blamed not only the army for the atrocities 
of war but also the politicians who had authorised it: ‘Si cet assaut criminel a été lancé 
pour des raisons électorales, il faudra alors faire passer Bernard Pons devant la Haute 
Cour de Justice, elle est faite pour cela.’ (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 188). Pisani, the 
ex-Minister for New Caledonia, was also critical of the opération de massacre which 
could, he believed, have been avoided. Lives had been put at risk with the decision to 
attack and the four who made the war—Pons, Giraud, Chirac and Mitterrand—were 
collectively responsible: ‘Cette responsabilité politique est collective, et nous devons 
tous l’assumer.’ (Le Monde 26 May 1988a). It was a return to the imaginaire impérial 
and the déculpabilisation du racisme of the previous century when Commander Testard 
had written: ‘il faut commencer par détruire cette population si l’on veut vivre en 
sécurité dans le pays’ (Plenel & Rollat 1988, p. 12). 
The loss of life during the years of violent conflict had, by ripple effect, a wide-ranging 
effect on the New Caledonian community. For generations, Ouvéa, Lifou, Maré and the 
East Coast had been connected by a network of family alliances. This meant that the 
loss of the nineteen on Ouvéa was felt by thousands. The significant demographic effect 
on New Caledonia of the 1984-1988 years is illustrated by a proportionate comparison 
with France. During these years 73 lives were lost in New Caledonia; this equates to the 
loss of 26,000 lives in France. The 1200 refugees who fled from properties on the East 
Coast is equivalent to a displacement of 400,000 people in France. On Ouvéa the loss of 
19 lives corresponded to 313,767 in France.324 Operation Victor had been disastrous; it 
appeared to have sounded the death knell for reconciliation between loyalists and 
indépendantistes. 
Les événements brought into focus the impossibility of transposing French law to New 
Caledonia, a country that differed historically, socially and culturally. Statutes 
formulated 18,000 kilometres away were unable to satisfy two diametrically opposed 
cultures, one based on individualism and the market economy, the other on communal 
ownership and ecological harmony. In the absence of consensus, dialogue and cultural 
                                                
324 These figures have been calculated by the author using INSEE population figures for the 1989 census. 
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exchange, real democracy and peace could not be guaranteed (Le Monde 21 May 
1988a). Michel Rocard, the new Prime Minister, was faced with the challenges of 
addressing the legacy of violence, destroying insurmountable barriers, and reuniting 
enemies within a French legal framework. The referendum in 1987, which had been 
boycotted by 80% of the Kanak, had served only to aggravate tension. It was a hollow 
victory that comforted the whites but left the question of self-determination 
unanswered.  
Rocard recognised the need to stop conflict325 and establish dialogue between the 
warring parties as a matter of priority for the Government.326 As a Social Democrat and 
Protestant he believed that he would be accepted by the Kanak, but not by the RPCR, 
which held the view that socialist governments favoured independence. The task of 
appeasing the loyalists327 while defusing the indépendantistes was an exercise that 
would take considerable diplomatic effort. To gain the confidence of both loyalists and 
indépendantistes, Rocard decided to appoint a team of six, a ‘mission of dialogue’ that 
would include both pro and anti-independence sympathisers. On 15 May, the 
‘Mediators of the Pacific’ were announced. Christian Blanc was to head the mission. He 
was a politician who had some knowledge of the country. He had been a principal 
adviser to Edgar Pisani in Noumea at the time of the Hienghène massacre in 1984 
(Christnacht 2003, p. 56) and as well an advisor for the Front de Libération Nationale 
during the Algerian war of independence. Politically left-wing, his pro-Melanesian 
sympathies would enable him to engage in dialogue with the Kanak.328 Two senior 
public servants, Jean-Claude Périer and Pierre Steinmetz, were selected to add balance 
to the group. Périer had been a military magistrate and Director of Gendarmeries, and 
Steinmetz had worked at the High Commission in Noumea from 1972 until 1975. Both 
                                                
325This was also recognised by Mitterrand, who in his pre-election Lettre aux Français (cited in Plenel & 
Rollat 1988, p. 251), stated: ‘La Nouvelle-Calédonie avance dans la nuit, se cogne aux murs, se blesse. La 
crise dont elle souffre rassemble, en miniature, tous les composants du drame colonial. Il est temps d’en 
sortir.’ 
326 Olivier Stirn, the author of the ‘Stirn statute’, and the interim Minister for DOM-TOM. was also aware 
of the need for everyone to be included in discussion, which he envisaged as being ‘une œuvre de longue 
haleine’ (Le Monde 15 May 1988). 
327 ‘Aux intérêts et aux phantasmes des plus égoïstes des Calédoniens qui ne voient d’autre alternative à 
une départementalisation qu’ils refusent, parce qu’ils ne la contrôleraient pas, qu’une autonomie gérée par 
eux, à leur profit, avec les crédits et la protection de l’État.’ (Le Monde 21 May 1988a). 
328 Christian Blanc was also an advisor to Pisani when the latter’s role in the Machoro assassination came 
under scrutiny. It seems odd that someone with this connection to conflict should be selected as a 
mediator at a time when Kanak sentiment was at fever-pitch. 
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of these candidates were right-wing and would share common political ground with 
Jacques Lafleur and the loyalists. 
In what may be seen as a paradox for a secular Republic, the final members of the 
mission were representatives of the Churches and of the Grand Lodge. As already 
noted, throughout the history of New Caledonia the Churches have played a 
determining role in the Caledonian imbroglio (Le Monde 3 September 1989), and it was 
decided that the delegation should have an œcumenical character. Monsignor Paul 
Guiberteau, Director of Catholic Education, was selected to establish a relationship with 
the mainly Catholic loyalists; Jacques Stewart, President of the Protestant Federation of 
France, was chosen to initiate dialogue with the predominantly Protestant Kanak and 
the final member of the team was Roger Leray, Grand Master of the Grand Orient 
Lodge, who had been responsible for establishing freemasonry in New Caledonia.329 
Each team member was judiciously selected in respect of the protagonists and special 
interest groups in New Caledonia. In this, the Kanak had no say; there was no 
discussion and no consensus. Decisions were made in France without reference to 
cultural difference—the terms of mediation were clearly French. 
The mission was greeted with scepticism in Noumea where it was doubted that such a 
delegation would be able to establish dialogue between the warring parties. Jacques 
Lafleur realised the need for dialogue but also for the Kanak to forego any thought of 
independence if reconciliation was to be achieved: 
Les gens de ce territoire ont perdu l’habitude de se parler, de travailler 
ensemble, cette situation ne peut pas durer toute la vie. Il y a 
obligatoirement pour ceux qui réclament une indépendance raciste, au 
nom de premier occupant, une part de sacrifices à faire… l’espoir pour la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie est parfaitement possible. 
(Plenel & Rollat 1988, pp. 197-198). 
While he voiced the need for the participation and empowerment of the Kanak in any 
process of reconciliation, Lafleur, a faithful advocate of Western hegemony, conceded 
nothing. By imposing obligation on the Kanak, the possibility of a mutually acceptable 
resolution was greatly reduced. 
                                                
329 Roger Leray was also Mitterrand’s choice as an independent mediator during the Ouvéa hostage 
taking. 
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When the ‘mediators’ arrived the country was bitterly divided and in mourning. The 
hope of being able to establish dialogue was dashed when, shortly after their arrival, a 
young Kanak on the East Coast was killed by the military and peace was again 
threatened (Le Monde 25 May 1988). Everyone was on edge. The delegation, despite 
hostility, traversed the country, meeting Chiefs and initiating dialogue. On Ouvéa they 
met Chiefs Daoumé and Bazit (RPCR) and Chief Weneguei (FI); in Hienghène, Tjibaou 
(FLNKS); and in Canala, Léopold Jorédié (FLNKS). Meetings with these political 
leaders provided an opening for more meaningful dialogue. All agreed that there was a 
need to talk and that the current state with roadblocks and gun-toting youths could not 
continue. Dialogue however, had been restricted to the Chiefs, the mediators did not 
speak the local languages, and were unable to formulate a framework capable of healing 
and re-building war-torn communities. 
When the mission returned to France, they were reasonably confident that a line of 
dialogue had been initiated between the rival parties. Propositions left in New 
Caledonia for deliberation included the division of the country into three partly 
autonomous provinces, the liberation of Kanak prisoners, a referendum on 
self-determination after ten years, and the return of administrative power to France for 
12 months. This was firmly linked to a Western understanding of how to arrange 
socio-political communities and how to manage conflict. There was no attempt to 
enhance Western theories of conflict resolution by bringing cross cultural exchange into 
the deliberations. In the opinion of Plenel and Rollat (1988, p. 17) France managed to 
resolve the conflict by replacing an illusion of domination by a reality of solidarity.  
The expectation of coming to terms with a century of torment and agony, the deaths of 
more than thirty compatriots within a period of six months, and the uncertain future of 
another thirty who were imprisoned in France, left many reeling and the Kanak 
community divided. The Ouvéa assault had been ‘the scene of the bloodiest operation 
by a European army in the Pacific since World War II’ (Waddell 2008, p. 163) and the 
severity of French reprisals had taken its toll. It was during this period of despair and 
shattered hope that Lafleur and Tjibaou, at the Prime Minister’s official residence, Hôtel 
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Matignon, sought a new frame of reference for the country, based on coexistence and 
dialogue. An agreement was drawn up by François Roux, the Larzac lawyer.330  
The recommendations of this agreement, the Matignon Agreements, included: 
 the transfer of administrative power to the State for a period of twelve months, with 
the High Commissioner as the State’s representative and the Territory’s 
administrative chief; 
 the division of the country into three provinces: North, South and Loyalty Islands, 
each with an elected government responsible for the economic, social and cultural 
management of the province; 
 a consultative customary council of provincial high chiefs from the customary aires 
to advise on native affairs; and 
 a referendum in 1998 to settle the question of self-determination.331 
Article 2 of the annex to the Agreement restricted the electoral roll to those registered to 
vote in 1988 and any of their children who had come of age in the intervening period. 
Article 93 of the Agreement provided for the setting up of the Agence de développement 
de la culture kanak (ADCK). 
The agreement was signed and the historic handshake between Tjibaou and Lafleur was 
exchanged. In Tjibaou’s view, the choice presented was either an agreement that fell 
short of Kanak demands or further bloodshed. He chose agreement. The importance of 
community involvement had been ignored and without consensus and a guarantee for 
independence, it was doubtful that the agreement would be viewed sympathetically by 
the indépendantistes (Waddell 2008, pp. 175-176). Western law does not always suit 
other cultural contexts and it would be difficult to convince the people of Ouvéa that 
their warriors had not died in vain. Yeiwéné was concerned (Le Monde 28 June 1988); 
he felt that they were at the edge of a black hole and if Tjibaou was dragged in, he 
would be as well (Chappell 2014, p. 204). According to Jorédié, Tjibaou had been 
outfoxed by Lafleur and the French Government, and French cunning had again won 
the day: ‘Les Français sont trop malins ; ils nous ont roulés si souvent.’ (Plenel & Rollat 
                                                
330 Roux successfully represented the Larzac farmers in their battle against the acquisition of farmland for 
the French army.  
331 A ten-year delay proposed by Dijoud in 1979 for a vote on self-determination had been found to be 
unpalatable to the pro-independence camp. Now Tjibaou had to confront his confreres with news of a 
similar delay. 
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1988, p. 204). For the FULK and PALIKA, who had refused to enter into the 
negotiations, it was a pyrrhic victory. If they decided to put Tjibaou on the spot, they 
would find themselves in a strong position.  
Six weeks after the massacre, the Matignon Agreements were presented to 300 
pro-independence delegates on Ouvéa. After 20 hours of deliberation the conclusion 
was reached that the agreement failed to provide the required guarantees, and 
independence was still distant and uncertain (Canberra Times 26 July 1988, p. 4). Deep 
dissatisfaction was also the mood at a meeting of the FLNKS congress at Hienghène 
and of the President of FULK, Yann Céléné Uregeï. The prospect of gaining the support 
of the people of Canala was doubtful as their relationship with Tjibaou had been 
strained since the death of Machoro. In Canala there was the unspoken belief that 
Machoro had been betrayed by the FLNKS chief. Tjibaou had not visited Canala since 
Machoro’s assassination, and the customary coutume de réparation had never taken 
place. As well, the people of Canala still bore the shame of their forebears who had 
betrayed the pro-independence leader, chief Ataï, in 1878. Their descendants were 
conscious of having to make reparation for the errors of the past by continuing the fight 
for independence (Le Monde 12 July 1988). More than a century later, Ataï’s head was 
still in France, and forgiveness had not been granted by his descendants. 
One of the principal claims of certain sections of the indépendantistes during the 
Matignon negotiations had been for a general amnesty: ‘Pardonner, ouvrir les yeux sur 
l’avenir en s’efforçant d’oublier les douleurs réciproques du passé, à sa traduction 
juridique: c’est l’amnistie.’ (Le Monde 7 August 1988). Injustices of the past weighed 
heavily on the indigenous population. In what appeared to be a travesty of justice, the 
‘Hienghène Seven’, who were responsible for the death of ten Melanesians, had been 
acquitted by the Court of Appeal, the ‘loyalists’ who had killed Pierre Declercq and 
Celestin Zongo remained at large, yet Jean-Luc Vayadimoin, who had survived the 
Hienghène massacre, was arrested and imprisoned for the murder of José Lapetite, one 
of the Hienghène assassins. 
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Film as a pathway to reconciliation: residual obstacles 
The military action on Ouvéa, and the controversy of the multidimensional conflict that 
followed, continued in a war of words and a series of books authored by those who had 
been actively involved and by others who had followed the events332. La morale et 
l’action, written by the Captain of the GIGN, Philippe Legorjus,333 was seen by 
filmmaker Mathieu Kassowitz as an opportunity to film that which had been hidden by 
the Pons embargo on outside contact and to answer those unanswered questions that had 
been buried with a general amnesty.334 The inability of the mediators to deal with and 
understand the importance of customary silence and non-verbal communication had 
also fuelled new forms of conflict. The death of the nineteen had forced a degree of 
reconciliation, and the common grave symbolised ‘la parole commune’ (Plenel & Rollat 
1988, p. 43). Anger was barely hidden and one year later the assassination of the 
FLNKS leaders Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwéné Yeiwéné on Ouvéa reopened ancient 
wounds and the social fabric of the island was in tatters.  
Kassovitz hoped with dialogue and film to find a pathway towards reconciliation, but no 
agreement could be reached. It was still too painful to recover the traumatic memories, 
and the suffering and horror were too difficult to articulate. Negotiation was delayed for 
ten years. In the interim, Kassovitz continued face-to-face discussion, sometimes for 
days. Custom provided a time for la parole, a time for listening and a time for 
decision-making. The process could not be rushed.  
It was envisaged that the film would provide a wide audience with an understanding of 
the human and political tragedy of the Kanak as well as the moral torment of Legorjus 
who had battled to achieve reconciliation amidst the confusion of political ambition. 
Opinion on Ouvéa was divided; many Kanak considered Legorjus to be a traitor. In the 
view of Benoît Tangopi:335 
                                                
332 These include Army General Jacques Vidal, journalists Alain Rollat and Edwy Plenel, Alain Picard of 
the GIGN, lawyer Cedric Michalski, and Antoine Sanguinetti, a member of the commission of enquiry 
into the affair for the Human Rights League. 
333 Legorjus wrote the book La morale et l’action in 1990 about his life with the gendarmerie, to debrief 
and ‘turn the page’ as he left the gendarmerie to begin a new civilian life.  
334 The amnesty included the military as well as the hostage takers and in consequence prevented any real 
official enquiry into the events (Leblic 2012, p. 119). 
335 Benoît Tangopi had taken part in the attack on the gendarmerie and was taken prisoner in France. 
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Legorjus nous a trahis. […] Nous avons dit que nous allions libérer les 
otages après le 8 mai 1988, deuxième tour des élections présidentielles, 
et Legorjus le savait, de même l’Élysée et Matignon puisque Legorjus 
était leur intermédiaire.  
(Cited in Leblic 2012, p. 112).  
Negotiations for Kanak acceptance were difficult, there was frequent disagreement, and 
many accused Kassovitz of reigniting the intertribal rivalry that formed part of the 
collective memory.336  
Ouvéa reste marquée par ses clivages et, dans les discours, les 
catholiques sont souvent opposés aux protestants, les locuteurs du Iaai à 
ceux du faga-uvea, les indépendantistes aux loyalistes, les gens du 
district Nord à ceux du Sud et ceux du Centre à ceux du Nord et du Sud, 
etc. 
(Faurie & Nayral 2012, p. 130). 
Enduring intertribal conflict and discontent dogged Kassovitz’s negotiations. For him to 
be able to film on the island, approvals were required from the families of the 19 
victims, the members of all of the tribes involved, the gendarmerie, the mayor and the 
local council. Some 300 agreements were obtained (Faurie & Nayral 2012, p. 124). 
Despite the protracted process of repeated negotiation and revision, full agreement 
could not be reached, differences became irreconcilable, and in the end it was decided 
to make the film in French Polynesia. 
The film focuses on the events from the perspective of Legorjus. It examines his 
relationship with Dianou and the mutual attempt to achieve a peaceful solution without 
bloodshed in a game in which they were both pawns. One lost his life, and the other his 
faith in humanity, the stakes were political and order was not moral (Legorjus & 
Follorou 2011, p. 211). The film brought to public notice the complex social, cultural, 
political and military history of a country in conflict and the immorality and cowardice 
                                                
336 See Chapter 1. Weneki in the previous century had been called the Cromwell of Ouvéa, as he plotted 
to depose his chief Imwone of the Gossanah tribe, and this had led to exile of the tribe to Wadrilla. It was 
not until after the massacre in 1988 that Imwone’s Gossanah tribe was finally recognised by the 
authorities.  
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of the politicians337 and released traumatic memories of violence. One of the conditions 
of the Matignon Agreements had been a general amnesty, but an amnesty provides no 
answers. The assassins were never judged and the events were not spoken about. 
Silence and denial had not brought about oblivion; the page had not been turned. 
The film opened the floodgates to a deluge of criticism and conflict when it was 
released in 2011. Douglas Hickson, the proprietor of the largest cinema in Noumea, 
refused to screen it. Theatre, he believed, was for entertainment and was not an 
appropriate venue for the Kassovitz film.338 For others, the response to the film was 
encouraging. Macki Wéa, who played the part of his brother in the film, believed that 
the film would highlight the struggle of the Kanak people and appeal to ‘l’humanité tout 
entière, pour dénoncer l’injustice et l’oppression et défendre la lutte d’un peuple pour sa 
liberté’ (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes 15 April 2011). Macki Wéa’s children, who were 
also actors in the film, felt as though the blanket of silence had been lifted: ‘Depuis 
vingt-trois ans, c’est une histoire qu’on a cultivée en silence, dans nos tripes. 
Aujourd’hui, on est fiers de poser ce caillou sur le grand chemin.’ (Les Nouvelles 
Calédoniennes 15 April 2011). Iabe Lapacas, a law student in Clermont-Ferrand, who 
played the role of his uncle Alphonse Dianou, believed that the film was liberating: ‘le 
film a libéré la parole’. For the first time since the massacre, parents were able to speak 
to their children about the events. The film provided a history which had not been 
taught in local schools—the subject had been taboo (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes 31 
December 2011). This film provided, for the young in particular, an insight into the 
traumatic ruptures and violence suffered by their families and their communities. 
Ideological commitment and the demand for socio-economic change had led to conflict 
which, when publicly aired, released concealed memories and, over twenty years later, 
provided a step towards closure and reconciliation in New Caledonia, as the country is 
in the final phase of the Noumea Accord. 
                                                
337 The title L’ordre et la morale is a play on words based on Legorjus’s autobiography La morale et 
l’action, and the comment of Bernard Pons: ‘Sometimes some deaths are necessary to uphold order and 
morality’. 
<http://www.pmc.aut.ac.nz/articles/ouv-massacre-film-gripping-tale-betrayal-and-political-opportunism>. 
[20 October 2014]. 
338 In 1988 the screening of the Charles Belmont film Les Médiateurs du Pacifique was also banned. 
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Ambiguity, reconciliation and Le Pardon 1998-2004 
Years of marginalisation and foiled independence claims had led to desperate measures 
being taken.339 The events of April-May 1988 drew attention to the militant activity of 
the FLNKS and to Djubelli Wéa who was a regional councillor of the party on Ouvéa. 
During these events Wéa felt that he had been betrayed and abandoned by the FLNKS 
executive. When he was released from gaol in Paris, by the partial amnesty which freed 
those Kanak who had not been involved directly in the killings,340 he made no secret of 
his wish to participate in the Matignon negotiations, but this was denied. Wéa was 
disillusioned; his father had died during the assault, he had been imprisoned without 
trial, and furthermore he did not agree with the terms of the Matignon Agreements. The 
people of Ouvéa had paid a high price to bring the issue of independence in New 
Caledonia to the notice of the world. Yet, when Rocard made a move towards 
reconciliation, the views of the people of Ouvéa were not sought (Mwà Véé 1999, 
p. 21). These injustices weighed heavily on Wéa.  
The fighting in 1988 on Ouvéa had been executed in Western military style. During 
these political manipulations, difference was vilified, there was no place for customary 
warfare which, by ritual and control, facilitated the post-war re-establishment of 
harmony. Although widely applauded in France, the Matignon Agreement in its 
urgency did little to aid reconciliation.341 In traditional culture, years rather than weeks 
are required for those embroiled in the complex cultural, social, political and emotional 
network to forgive the suffering and ruptured lives caused by unexpected extreme 
violence. At Matignon, this was not allowed.  
                                                
339 It is interesting to note that Rock Apikaoua considered the State responsible for the assassinations at 
Wadrilla in 1989: ‘Les assassinats de Wadrilla [ …] ne se rattachent pas à des dissensions internes du 
monde kanak, mais bien à l’incapacité de l’État français à assurer le lien entre les différentes 
communautés pour éviter qu’elles ne se déchirent.’ (Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 58). 
340 ‘Le bénéfice de l’amnistie ne s’étend pas à ceux qui, par leur action directe et personnelle, ont été les 
auteurs principaux du crime d’assassinat.’ (Michalski 2004, p. 246). 
341 Of this Agreement Alain Christnacht wrote: ‘La démarche de Matignon fournit d’utiles enseignements 
pour résoudre les conflits les plus sévères : réunir les adversaires, les aider à se parler, dire, écrire ce qui 
divise comme ce qui rassemble—il y a de la psychanalyse sociale dans cette démarche ; rechercher 
ensuite le plus grand commun dénominateur, et, si l’un des problèmes posés paraît alors insoluble, le 
repousser à un rendez-vous ultérieur’. (Cited in Apikaoua & Briseul 2014. p. 95). The Agreement was not 
universal; it failed to resolve the conflict which continued to be harboured by some and degenerated into 
further crisis. 
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For the Gossanah tribe, the events of May 1988 opened a Pandora’s box and reignited 
old hatreds and divisions. As already noted, in the previous century the tribe had been 
driven from its ancestral land by rival Catholic tribes, stripped of its sovereignty by the 
colonial administration, and subjected to the authority of Bazit, a Catholic 
administrative chief whose authority they never recognised (Guiart 1997, p. 93). For 
over a century intertribal tension had mounted, and when the hostages were taken to a 
cave on Gossanah tribal land, the tribe was again caught in the cycle of conflict which, 
according to Guiart, was rooted in ‘ancient local tragedies’ that were thought to be 
extinct but that could not be erased. 
On Ouvéa in 1988, Western politics had dictated that the conflict should be resolved by 
force. The Kanak were unprepared for the butchery and brutality of the attack by 
modern European troops,342 and the result was devastating. Fifteen of the twenty-seven 
villages on Ouvéa had members who were either killed or taken prisoner (Guiart 1997, 
pp. 95-96). Customary negotiation by way of dialogue was not possible and in the 
pursuit of political interests there was no time for an attempted reconciliation. To end 
the conflict and restore peace, Western law, which tends to be adversarial rather than 
consensual, removed the offenders from the community in what appeared to be a replay 
of the colonial justice of the previous century when ‘Kanak rebels’ were sent to Tahiti 
or Indochina. The law, custom and Christianity were again in opposition as intertribal, 
Kanak–French, and interdenominational rivalry were re-ignited.  
The people of Ouvéa felt abandoned; their plea for help from the FLNKS executive had 
been ignored (Le Monde 7 May 1989), and in grief they turned to custom for answers. 
Kanak custom dictates that chiefs who fail to support their people will be punished or 
even killed. Leblic noted the possibility of revenge for the sanguinary events of 1988 
for which ‘no [customary] act had been undertaken’. She also suggested that ‘an 
ambush during a customary ceremony must be considered as traditional; the oral 
literature has cases of such attack stories.’(Leblic 2007, p. 278).  
Tjibaou had left his tribe at six years of age to be educated by the Marists. It was ten 
years before he returned to his tribe and during this time he lost his mother-tongue and 
                                                
342 This different mode of warfare was noted by Rev. Macfarlane (see Chapter 1).  
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knowledge of customary practice.343 According to Guiart (1997, p. 97), Tjibaou had 
‘lost his Kanak vision’ and had no experience of life on the islands such as Ouvéa, 
devoid of any history of European settlement. By going to Ouvéa without seeking 
forgiveness, ignoring the warnings of Guiart and Djubelli himself, Tjibaou neglected to 
observe customary practice, a pillar of Kanak culture.  
Tjibaou’s problems were exacerbated when he bypassed the seeking of consensus 
before signing the agreement at Matignon.344 The agreement proved to be adversarial. 
Decisions were made unilaterally and it was a French document which returned power 
to France. Louis le Pensec, Minister for DOM-TOM,345 realised the inappropriateness, 
according to Kanak custom, of focusing on individuals in isolation rather than as 
members of a community and tried to justify it in terms of French understanding: ‘les 
accords de Matignon ne liaient pas deux hommes seuls. L’un et l’autre étaient porteurs 
des espérances de leurs communautés.’ (Le Monde 12 May 1989). Tjibaou had been 
caught between two worlds: a politician in a Western arena, adversarial and isolated, 
and a Kanak chief in a community that relied on consensus. The divergent logic of these 
roles led to personal recrimination and communal dissatisfaction. 
On 5 May 1989, the concerns of the FLNKS leaders who had signed the Matignon 
Agreements became a reality when the customary end of mourning ceremony for the 19 
killed on Ouvéa ended in a bloodbath. Tjibaou and his deputy Yeiwéné were 
assassinated by Djubelli Wéa, who was subsequently gunned down by Tjibaou’s 
bodyguard, Daniel Fisdiepas. The year of suffering had taken its toll on Wéa whose 
torment was evident in his final words: ‘Vive Kanaky, Vive l’Indépendance’ (Le Monde 
6 May 1989, cf. Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 57). 
Many believed that the assassinations were in response to the failure to observe tribal 
custom and before the ceremony many had suggested that Tjibaou should not go to 
Ouvéa. Wéa’s brother claimed that Tjibaou and Yeiwéné had been telephoned by 
Djubelli and warned not to attend the ceremony (Guiart 1997, p. 100). Six months 
earlier Jean Guiart had published a paper which recommended that Tjibaou should 
                                                
343 The importance of customary knowledge was advocated by Maurice Nenou in the National Assembly. 
He had remained with his Napoemien tribe until he was 18, when he left for school at Do Neva. 
344 Tjibaou had also neglected customary reparation following the death of Eloi Machoro and this 
similarly resulted in intertribal tension.  
345 Louis Le Pensec, Minister for DOM-TOM 28 June 1988 to 29 March 1993. 
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negotiate with the bereaved families, and that it would be unwise to attend the 
ceremony without having taken this precaution (Guiart 1997, p. 99). 
Towards reconciliation 
The tragedies of 1988 and 1989 had plunged the people of Ouvéa into the depths of 
anger and sadness. They were divided and isolated, and native custom seemed 
irrelevant. In 1988, the people of Ouvéa had been treated with sympathy as martyrs for 
the independence cause; one year later the tables had turned and they were now shunned 
and, as assassins, were despised. The sacrifices made by the Kanak throughout their 
troubled postcolonial history were recognised by Paul Néaoutyine346 at the end of the 
mourning ceremony347 for Tjibaou in Tiendanite when he stated: 
Il faut réaffirmer notre détermination à mener le combat pour la dignité 
de notre peuple jusqu’à son terme, en souvenir de tous les sacrifices déjà 
donnés par les enfants du peuple kanak.  
(Le Monde 6 May 1990b) 
The suffering on Ouvéa after the assassination of the FLNKS leaders mirrored that of 
the Canala tribe whose warriors over 100 years earlier had betrayed the great freedom 
fighter, Ataï. This death weighed heavily on the people of Canala. Ataï had been 
decapitated, his head had been sold to a naval medical practitioner and later donated to 
the Anthropological Society of Paris, where it was conserved in the Dupuytren Museum 
of Monstrosities. In 1950 it was transferred to the Musée de l’Homme and finally, in 
2014, returned to its final resting place in Saraméa. It was only then that the customary 
end of mourning could be observed (Le Monde 29 August 2014). According to native 
custom, it was only after the end of mourning had been observed that reconciliation was 
possible (Kajman 1985).348 The significance of customary views cannot be 
underestimated if we are to understand the relation of violence and reconciliation in 
                                                
346 Paul Néaoutyine succeeded Tjibaou as president of the FLNKS.  
347 For security, the militants of the UC and those opposed to the strategies of Tjibaou, the FULK and 
Union syndicale des travailleurs kanaks et des exploités (USTKE), were banned from this ceremony. 
348 Alban Bensa wrote in 1985: ‘Il y a deux ans les gens des côtes est et ouest se sont réconciliés à 
l’occasion d’un échange coutumier extrêmement important sur ce point. Les gens de Thio-Canala, de la 
côte est, ont demandé pardon à leurs frères des autres côtes pour leur responsabilité dans la mort du chef 
Ataï à la fin de l’insurrection de 1878.’ (Kajman 1985). 
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New Caledonia. The multi-layered example of Ataï and the return of his head is a case 
in point and of relevance to the tragedy on Ouvéa. 
On 16 July 1982 at the first meeting of the Chiefs of the Xaracuu region in 104 years, 
the Kanak of Canala and Thio had asked pardon of the other tribes for their 
responsibility in the death of Ataï (Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 62). For another 32 
years the entire tribe of Bergé Kawa, a descendant of Ataï, continued to mourn. When 
the head was returned, it was finally possible for reconciliation to take place between 
the tribes of the descendants of Ataï and Ségou, his assassin, and with the French State 
(Le Monde 29 August 2014). In Kanak custom, the shame of a single member of the 
clan is shared by all and it is only when there is total consensus that le pardon and 
forgiveness can be achieved. 
For almost ten years the people of Ouvéa were unable to talk about the events which 
had devastated the island in 1988 and again in 1989. Sporting and political institutions 
were boycotted, the Gossanah tribe had cut their ties with the Protestant church and the 
doors of the church had shut. This emphasised the shunning of Western values by a 
tribe with long historic ties to the church—Djubelli had been a Protestant pastor. As has 
been noted, the massacre at the grotto re-ignited the interdenominational conflict which 
had torn the island apart in the previous century and, according to Girardian theory, the 
death of a ‘scapegoat’ was needed for peace to return to the island.  
After years of misery and voluntary exclusion, the people of Ouvéa needed to free the 
positive potential of the future from the negative acts of the past. For the community to 
move ahead together, barriers had to be destroyed, the curse exorcised, and the feelings 
of culpability overcome. Gogny Dieno, a teacher, Vice-President of ÉÉNCIL and 
President of the Commission of Languages, believed that although the events of the past 
had been inspired by politics, the only way to achieve reconciliation was by dialogue, 
supported by the pillars of Kanak society—custom and religion (Mwà Véé 1999, p. 14). 
The island’s youth, traumatised by the death of so many, had become undisciplined and 
had turned to cannabis and alcohol. Their hostility was directed towards the European 
teachers who were harassed until they finally left the island. All schools—Protestant, 
Catholic and State—closed. Life was difficult. The fabric of local society had been torn 
apart, families were divided and people were angry and suffering. When a local youth 
died in a drunken orgy, a Committee of Dialogue was set up by, among others, Billy 
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Wapotro, the Director of the Alliance Scolaire de l’Église Évangélique. The Committee 
included those with a knowledge of Kanak culture, psychology, health, law and 
education.349 The boycott on education was viewed as a retrograde step in the march 
toward Kanak emancipation, and was discouraged. An agenda, drawn up by the 
Committee, brought to the fore all of the problems of concern for the people of Ouvéa. 
The group met at Eben Eza to reflect upon la parole, which had become contradictory, 
aggressive and conflictual. In Kanak society the elders are the custodians of la parole 
but the trust the young had for their elders had been destroyed, and the young refused to 
listen to them. On the island the fallout was general. 
The Wéa tribe chose to continue their own way of life in isolation and avoided outside 
contact. Billy Wapotro contacted Hnine Wéa, but he received a negative response. The 
RPCR loyalists of the Kauma and Luekhot tribes, who had not taken part in the events 
and had not suffered loss, were excluded from the Committee although they were 
permitted to attend as members of the wider community. This illustrates the collective 
nature of Kanak dispute resolution processes and the responsibility of the community as 
a whole in maintaining customary values. Although war between interrelated tribes was 
not unknown (see Chapter 1), the situation after the ‘events’ of 1988 and 1989 was 
unsustainable. The walls of silence needed to be destroyed so that voices could be 
heard. Reconciliation was essential. 
After nearly ten years the Wéa family was still struggling to come to terms with the 
torture and imprisonment of Djubelli, the assassination of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and 
Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, and then the death of Djubelli. Tom Tchako, the Pastor at Gossanah, 
was a member of the Ognat tribe, spoke the local language Iaai and had close family 
ties with the people of Gossanah. He was aware of the suffering on the island and was 
anxious to extricate it from ‘le mystérieux mal qui commençait à gangréner l’île’ (Le 
Monde 6 May 1990a). Communication on the island had broken down completely. 
Father de Viviès, the Catholic priest at Fayaoué, was also concerned that the people in 
this extremely religious community had lost faith. The churches were no longer capable 
                                                
349 The Committee of Dialogue included Billy Wapotro, Director of the Alliance scolaire enseignement 
protestant en Nouvelle-Calédonie; Joseph Streeter, President of the Association Calédonienne pour 
l’animation et la formation (ACAF) and President of the Association protection enfance et jeunesse en 
difficulté en Nouvelle-Calédonie (APEJ); Richard Kaloi, President of the Province des Iles Loyauté; and 
Maki Wéa. 
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of providing the cement required to maintain community bonds. Catholics and 
Protestants were divided.  
The renewed role of the Church 
Pastor Tchako realised that differences had to be aired, acknowledged and dealt with, 
and believed that it was the role of the Churches to initiate mediation. Rock Apikaoua, a 
Melanesian Catholic priest, came from the mainland to assist Tchako in the 
reestablishment of dialogue between the rival tribes. To restore confidence within the 
community it was necessary to talk about the painful events of the past and to listen to 
what others had to say. Communication was essential in a society which relied heavily 
on the spoken word, the customary parole, as Apikaoua notes: 
Le système qui consiste à signer une pétition, les situait, eux, Kanak, 
entre deux mondes. Une pétition, c’est la manière de faire des autres, 
alors que la manière de faire dans le monde Kanak, c’est le palabre […] 
Dans le traitement d’un conflit, lorsque chaque individu ou chaque 
groupe a le sentiment qu’il est considéré et écouté, cela atténue le conflit. 
(Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 99). 
In the spirit of oecumenism, Protestant and Catholic religious leaders united with 
customary chiefs, political leaders and municipal councillors for the symbolic 
destruction of barriers.  
When the barriers were removed, and questions which had smouldered for years had 
been answered, it was possible to distinguish a certain mutual understanding. In some 
instances, century-old manacles were shed. As has already been noted the Protestant 
Gossanah tribe had, since the early years of colonial administration, lived as vassals to 
the rival Catholic tribe of Weneki. In the process of post-trauma mediation under the 
direction of Tom Tchako, the Protestant tribe was at last recognised by the authorities 
and the administration. This provided the Gossanah tribe with a glimmer of optimism 
although Niné Wéa stressed that ‘nous restons sur nos positions politiques’ (Le Monde 
29 August 2014). 
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A drama of ambiguity: Anthropologists join the conflict and the 
drama of Ouvéa rises like a phoenix from the ashes  
While a delicate pathway to reconciliation was being trodden on Ouvéa, in 1997 Guiart 
reopened debate on the subject of the massacre in a controversial article published, after 
an emotional debate, in the conservative Journal of Pacific History350 In the article 
Guiart proposes answers to questions that had for a long time been buried by the 
amnesty. He observes that murders followed by amnesties eliminate the hearing of 
evidence in court and absolve the perpetrators of crime. In his 1997 article, ancient 
tribal pathways are tracked to explain how the events on Ouvéa in 1988 and 1989 were 
embedded in intertribal wars of the past. In academic circles the article created a great 
deal of angst and for the next three years the journal became a battlefield of claim and 
counterclaim. 
These articles provide a certain view of the conflict which shrouded the island for ten 
years and of the continuing entanglement of religious, tribal and political conflict. In 
Guiart’s opinion, conflict within Kanak communities has been managed but never 
totally suppressed and the war on Ouvéa in the mid-twentieth century was the 
re-emergence of the mid-nineteenth century wars of religion. In his analysis, Guiart 
appears to have conflated a number of different political social and religious issues. In 
the 19th century, Marist priests, aided by the French administration, supplied Catholic 
tribes with guns to provide them with an advantage over their Protestant rivals. 
Similarities occurred a century later when, according to Guiart, religious rivalry was 
again ignited. The RPCR group of Catholic tribes on Ouvéa obtained guns, even though 
there was nothing to hunt on the island, and to redress the balance of power, in 
Girardian mimetic desire, the Protestants decided to raid the local gendarmerie, the only 
source of guns on the island. Although religious rivalry was indeed seen during the 
events on Ouvéa, Guiart’s theory ignores the fact that at least two of the attackers of the 
                                                
350 Guiart was a student of Maurice Leenhardt, married to the daughter of a Lifou High Chief and the 
brother-in-law of Maurice Lenormand. During the ‘events’ in 1985, demonstrators rioted in the streets of 
Noumea, burning the house of Guiart’s wife, the pharmacy of Maurice Lenormand, cars of several 
indépendantistes, the offices of the USTKE, and the garage of André Dang, a supporter of the 
independence movement who was described in an article in Le Point written by Jean-Yves Boulic as ‘ce 
jaune, ce traître, cet ami des Kanaks’. Dang was living in exile in Australia at the time (Pitoiset & Wéry 
2008, p. 57). 
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gendarmerie were Catholic,351 and that the Fayaoué gendarmerie was not targeted in 
isolation. Similar raids were planned for Maré, Lifou and various points around Grande 
Terre. Guiart also contradicts his original argument when he points out that the attack 
had been planned the week before at a FLNKS meeting attended by Tjibaou, 
Lenormand and Dianou, all of whom were Catholics. 
It is interesting to note that this war which began as a means of highlighting the call for 
Kanak independence could, according to Guiart, have provided the grounds for an 
independence claim. The question is asked whether this war, which was orchestrated by 
the French government and which pitted French citizen against French citizen,352 was 
unconstitutional, and whether it could be interpreted as an indirect official recognition 
of Kanak independence (Guiart 1997, p. 91) In the midst of mourning, official enquiries 
and incarceration, the opportunity to make such a claim was lost and arrangements were 
set in place in France to ensure French domination in what was touted as a broadly 
based reconciliation process. The agreement which was signed to avoid further violent 
conflict replaced the struggle for emancipation with a promise for economic 
development. Money provided by the French State to the predominantly Kanak 
Northern Province and the Loyalty Islands was not a panacea. As Guiart indicated, 90% 
of the funds were absorbed by local and metropolitan businesses in project management 
and dozens of these projects failed (Guiart 1997, p. 99). Indeed, as an instrument of 
reconciliation the Matignon Agreement failed to achieve universal acceptance and was 
the cause of a bitter schism between Kanak communities. 
Also established is a link between the assassination of Eloi Machoro and those in the 
grotto (Guiart 1997, p. 102).353 Both had been abandoned by Tjibaou, and for both the 
order for the attack had come from the same source—the top—and had to be obeyed. 
Within this tangled web of conflict and conspiracy, it is noted that as Minister for 
Justice during the Algerian War of independence, Mitterrand had ordered the ‘killing of 
the nationalist leaders in order to decapitate the anti-colonial revolt’ (Evans 2014) and 
                                                
351 Chanel Kapoeri, a delegate of the independence party l’Union Calédonienne, was Catholic and 
Alphonse Dianou had trained in Fiji to become a Catholic priest. 
352 In the opinion of Apikaoua (Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 58), the assassinations were not due to 
dissension within the Kanak camp but to the incapacity of the French State to preserve social cohesion 
and harmony in an impartial and equitable way. 
353 See above, Chapter 3. 
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for Guiart it appeared that this strategy of ‘find the chiefs and kill them’ (Guiart 1997, 
p. 90) had also been applied in New Caledonia.  
The people of Ouvéa had been abandoned and betrayed by their political leaders, 
negotiations had failed and it was necessary to draw on customary conflict resolution to 
provide a pathway toward reconciliation. Custom and Girardian ‘scapegoat’ theory 
were here in tandem; death was required to establish peace. The assassinations in 1989 
completed the removal of the chiefs of the independence movement, Declercq, 
Machoro, Tjibaou and Yeiwéné.  
The clash of ethnographic opinion continued when a year later in the same journal,354 
French anthropologists Alban Bensa and Eric Wittersheim (1998) accused Guiart of 
‘ethnological delirium’ and ‘hackneyed ethnographic rhetoric’. Disputing Guiart’s 
analysis they drew attention to the pre-existing conditions which had resulted in 
conflict: the appalling colonial policy of the French Government, tribal confinement by 
nomadisation, and the ‘vengeful attitude’ of the Prime Minister and his ‘sinister’ 
Minister for Overseas Territories. These factors, they believed, were more likely to have 
caused conflict than the unlikely, uncheckable, apolitical Kanak custom-dictated 
motives suggested by Guiart.  
Finally, three years later, Guiart wrote again to justify his findings, citing the 
unambiguous role of Mitterrand in authorising the attack on the grotto and the 
ambiguous plan of the FLNKS which had no backup strategy and rivalry: ‘Over the last 
50 years I have seen the old competitions [rivalries] spill over into local politics and 
elections at all levels: competition [rivalry] being the real working structure of islands 
societies’ (Guiart 2001, p. 248). 
In these small island communities the recurring cycles of mimetic desire have 
historically caused rivalry which has erupted into violent conflict. Despite differing 
emphases, these articles find corroboration in the histories presented in earlier chapters 
of this thesis, where intertribal rivalry, religious rivalry and French hegemony all 
contributed to violent conflict. In the context of restorative justice and reconciliation, all 
                                                
354 There have been other ‘scoops’ that have been even tardier in arrival: Michalski (2004), Picard (2010), 
Vidal (2010), Legorjus [& Follorou] (2011). 
 200 
of these factors must be examined so that damage done and wrongs committed can be 
addressed in what must be a painful and complicated healing process.  
On the road to reconciliation 
Deep-seated conflict, as has been outlined, is not amenable to the short-term solutions 
presented by fly-in, fly-out mediators from France. Despite being well intentioned, 
Western approaches to conflict resolution in New Caledonia have failed to give due 
consideration to cultural differences in this country where pre-colonial custom 
infiltrates the post-colonial, and Christian belief is inextricably entwined. The 
successful blending of religion and custom was evident in 2006 at the inauguration of 
the tiny Protestant Church at Windo, Poindimié, which was attended by some 4000 
people who travelled from as far away as Maré for the ceremony.355 In the two-day 
œcumenical celebration, religious ritual united with the chants of indigenous choirs, the 
pilou-pilou, bougna and customary gift exchange and rhetorical jousting.  
Nearly all Kanak identify as being Christian356 and on Ouvéa all twenty tribes ascribe to 
religious affiliation: eight are Catholic, five adhere to the Evangelical Church of New 
Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands,357 the Wakat tribe belongs to the Free Evangelical 
Church; and the Fayaoué tribe has both Catholic and Protestant members (Filippi & 
Angleviel 2000a p. 287).358 In such a Christian milieu it is not surprising that it was 
under the auspices of the Church that the process of mediation and reconciliation was 
initiated. 
Gradually, under the watchful eye of Tom Tchako and the Committee of Dialogue, the 
yoke of the past was shed, but the realisation remained that divisions had to be 
                                                
355 This Protestant church was inaugurated on 9 December 2006. It was built by the young people from 
nearby tribes under the auspices of the chantier école, a project of the Territorial Establishment for the 
Professional Training of Adults, and the youth employment scheme of the Northern Province, funded 
with a grant of 5,000,000 CFP from the French Government. It was an œcumenical project that 
transcended Protestant, Catholic and French State secular barriers.  
356 Rock Apikaoua comments: ‘j’avais été très surpris de la religiosité des gens, catholiques et protestants 
[…] la foi très profonde’ (Mwà Véé 1999, p. 6). 
357 In 2013 ÉÉNCIL became the Église protestante de Kanaky Nouvelle-Calédonie (EPKNC). 
358 The strength of religion is indicated in the listing by Filippi & Angleviel (2000a, p. 287) of religious 
affiliation in the chart ‘Characteristics of tribes by commune’. On Ouvéa there is also a sharp divide 
between those who have originated from Wallis Island, the Faga-Uvea speakers who are all Catholics and 
the Melanesian Iaai-speaking tribes which are Protestant. 
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transcended so that the people of Ouvéa could move together to a new future. An 
œcumenical community office was established to break the ancient taboos between 
Catholics and Protestants. Once a week this office held a youth club to provide young 
people with the opportunity to ask questions and discuss their problems. The slogan 
‘Iaai hier, Iaai aujourd’hui, Iaai demain’ was to provide hope for the future while 
managing the present and honouring the past. From anger, sadness, division and 
isolation, the inhabitants of Ouvéa, with the help of Rock Apikaoua and Tom Tchako, 
gradually rediscovered hope and confidence in their shared cultural homogeneity: 
Il y a des facteurs sociologiques qu’il faut souligner d’emblée, c’est que 
l’on a affaire à une communauté qui est culturellement homogène, avec 
une manière de penser, et de faire qui lui a permis de dépasser assez vite 
la différence qui existe en elle entre catholiques et protestants. 
(Mwà Véé 1999, p. 5). 
In the wake of violent Kanak–French conflict, the Churches, Catholic and Protestant, 
had been able to overcome the divisiveness of their creeds to find a common ground for 
reconciliation and unity in Melanesian custom. 
A ‘Committee of 4-5 May’ organised sporting and cultural activities for the young. 
Activities such as song-writing about events of the past allowed adults to gauge how the 
children were managing the mourning for those lost and the stigma of the assassination 
of Tjibaou and Yeiwéné. Each year on 5 May those who had died in the political 
struggle for independence were remembered with a pilgrimage to the grotto until it was 
decided that this caused children, who were too young to understand, undue suffering, 
and the grotto was closed. The clan played an important role in the life of the child, and 
on this island with a population of around 3000, many suffered from the loss of a clan 
member: ‘un enfant dans la société traditionnelle n’est pas l’enfant du couple mais c’est 
l’enfant du clan. Il est socialisé très jeune du fait qu’il est toujours avec les autres 
enfants.’ (Streeter cited in Mwà Véé 2005). 
Gradually, longstanding battles were resolved. Due to the ancient history of the island, 
the situation was complex: barriers which had been erected in the past had to be 
destroyed, and a new framework of action based on current values and traditional 
culture had to be constructed. The Committee of Dialogue was aware of the high price 
the people of Ouvéa had paid and sought a means of bringing together custom, women, 
men, children, clans and the churches. Tchako, de Viviès and Apikaoua did much to 
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overcome religious prejudice. A connection with the outside world was achieved when 
Rock Wamytan, President of the FLNKS, and Nidoïsh Naisseline, the President of the 
Loyalty Islands Province, attended a sports day organised by the ‘Committee of the 10th 
Anniversary’ in 1997. With the help of the Church and the Committee of Dialogue, the 
people of Ouvéa now had the strength to approach the families of the gendarmes, the 
victims of 22 April 1988, and attempt to bring the two camps together in a process of 
reconciliation.  
Forgiveness and reconciliation 
The process of reconciliation took a long time, however, and it was not the political 
agenda of the Matignon Agreements that determined reconciliation but the maturing of 
a society which, the year later, was moving toward the Noumea Accord.359 
On 22 April 1998, the initiative of the people of Ouvéa, the Churches, the Committee of 
Dialogue, and the Committee of 22 April 1988 brought together all of those who had 
suffered: the wives, mothers and children of the nineteen Kanak who had been killed 
and the families of the four gendarmes who had lost their lives at Fayaoué on 22 April 
1988. An œcumenical service was held by Pastor Tchako and Father Apikaoua at the 
chapel of Saint-Michel in Fayaoué to mark the reconciliation between the Ouvéa 
community and the gendarmerie. 
The wife of one of the gendarmes, Madame Linda Zawadzki, confirmed her desire for 
reconciliation in a message of peace: 
Du bilan de ces dix années, où il a fallu poursuivre une route semée 
d’embûches, je ne retiendrai qu’une chose, la très belle promesse de Paix 
qui va baigner l’Église d’Ouvéa, le 22 avril prochain, qu’elle puisse être 
le début de nombreuses décennies de sérénité pour toute la population du 
territoire. 
                                                
359 The scope of this thesis does not allow for elaboration on the Noumea Accord. The reader will 
appreciate, however, that all of the issues of conflict and reconciliation were already present in the events 
analysed in this thesis. 
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C’est le vœu que je forme bien volontiers et que je vous demande de 
transmettre, au nom des miens, à tous ceux que l’intelligence et la bonne 
volonté va rassembler le 22 avril prochain, dans la foi. 
(Lamboley n.d.). 
This ceremony was followed on 5 May 1998 by a pilgrimage to the grotto by 
representatives of political parties and the customary council. On this day, ten years 
after the Ouvéa massacre, it was decided to close the entrance to the grotto for five 
years out of respect for those whose lives had been lost. On the same day, the ninth 
anniversary of the assassination of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwéné Yeiwéné, the Wéa 
family sought the support of the Church to begin the process of reconciliation with the 
Tjibaou and Yeiwéné families (Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 59), and the Noumea 
Accord was signed, setting the country on the road to a destin commun. 
In August of that same year France’s Minister for Overseas Territories, Jean-Jack 
Queyranne, travelled to Gossanah and, as a gesture of reconciliation between the French 
Government and the Kanak people of Ouvéa, planted a tree in the village. In June 1999 
reconciliation was achieved between the Protestant pro-independence Imwone clan of 
Gossanah and the loyalist Catholic clan of Bazit, who had been bitter rivals for 
generations.  
Where the Western political agenda had failed, custom, working in tandem with the 
Church, had triumphed. The process of reconciliation took a long time, and this allowed 
for extensive participation, bargaining and compromise. In a world where custom is oral 
and time flows with the seasons of the ‘yam calendar’, reconciliation was achieved.  
For the people of Ouvéa a much more problematic reconciliation lay ahead, the pardon 
between the Gossanah tribe of Djubelli Wéa, the Tiendanite tribe of Jean-Marie Tjibaou 
and the Nidenod tribe of Yeiwéné Yeiwéné. In customary practice the pardon offers not 
only reconciliation but also forgiveness and this, due to family relationships, was a 
more delicate matter than the reconciliation with the gendarmes and would take another 
six years to achieve.360  
                                                
360 According to Billy Wapatro, the old Kanak say: ‘vous avez un problème entre vous parce que vous ne 
vous êtes pas rencontrés pour en parler’ (Mwà Véé 1999). 
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For over a decade the process of reconciliation between the Tjibaou, Wéa and Yeiwéné 
families remained an inaccessible aspiration. The wounds inflicted by the assassinations 
were deep and the pain intense. Links between Ouvéa and Hienghène had been 
established from the earliest times by marriage. The father of Lorenza Naheit, the 
adopted daughter of Jean-Marie and Marie-Claude Tjibaou, was the chief of the 
Hnagèigèi clan which is of the same lineage as the Wéa clan of Gossanah. Lorenza’s 
biological father, Similien Naheit, was a teacher at the Catholic mission school of 
Ouaré, Hienghène. When Similien died in 2003, his wish was that he should be buried 
in Hienghène in order to open a line of dialogue between Hienghène and Ouvéa. 
Between Gossanah and Maré, there were also familial and customary links. The 
great-grandmothers of Hnadrune Yeiwéné and Manaki Wéa were sisters, and two of 
Yeiwéné Yeiwéné’s brothers were married to women from Gossanah. Family ties which 
had been severed had to be reconstructed gradually, but for years the period of silence 
and mourning continued. Yet in the Kanak world through silence there is 
communication. Kanak political etiquette demanded five to six years of silence but after 
ten years there was still no lasting contact between the Grande Terre and Ouvéa, 
although Manaki Wéa had visited Hienghène in 2003 for the funeral of Similien Naheit.  
For fourteen years after the assassinations the community remained fractured, and 
attempts to unite the clans from Gossanah, Tiendanite and Nidenod were in vain. A 
court case to determine whether Wéa had acted alone or with accomplices was still 
pending. In 2003, the case was dismissed and officially closed. With the court case 
over, the Tjibaou and Yeiwéné families had no interest in pursuing the matter; they 
were now ready to meet with the Wéa family, to discuss their mutual concerns, and to 
re-establish broken ties. They hoped that reconciliation would be an important step 
towards the reunification of the country, of ‘vouloir vivre ensemble du pays’ (Apikaoua 
& Briseul 2014, p. 59).  
Under the impulse of Rock Apikaoua and Jean Weté, a Pastor from Gossanah, a 
meeting was held at which it was decided to create a timetable for the gradual 
progression towards a pardon and reconciliation. The first meeting was held in 
December 2003 after an œcumenical service at the Evangelical Church of New 
Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands in Noumea. At this meeting, the decision was taken 
to map a way to reconciliation. Plans were made to hold a meeting once a month for the 
next six months. At one of these meetings the Tjibaou, Wéa and Yeiwéné families 
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decided that the Fisdeipas family should be included to aid dialogue and establish a 
work plan. A Reconciliation Committee was set up which included members of the four 
families as well as the Catholic Church and the two branches of the Protestant Church. 
At the insistence of Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s son, Joël, a final meeting was arranged at the 
Noumea cathedral. This meeting was to include Djubelli Wéa’s brothers, so that 
unanswered questions about the assassination might be explained. It was important that 
this should occur before a pardon could be agreed upon. Total faith, trust and agreement 
was necessary, as if anyone involved had any doubt or uncertainty, the negotiations 
could not continue.  
Sixty members of the Gossanah and Wadrilla tribes came from Ouvéa for the meeting 
in the cathedral. For eight hours the Tjibaou and Yeiwéné children asked the questions 
that they believed needed clarification. At 10 p.m. Joël announced ‘On n’a plus besoin 
de se réconcilier, ils ont dit la vérité !’ This emphasised the importance of the truth in 
the process of reconciliation. It was important to know the truth about the past and how 
this had been interpreted in order to be able to progress towards a shared future. The 
mere passage of time could not heal the wounds of past violent conflict. As Apikaoua 
realised, truth had to be internalised; it could not be imposed from above; victims and 
survivors had to be consulted (Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 60). At the end of the 
meeting, agreement was reached to continue towards ceremonies of pardon. 
The private ceremonies of reconciliation in Ouvéa, Tiendanite and Maré were captured 
on film, photo, and in text by the ADCK on 17 July 2004. Thousands arrived at 
Tiendanite from Ouvéa and Maré laden with gifts that marked the culmination of the 
resolution process and le pardon. In the context of reconciliation the exchange of gifts 
plays an important role. The procession was led by Jean Weté, the pastor from Ouvéa, 
in a symbolic return from exile. He was followed by Joachim Naheit, the head of the 
Wéa clan. It was an emotional arrival, a silent stream of humanity pouring into the tiny 
village of Tiendanite, with bowed heads in an attitude of humble supplication. The 
arrivals were greeted by Daniel Fisdeipas, the mayor of Hienghène. 
Maki Wéa, the brother of Djubelli, kneeling before the Tjibaou tribe, made a customary 
gesture to all of the Tjibaou children. One after the other the Wéa brothers did likewise. 
Uthang Wéa asked for pardon in Iaai, the local language of Ouvéa, and this was 
simultaneously translated by his brother Cyril. Wainia Wéa presented yams, mats, 
manou and money, and Hnuhnoo Wéa recalled the ancient ties which existed between 
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the people of Hienghène and those of Ouvéa. Joël Tjibaou was obviously moved as he 
touched each of the gifts as a customary sign of acceptance, and with the help of Daniel 
Fisdeipas, made the customary gift exchange. Then Joël in a subdued voice before 
thousands of bowed heads gave the pardon: ‘Vous nous demandez d’accepter le pardon, 
nous l’acceptons.’ (Mwà Véé 2004-2005, p. 14). 
In a day full of emotion, a plaque was unveiled by the children of the families at the 
tomb of Jean-Marie Tjibaou. The tomb was draped in the FLNKS colours and inscribed 
with the words of Tjibaou: 
Kanak country green, red symbol of the struggle of the Kanak people, of 
our unity […] the blue of sovereignty, the sun is shining today, though in 
the history of the Kanak people it hasn’t always done so for us. 
(Fraser & Trotter 2005, pp. 143-144). 
Other speeches made at the tomb included those of Dick Padfi, the pastor at Hwadrilla, 
Ouvéa; Jean-Pierre Yeiwéné, a brother of Yeiwéné Yeiwéné; Wanakame Gada, in the 
name of all of the chiefdoms on Ouvéa; and Emmanuel Tjibaou who spoke of the three 
victims of the assassination. Trees—a Pin Colonnaire and a Kaori—were planted and 
an œcumenical service was held by Rock Apikaoua, Jean Weté and Watre Hanye, 
representing the three historic Churches of New Caledonia.  
In each of the reconciliation exercises the Church instigated, guided and concluded 
every step of the way and, in the final summing up of events by the self-effacing Rock 
Apikaoua: 
[…] au niveau des Églises, nous n’avons été que les outils, mais les 
acteurs privilégiés de ce grand moment, ce sont les gens eux-mêmes. 
Notre joie, aux pasteurs et à moi-même, c’est d’avoir participé 
modestement à cela. 
(Mwà Véé 2004-2005, p. 50). 
This showed that reconciliation was possible in New Caledonia; indeed it was a 
possible pointer to the future of the island, where the Noumea Accord calls for a destin 
commun for its diverse and historically divided peoples. 
 207 
Conclusion: Chapter 5 
The result of the attack on the gendarmerie at Fayaoué was a bitter moment in the 
history of New Caledonia. There were no winners; 25 lives were lost, including 
gendarmes, soldiers and Kanak. The reputations of the army and gendarmerie were 
tarnished; the political party of Chirac and Pons, who were major players in the events, 
was defeated in the Presidential election; and the action of Mitterrand, in signing the 
requisition for the army to engage in warfare against French citizens, could only be 
regarded with suspicion.  
The enthusiasm which greeted the signing of the reconciliatory Matignon Agreements 
was not shared by all Kanak. The agreement was concluded without customary 
consultation and independence was not achieved. The general sentiment was that many 
lives had been lost in vain. Bitterness and disillusionment led to renewed violent 
conflict with the assassination of the leaders of the pro-independence FLNKS party. 
For ten years the suffering caused by these events made reconciliation elusive. 
Eventually, with the cooperation of the Churches, meetings and œcumenical services 
were organised which brought together the victims and survivors of the assault and 
assassinations. In 1998 reconciliation took place between the families of the gendarmes 
killed and the people of Ouvéa. A pardon for the family of the assassin of the FLNKS 
leaders was more difficult to achieve due to family ties and also because it included 
forgiveness, whereas reconciliation, by definition, is the restoration of friendly relations 
which will allow the opposing parties to live together in harmony. 
It was another six years before a pardon was granted to the Wéa family by the Tjibaou 
and Yeiwéné families in an emotionally charged ceremony which concluded with the 
words of a catechist from Tiendanite: 
Quand vous avez tué notre chef, parce que Jean-Marie Tjibaou était chef 
de cette tribu, nous ici, à Tiendanite, on a roulé une grosse pierre pour 
fermer la porte de la case commune, pour qu’on n’ait jamais à vous 
recevoir. Aujourd’hui, du fait de la réconciliation, je vais pousser cette 
pierre, ouvrir la porte, et définitivement caler la porte avec la même 
pierre pour qu’elle ne se referme plus jamais. La réconciliation est 
définitive, vous êtes ici chez vous. 
(Apikaoua & Briseul 2014, p. 61). 
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In this way, the representatives of the major Churches of New Caledonia, in dialogue 
with clan members, provided a way by which mediation, forgiveness and reconciliation 
could take place. 
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CONCLUSION 
In New Caledonia the cycle of conflict has continued, albeit in different guises, since 
pre-colonial times. According to René Girard, all violence springs from imitative desire, 
the innate drive which leads to competitiveness and ultimately to conflict. This theory 
finds corroboration in the cases that I have studied in this thesis and brings into question 
the possibility of ever achieving lasting peace and reconciliation. Girardian theory also 
suggests that, in times of conflict, the death of a scapegoat is needed for the 
re-establishment of peace. This was also witnessed in pre-colonial Kanak communities 
whereby custom limited the number killed in conflict so that peace was restored, 
ecological equilibrium was maintained and reconciliation could be achieved. The effect 
of traditional regulation on the recurring cycle of conflict and reconciliation enabled the 
tribes in this multilingual society to forge a network of customary alliances and to 
co-exist. 
When missionaries, sandalwood merchants and colonisers introduced Western values 
and a regime of domination, the cycle of conflict became more intense and the 
possibility of reconciliation more remote. Indigenous custom lost its relevance when 
confronted by a technologically superior armoury and deaths on a scale previously 
unknown on the island. New Caledonia became a battleground between coloniser and 
colonised and peace was achieved by force and coercion. Reconciliation was not at the 
forefront of the colonial approach.  
After French annexation in 1853, land became a contentious issue. Land was the source 
of indigenous life with which the ‘blood of the ancestors’ was intricately entwined in 
the Kanak psyche. The spoliation of ancestral tribal land stripped the Kanak not only of 
their source of survival, but also of their cultural identity. As land was alienated, the ties 
that bound Kanak relationships also disintegrated. Private land ownership replaced 
communal ownership and the Kanak and their crops were subjected to the whims of the 
colonial masters and to the appetite of their cattle. Tribal hierarchies were destroyed and 
administrative chiefs were appointed. The very extinction of the Kanak was predicted, 
yet despite adversity the Kanak survived, and sometimes rebelled—their fortitude had 
been underestimated. 
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Conflict knew no bounds. Even those outsiders who arrived with the best of intentions 
were soon embroiled in the cycle of conflict. Missionaries who came with a message of 
peace became themselves a source of intertribal rivalry, which escalated into wars of 
religion when the Catholic and Protestant denominations of Christianity became 
involved. Religious conflict was multi-faceted and drew Britain and France into the fray 
of a ‘paper war’. The legacy of British–French religious antagonism was recycled when 
conflict in the Protestant Church, in the mid-20th century, resulted in the schism that 
divided the Church and the Protestant community. This division of the Church and its 
tribal adherents had political repercussions which have persisted until the present day. 
French colonisation, touted at the time as a mission civilisatrice, was no more 
successful as a reconciliatory force. When violent reprisals and coercion proved unable 
to achieve peace, the repressive laws of the Indigénat were introduced. Law and order 
was enforced by incarceration, causing further grief. 
Western approaches to conflict resolution generally failed and reconciliation remained 
elusive. In the analysis that I have undertaken of almost 150 years of conflict and of the 
attempt to achieve peace and reconciliation, I have found that insufficient recognition 
was given to the injustices of the past, to Kanak custom, and to Kanak tradition. Laws 
and statutes which were relevant in metropolitan France could not successfully be 
transposed to New Caledonia; in the different socio-political milieu they led to further 
conflict, with little likelihood of reconciliation being achieved.  
It remains difficult to obtain knowledge of past histories from a Kanak perspective. 
Indigenous oral histories in which silence is meaningful may be lost in translation; they 
are not universally understood and frequently devalued. I have therefore relied on the 
histories of Western academics whose work is naturally steeped in a Western system of 
values. It is clear that a more inclusive and consensual approach to conflict resolution is 
needed for lasting reconciliation to be possible in which Kanak voices would be heard. 
There have, however, been exceptional events offering some prospect of hope. The 
multiple tragedies of Ouvéa (1988, 1989) are a case in point. The successful 
achievement of reconciliation by the Kanak may provide a model for future 
reconciliatory action. Reconciliation was realised between the people of Ouvéa and the 
families of the gendarmes who lost their lives in the Fayaoué attack in 1988. Following 
the success of that reconciliation, the more difficult intra-Kanak reconciliation between 
the families of the assassinated leaders, Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwéné Yeiwéné and 
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their assassin Djubelli Wéa was also achieved. Mediation involved the entire 
community under the guidance of leaders from the major Churches. According to 
Kanak custom, time was allowed for grieving, for the acceptance of the death, and for 
the ascension of the dead from earth to the living world of the ancestors. It is this belief 
in eternal life that binds custom and Christianity, the two major pillars of Kanak life, 
which, it is clear, need to be included in any deliberative process.  
This throws into sharp relief the enormous cultural divide between the French and the 
Kanak. Although the general modus operandi of the French peacemakers was force, 
coercion, incarceration and legal statutes, French Socialist Governments have provided 
some notable exceptions: Georges Lemoine opened the way to discussion by bringing 
the rival parties together at Nainville-les-Roches; Michel Rocard realised the necessity 
for dialogue and religion leading to the Matignon Accords, but in opting for economic 
development rather than political emancipation he further divided the Kanak people; 
Lionel Jospin, the Prime Minister at the time of the signing of the Noumea Accord, 
recognised past injustices and advocated the need for social dialogue. While the 
Noumea and Oudinot Accords, a process still underway in New Caledonia, go beyond 
the scope of this thesis, their logic is coherent with the œcumenical spirit that I have 
discussed in detail in relation to the Ouvéa reconciliations. 
In general, the French underestimated the recuperative effect of time, devalued Kanak 
customary values and failed to understand the Christian devoutness of the Kanak. The 
ability of fly-in fly-out mediators to obtain consensus was misjudged and ignorance of 
the pillars of indigenous society—custom and Christianity—proved to be fatal. Given 
this history of conflict and the successes and failures of reconciliation attempts, I hope 
that my thesis might not only provide an analysis of past events but also offer insight 
into possible forms of the future, both in terms of New Caledonian society and 
scholarship on the subject. Future study of New Caledonia might, for example, involve 
further examination of the Kanak approach to conflict resolution and how it might be 
included in the search for future harmony in a common destiny. As decisions are being 
made which will affect the future of the country, the power of the Church could be 
worthy of study—as a reconciliatory partner such as in the Ouvéa reconciliations, as a 
divisive devil’s advocate as witnessed in the mid-20th century scission of the Protestant 
Church, in the overt ÉÉNCIL support for independence, or in the controversial addition 
of Kanaky to ÉÉNCIL. More recently, further dissent within the Protestant Church, 
 212 
reported in the local press, may emphasise a broadening of the Northern Province–
Southern Province divide. This may act as a springboard into further studies of the 
political power of the Church within Melanesian society and the way in which religion 
has been adapted to become linked to customary thought. 
By examining the history of conflict in New Caledonia, its causes and manifestations, 
this study has diagnosed shortcomings in the measures taken to establish peace and 
reconciliation. The traumas of the past continue to haunt the indigenous population, and 
as long as there may be failure to address the legacy of colonialism, exclusion of the 
Kanak from the decision-making process, and devaluation of religion and custom within 
the Kanak community, future peace and reconciliation will remain in limbo. As New 
Caledonia approaches a referendum to determine its future status—independence or 
continued association with France—, achieving reconciliation in this deeply divided 
community remains both an official goal and a problematic ideal.  
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APPENDIX   
Maps of the Tribes of New Caledonia361 
 
Grande Terre north  
                                                
361 Maps taken from Filippi, O & Angleviel, F (eds)  2000a, Chroniques du pays Kanak : Société Kanak, 
Vol. 1, Éditions Planète Mémo, Noumea. 
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